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This paper investigates whether China's R&D tax deduction policy triggers firms to manipulate their R&D expenditures upward.

This paper employs the ratio of actual tax savings as a proxy for the benefits of the R&D tax deduction policy based on manually collected and systematically cross-checked data. The relationship between tax benefits and abnormal R&D spending is estimated in a sample of Chinese A-share listed companies for the period 2007–2018.

The findings suggest that tax deductions lead to positive abnormal R&D spending and that this deviation in R&D spending may be attributed to firms' upward R&D manipulation for tax avoidance. The results also indicate that this behavior is more significant for the period after the policy revision, in non-HNTEs (high and new technology enterprises), and in firms with a high ratio of R&D expenses.

It is difficult to establish a sophisticated and unified model to identify the specific strategy of upward R&D manipulation that firms use to obtain tax benefits.

Managers should take into account upward R&D manipulation when designing governance mechanisms. Policymakers in developing countries may further pursue preferential tax policies that cover every stage of innovation activities gradually; the local provincial governments need to leverage their proximity and flexibility advantages to develop a tax collection and administration system.

This study contributes to the understanding of the complex effect of R&D tax incentives and helps more fully illuminate firms' upward R&D manipulation behavior from the perspective of tax planning strategies, which are underexplored in previous research.

Contract Manufacturers (CM, factory) can cultivate factory brand products by imitating Original Equipment Manufacturers' (OEM, brand owner) National Brand products, and compete with OEM through the online retailer, that is, factory encroachment. In practice, few consumers can identify the quality of those two products in the online market. Implementing blockchain technology (BTI) can help all consumers identify product quality but may change the operation decisions and incur implementation costs. This study aims to explore how will the BTI strategies affect participants' operation performance under the factory encroachment and delve into the decisions regarding NB product quality and CM encroachment.

This study constructs a three-level outsourcing supply chain comprising one contract manufacturer (CM, factory), one original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and one online retailer. By utilizing the Stackelberg game, the authors first compared the results between two strategic decisions of BTI and no-BTI by online retailers under the factory encroachment scenario. Then, the NB product quality decision and the CM's encroachment decision are also investigated.

BTI strategy can benefit all participants (triple win), which both occurs in exogenous and endogenous quality cases, and the triple win area will expand (shrink) as the BTI cost decreases (increases). In addition, the OEM will improve product quality to confront competition from the CM, and the OEM may not always benefit from the BTI, it depends on the maturity of the market. Interestingly, BTI could improve the consumer surplus when the proportion of novice consumers is low. Finally, this study also investigates the extended case that CM always encroaches into the market whether the online retailer choose BTI or not, which hurts OEM's profit and decreases the product quality.

This study sheds light on the strategic decisions of online retailers' BTI regarding supply chain members' profits, consumer surplus and social welfare under factory encroachment. It also demonstrates that the BTI strategy, under different quality decisions (endogenous and exogenous), can be more profitable for chain members and consumers.