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Purpose – Study the firm-level and country-level determinants of US institutional investors' holdings in American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) from emerging markets.

Methodology/approach – We use a sample of 112 firms from emerging markets that listed as ADRs between 1990 and 2005. Rather than adopting the issuer's perspective, we take in this study the point of view of the investor and we focus on the US institutional investors' participation in ADR firms.

Findings – We find that institutional investors hold higher stakes in foreign firms that are listed on more restrictive exchanges, in large, privatized, more liquid, and more transparent firms. Mutual investors and other institutional investors also prefer firms from countries with weaker institutional environments and from civil law legal tradition. Controlling for country-level determinants increases significantly the explanatory power of the model.

Social implications – Our results have important implications for firms from emerging markets seeking to attract foreign institutional investors.

Originality/value of the chapter – We focus on the motivations of investors when they choose to invest in the ADR, rather than on the ADR issuer motivation. In addition, we consider all types of institutional investors that acquire a participation in an ADR firm.

Institutional investors have increasingly gained importance since the early 1990s. The assets under management in these funds have increased threefold since 1990 to reach more than US$45 trillion in 2005, including over US$20 trillion in equity (Ferreira & Matos, 2008). Further, the value of institutional investors' assets represents roughly 162.6% of the OECD gross domestic product in 2005 (Gonnard, Kim, & Ynesta, 2008). Given the magnitude of institutional investors' holdings relative to the world market capitalization, challenging questions on the economic role of these investors have been raised. One such question concerns their impact on the stability of stock markets. On the one hand, active strategies of buying and selling shares by these investors may contribute to moving stock prices away from their fundamental values. On the other hand, if all institutional investors react to the same information in a timely manner, they are in fact helping to increase market efficiency by speeding up the adjustment of prices to new fundamentals (for competing theories on the role of institutional investors, see, e.g., Lakonishok, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1992). This view of institutional investors as “efficiency drivers” generated considerable debate for many years (see, e.g., Ferreira & Laux, 2007; French & Roll, 1986).

The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of Shariah Advisory Board (SAB), Audit committee (AC) and board of directors (BD) characteristics on the performance of Islamic banks (IBs) in the MENA region.

The paper employs a quantitative approach, utilizing both ordinary least squares (OLS) regression and panel data analysis (random effects models) to examine the relationship between corporate governance variables and the performance of IBs. The sample consists of 50 IBs from 10 countries, spanning a seven-year period (2010–2016), with the exclusion of the Covid-19 pandemic period. To ensure the robustness of the results, various sensitivity tests were conducted, including pooled regression OLS and subsample analysis based on adhering to the Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) standards.

The study's findings suggest that the size of the SAB and the membership of at least one member of the SAB on the AAOIFI have a notable adverse effect on the performance of IBs. On the other hand, the AC independence has a positive influence on bank performance. However, there was no significant impact observed for AC size, meeting frequency and BD characteristics on bank performance. The research also revealed nuanced relationships between governance variables and bank performance when analyzing the sample based on AAOIFI adoption. Among banks not adhering to AAOIFI standards, SAB size and CEO duality negatively affected return on assets, while AC independence positively impacted it. For AAOIFI-compliant banks, AC independence significantly improved bank performance, whereas AC meetings exhibited a negative effect. Furthermore, there were no significant relationships observed for return on equity among banks not adhering to AAOIFI standards, whereas AAOIFI-compliant banks experienced positive impacts from AC independence. These results offer valuable insights into the intricate connection between governance attributes and bank performance, particularly in the context of AAOIFI standards adoption.

The study's findings have important practical implications for various stakeholders in the Islamic banking industry. For bank practitioners and management, the study highlights the significance of enhancing the independence of AC to improve decision-making and risk management, leading to better bank performance. Moreover, careful selection of SAB members can mitigate potential negative effects on performance. Policymakers may consider promoting AAOIFI standards to shape the relationship between governance and bank performance. Investors can use the insights to make informed decisions, and banks with stronger governance may attract more investments.

Through quantitative analysis and AAOIFI-based sample division, this study adds to the growing literature on corporate governance and the performance of IBs by examining the impact of multiple corporate governance variables on the performance of IBs in the MENA region. To provide a theoretical basis for this relationship, three theories, namely agency, stewardship and stakeholder theories, are employed and discussed.