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This paper is a dedication to Professor Ngo Van Long who introduced the idea of Kant–Nash equilibrium. The author extends this analysis to the study of adult and child labor markets.

This is a game theoretic analysis of the market for adult and child workers when some firms behave in the neoclassical Nashian way and some firms follow a Kantian social norm.

The presence of Kantian firms in the output market in addition to Nashian lowers industry output and labor demand. This raises the possibility that Kantian behavior in the output market could lower wages sufficiently and increase the incidence of child labor. If firms engage in Kantian behavior in the labor market by not hiring child workers, adult wage rises but could lower child wage as children if they work can only work for Nashian firms. When labor demand is sufficiently high, more Kantians could raise adult wage above subsistence and eliminate child labor supply.

This is the first paper to apply Kant–Nash equilibrium to the labor market. The result that Kantian behavior could have an unintended negative spillover effect in other markets is new. The paper keeps alive the ideas of Professor Long, which hopefully will stimulate further work and build on his ideas.

This edited volume has its genesis in a conference entitled New Paradigms in Economics of Welfare and Trade under Globalisation and Regionalisation. Held at the Coogee campus of the Australian School of Taxation (Atax), University of New South Wales (Sydney, Australia) from 8th to 10th August 2006, this conference brought together economic theorists from around the globe to celebrate Murray Kemp's 80th birthday. Conference participants and presenters included a former teacher, colleagues, co-authors, senior academics and many former students of Murray. After a two-year gestation period, the volume has finally been published. Half of the chapters in this book are derived from papers presented at the conference. The remaining half of the book consists of invited papers completed after the conference. All chapters in this volume were subjected to a formal reviewing and revision process.

Purpose – In this chapter we study the welfare effects of relaxing government restrictions on bidding by foreign firms for government procurement contracts.

Methodology – We use a modified version of the Tullock model of rent contests. Firms spend resources to influence decisions of awarding contracts. We consider the case where firms are heterogeneous in terms of lobbying effectiveness.

Findings – The opening of the bidding opportunities to foreign firms can, under certain conditions, improve social welfare of the liberalizing country. The gain partly comes from reduced aggregate domestic lobbying efforts, which implies lower social waste, and partly from tax revenue on the profits of winning foreign firms.

Practical implications – Our analysis indicates that when negotiating on opening up trade in services, governments should take into account the effects of foreign entry on domestic lobbying costs.

Purpose − The principal aim of this chapter is to present a comprehensive and critical review of Murray Kemp's contributions to the discipline of international trade and welfare economics.

Methodology/Approach − This chapter employs the critical literature review approach, including archival analysis and face-to-face interviews.

Findings − It is shown that Kemp has been a key player in the modernization of trade theory. In particular, he has extended the theorems of gains from trade in many different directions and under the most general conditions.

Practical implications − In surveying Kemp's research contributions this chapter provides a useful overview of the development of the normative theory of trade. It also examines a number of methodological issues that may prove to be useful to economic theorists.