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The importance of service firms cooperating with digital platforms is widely acknowledged. The authors study three contractual relationships (fixed-cost, cost-sharing, and profit-sharing) between service firms (specifically hotels) and digital platforms in a highly fragmented service supply chain to examine which of these contract types optimizes profits.

The authors extend prior models analyzing the optimal expected total profit from the travel service firm (hotel)–digital platform relationship, providing new insights into each contract type’s ability to coordinate decentralized systems and optimize profits for both parties.

This study finds that fixed cost contracts cannot coordinate the decentralized system. Cost-sharing contracts can coordinate the decentralized system but only allow one channel profit split. In contrast, profit-sharing contracts may not always perfectly coordinate the decentralized system but support alternative profit allocations. Practically, both profit-sharing and cost-sharing contracts are preferable to fixed-cost contracts.

The paper includes implications for travel service firm managers to consider when structuring contracts with digital platforms to focus on profit optimization. Profit-sharing contracts are most preferable when cost and revenue data are fully shared between parties, while cost-sharing contracts are preferable over fixed-cost contracts.

This study extends prior investigations into the utility of different contract types on the optimal profit of a travel service firm (hotel)-digital platform provider relationship. The research fills a gap in the literature concerning the contracts used in these relationship types.

This study aims to understand client food preferences and how pantry offerings can be optimized by those preferences.

This study develops and administers customized surveys to study three food pantries within the Second Harvest Food Bank of Northwestern North Carolina network. This study then categorizes food items by client preferences, identifies the key predictors of those preferences and obtains preference scores by fitting the data to a predictive model. The preference scores are subsequently used in an optimization model that suggests an ideal mix of food items to stock based upon client preferences and the item and weight limits imposed by the pantry.

This study found that food pantry clients prefer fresh and frozen foods over shelf-friendly options and that gender, age and religion were the primary predictors. The optimization model incorporates these preferences, yielding an optimal stocking strategy for the pantry.

This research is based on a specific food bank network, and therefore, the client preferences may not be generalizable to other food banks. However, the framework and corresponding optimization model is generalizable to other food aid supply chains.

This study provides insights for food pantry managers to make informed decisions about stocking the pantry shelves based on the client’s preferences.

An emerging topic within the humanitarian food aid community is better matching of food availability with food that is desired in a way that minimizes food waste. This is achieved by providing more choice to food pantry users. This work shows how pantries can incorporate client preferences in inventory stocking decisions.

This study contributes to the literature on food pantry operations by providing a novel decision support system for pantry managers to aid in stocking their shelves according to client preferences.

The purpose of this study to improve the efficiency of customer acquisition and retention through the design of salary information disclosure mechanism.

This study develops a stylized game-theoretic model of delegating customer acquisition and retention, focusing on how firms choose delegation and wage information disclosure strategy.

The results confirm the necessity for enterprises to disclose salary information. When sales agents are risk neutral, firms should choose multi-agent (MA) delegation and disclose their wages. However, when agents are risk averse, firms may disclose the wages of acquisition agents or both agents in MA delegation, depending on the uncertainty of the retention market.

This paper contributes to the literature on delegation of customer acquisition and retention and demonstrates that salary disclosure can be used as a supplement to the incentive mechanism.