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To examine whether Japanese commercial banks exhibited economies of scale and economies of density at the time when the mega‐merger wave in Japanese banking began in the late 1990s. Since this merger wave has not yielded efficiencies, this analysis aims to shed light on whether banks, at the start of the wave, had reason to believe that larger banks would be more efficient.

Using a modified version of the translog cost function, the analysis estimates economies of scale and economies of density for Japanese city banks, trust banks, and regional banks. Then, the relationship between size and economies of scale/density and that between profitability and scale/density are explored using regression analysis.

Results suggest that larger banks (as measured by value of assets/loans/ deposits/investments, and number of employees/branches) were more likely to be in the decreasing/constant returns to scale/density region than smaller banks, The finding was statistically significant for all three types of Japanese banks. On average, city banks exhibited diseconomies of scale/density; trust banks exhibited constant returns to scale and increasing returns to density, and regional banks exhibited increasing returns to scale and density. This suggests that unions between city banks and either regional banks or trust banks may have been more likely to yield cost‐efficiencies, and raises questions concerning the efficiency motivations of the mega‐bank mergers. The findings further indicate that banks with higher sales were more likely to have exploited scale/density efficiencies, and that banks with higher net incomes were more likely to be in the increasing returns region.

This paper suggests that the mega‐merger wave in Japan in the late 1990s may not have been motivated by a desire for greater efficiencies through utilization of under‐utilized branch networks. Unlike other studies, this analysis differentiates between economies of scale and economies of density.

The purpose of this paper is to examine whether the online auction mechanism in the USA is more effective at pricing initial public offerings (IPOs) than the traditional book building process.

The analysis compares the performance of online auction IPOs with traditional IPOs issued in the same industry area and in the same year to assess the differences in first day mispricing and its persistence. The paper compares the characteristics of firms choosing the auction process relative to the traditional process. It also uses regression models to examine whether online auction IPOs had a significantly lower first day price increase than traditional IPOs.

The results indicate that for 60 percent of the auction IPOs, over 40 percent of the traditional IPOs issued in that year and in that three‐digit Standard Industry Classification (SIC) area had greater mispricing. The mispricing of online auction IPOs relative to traditional IPOs persist over time for 50‐80 percent of online auction IPOs. Regression analyses controlling for industry effects, year effects, size of the issue, and type of traditional underwriter (low, medium, and high volume underwriters) suggest that the auction's first day price surges are not significantly lower than those of traditional underwriters. Moreover, high volume traditional underwriters have statistically significantly higher first day price surges than low volume traditional underwriters, supporting the theory that they intentionally misprice to benefit their preferred clients. Firms choosing the auction process tend to be smaller in terms of the number of shares of their IPO and their annual sales than firms choosing the traditional IPO process. There is some overlap in industry sector and age, although this varies by year.

This paper suggests that the auction process may not be as efficient in pricing IPOs as was initially intended and that there are opportunities for further innovation and improvement.