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According to Clark (1935a, b), if the various studies on the secondary effects of public works expenditures are examined, two main approaches to the analysis of the problem are revealed: “one via successive cycles of income and spending by ultimate recipients of income” – which the Columbia economist termed the “Kahn-Keynes” approach – “the other via the volume of money and its velocity of circulation.” As is well known, in the first approach, business fluctuations are seen primarily as a consequence of fluctuations in current investment. Accordingly, the amount of the secondary effects is determined by: (a) the amount of the net increase in investment; (b) the marginal propensity to consume; and (c) the length of the income propagation period. As it appears from the above, in the “Kahn-Keynes” analysis of the secondary expansion, money plays only a passive role.

In a recent paper (Fiorito & Vernengo, 2009), the present writers have dealt with John Maurice Clark's contribution to macroeconomics in the 1930s with a special, but not exclusive, emphasis on its relationship to the Keynesian revolution. The general framework of Clark's aggregate analysis can be traced in a series of scattered contributions centering on the efficacy and consequences of countercyclical fiscal policy. Albeit offering a qualified support for a program of public works, Clark was concerned with the inflationary consequences of Keynesian policies, once the economy approached full employment. Clark was also dissatisfied with those interpretations of the income flow analysis, which came to be known as “Hydraulic Keynesianism” that led to the development of the so-called neoclassical synthesis.

Global imbalances and financial crisis discussed in the preceding chapters were not the only contemporary issues that shaped the current and future landscape of the world economy. Since 2004, many countries also felt a significant shock prompted by a surge in the oil price, forcing them to look for the appropriate policy response that would produce least pain and minimum impact on welfare. The fact that oil remains an important source of energy for many countries, developed and developing alike, a price surge can trigger a new round of global conflicts. Indeed, from the hording of grain in Neolithic times to rivalry over resources in the interimperial wars of the 16th–19th centuries that laid the groundwork for World War I, and to modern nations warring over oil, competition and the desire to have a control over the possession of critical sources of vital materials had always been at the center of conflicts from the very beginning of human story. To prop up their industrialization, for a long period of time developed countries had relied on a stable supply of oil, making their political and strategic relations with oil-producing countries so critical, yet fragile and crisis prone. Conflicts and wars over oil were fought among the oil-producing countries as well.¹ Although it was not admitted by the U.S. administration, at least not publicly, the desire to have greater control over oil was also the primary reason for the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq.

The theory of the monetary circuit, as developed in its most powerful form by Graziani (1989), has made a significant contribution to the analysis of credit money in Marxian economics. A key issue is the extent to which circuit theory fails to take into account the relationship between sectors producing capital and consumption goods. In Marx’s reproduction schema, how much money do capitalists need to advance in order for exchange between sectors to balance, and for the circuit to be closed? The purpose of this paper is to address this issue by examining different models of the monetary circuit, each of which has a textual grounding in Marx’s often contradictory musings in Capital, Volume 2.

Alongside alternative conceptions of the circuit of money, different interpretations exist about the role of the multiplier, which can be nested in Marx’s reproduction schema. The problem, from a Marxian point of view, is that in the existing literature investment is usually confined to the capital goods sector. It can be argued that Marx, for the most part, viewed investment as involving accumulation in both departments of production. Using a multiplier framework, derived from input-output technology, this wider treatment of investment is considered as an alternative way of modelling the circulation of money. In addition to contributing to Marxian analysis of the money circuit, this approach could also be more accessible to a wider Post Keynesian audience, since a scalar Keynesian multiplier is employed.

The scientific correspondence between Harrod and Robertson was initiated by Harrod’s criticism of Robertson’s Banking Policy and the Price Level (1926).⁷ Harrod first wrote on 18 May 1926 (letter 2) raising at once the following “salient point”: Much of your argument depends on the view that justifiable expansions and contractions as defined by you are desirable. Why are they desirable? You give reasons on p. 22 why you think some instability in output desirable. But the reasons mentioned there (and I can’t find any others) don’t seem particularly directed to show that the special form of instability constituted by the so-called “justifiable” expansions and contractions is desirable. They seem to me to show that perhaps some instability, that, presumably, of less degree than we have been accustomed to in the past, is good, but by no means precisely how much is good. Thus, suppose the “hypothetical group member” or “the actual workman” of p. 19 were able to govern output according to their own self interest, there would still, according to the arguments of ch. 2, be some instability. Would not that be enough? Or if you want more, why stop at the “justifiable”? Why not have some of that due to “secondary” causes? It seems to me that you have been led away by purely aesthetic interests to identify that more moderate amount of instability which we really need (as shown on p. 22.) with that which we would get: (i) if secondary causes were removed; and (ii) if control of output stayed where it is now – in the hands of the entrepreneur. I don’t see how you can say to the banks more than “damp down fluctuation a bit, but leave some fluctuation, as that is healthful for the body economic”.He added two notes to his letter, in the first of which he commented upon the four proposed courses of policy outlined by Robertson on pp. 25–26 of his book. In the second note Harrod suggested that Robertson’s calculations in Appendix I to Ch. 5 of Banking Policy assumed the following behaviour of the public: (i) People do not allow for the effect of their withholding on the price level (this is reasonable). (ii) They are ignorant as the future course of inflation (or do nothing to meet it). (iii) On this basis they decide what withholding is necessary to restore H, decide that it would be too much effort to restore it at once, and…spread the restoration over K – 1 days. It so happens that by choosing K – 1 their 2 errors (or failures to take everything into account) cancel each other out, and they do effect the restoration in that time. If K or K – 2 had been chosen, this would not have been so.Harrod further argued that Robertson’s “so-called reasonable assumption of a restoration in K – 1 days is purely arbitrary,” and that “all this reasoning is rendered of doubtful value by the fact that we must suppose an alteration in view as to ‘the appropriate proportion between Real Hoarding and Real Income’ during the process of inflation. Not only will people not replenish H at once, but they may well voluntarily reduce it.”