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The purpose of this paper is threefold; first, to give a background to the security of payment problem in the New South Wales construction industry and the problem giving rise to the Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Amendment Act 2010 (NSW) (“2010 Amendment Act”); second, to provide an analysis of the operation of the 2010 Amendment Act; and finally, to address the main implications of the amendments for the three parties involved, namely the claimant, the respondent and the “Principal contractor”.

A review of the relevant literature was undertaken on the security of payment problem in the NSW construction industry and the problem giving rise to the 2010 Amendment Act. A “black‐letter” approach is adopted to analyse and explain the provisions contained in the 2010 Amendment Act. At the time of writing, no case law relevant to the amendments had been published.

The amendments brought about by the 2010 Amendment Act add appreciably to the scope of the Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 1999 (NSW). The effect of the procedure under the 2010 Amendment Act is similar to that under the Contractors Debts Act 1997 (NSW). The 2010 Amendment Act enables a claimant to “freeze” money in the hands of the Principal contractor pending an adjudication, thereby increasing the chance of recovery of the adjudicated amount by the claimant. If, under this new procedure, the Principal contractor fails to “freeze” the monies, the Principal contractor will be liable (along with the respondent) for the amount owed to the claimant. There is a potential for the amendments to be used unfairly by claimants to coerce settlement of unmeritorious payment claims.

The analysis of the 2010 Amendment Act presented in this paper may be of interest in international jurisdictions where statutory adjudication for the construction industry has been introduced or is being contemplated.

The purpose of this paper is to outline a proposal for a Dual Scheme model of statutory adjudication for the Australian building and construction industry.

The paper deals with the security of payment problem in the Australian construction industry and the legislative response to that problem in New South Wales and elsewhere more generally. The paper highlights deficiencies in current adjudication schemes in Australia and proposes a revised methodology of adjudication by means of the proposed Dual Scheme model. The Dual Scheme is explained in detail and examples are given showing how the Dual Scheme would work in practice.

The Dual Scheme of adjudication allows for adjudication of “progress claims” (just as they are adjudicated now under the “Defined Scheme”), but also provides for separately adjudicated “money claims” in a similar way to that done under the “Non‐specific Scheme”. Both parties to a construction contract can take advantage of adjudication under a Non‐specific Scheme whilst simultaneously maintaining the relative time and cost benefits of the Defined Scheme in dealing with progress payment claims. Implementation of the proposed Dual Scheme would require new legislation.

The Dual Scheme is not a proposal to merely amalgamate two existing models of adjudication in Australia. Rather, it is a Dual Scheme incorporating the philosophy of two disparate systems of adjudication framed in a companionable form. It is hoped that the Dual Scheme may act as a common starting point for eventual agreement between the various interested groups as to what a national scheme of statutory adjudication in Australia will resemble in the future. The Dual Scheme proposal may be of interest in other jurisdictions where statutory adjudication for the construction industry has been introduced or is being contemplated.

In Australia, compulsory rapid adjudication under the Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 1999 (NSW) (or the equivalent legislation another Australian State or Territory) is a common way that payment claims under commercial construction contracts are decided. Construction contracts often contain penalty clauses. In particular, time bar clauses have been used to impose a penalty upon claimants and are frequently raised by a respondent as a reason for withholding payment. In the recent case of Andrews v. Australia and New Zealand Banking Group [2012] HCA 30 (“the Andrews case”), decided by the high court of Australia, the court has described how Australian courts must deal with penal provisions in contracts. The purpose of this paper is to consider the effectiveness of time bar clauses in the light of the penalty doctrine enunciated in the Andrews case.

A “black‐letter” approach is adopted to analyse and explain the effectiveness of time bar clauses in the light of the penalty doctrine enunciated in the Andrews case.

In the Andrews case, the high court decided that a penalty may arise where there is a stipulation in a contract in favour of a second party and upon the failure of that stipulation (the primary stipulation) there is a secondary stipulation that imposes on the first party an additional detriment to the benefit of the second party. If the second party can be compensated for the failure of the primary stipulation then to the extent that the additional detriment imposed on the first party exceeds that compensation, it is a penalty. In the context of time bar clauses, if a construction contract provides that when one party (the first party) fails, within a time prescribed by the contract, to give the other party (the second party) notice of a claim for extra remuneration or an extension of time, the consequence is that the first party forfeits an entitlement to be paid money that the party would otherwise be entitled to claim, or the first party becomes liable to pay the second party money, the penalty doctrine might apply.

The penalty doctrine is applicable to all contracts. The analysis of the Andrews case presented in this paper may be of interest in international jurisdictions, particularly where statutory adjudication for the construction industry has been introduced or is being contemplated.

The study here responds to the view that the crucial problem in strategic management (research) is firm heterogeneity – why firms adopt different strategies and structures, why heterogeneity persists, and why competitors perform differently. The present study applies complexity theory tenets and a “neo-configurational perspective” of Misangyi et al. (2016) in proposing complex antecedent conditions affecting complex outcome conditions. Rather than examining variable directional relationships using null hypotheses statistical tests, the study examines case-based conditions using somewhat precise outcome tests (SPOT). The complex outcome conditions include firms with high financial performances in declining markets and firms with low financial performances in growing markets – the study focuses on seemingly paradoxical outcomes. The study here examines firm strategies and outcomes for separate samples of cross-sectional data of manufacturing firms with headquarters in one of two nations: Finland (n = 820) and Hungary (n = 300). The study includes examining the predictive validities of the models. The study contributes conceptual advances of complex firm orientation configurations and complex firm performance capabilities configurations as mediating conditions between firmographics, firm resources, and the two final complex outcome conditions (high performance in declining markets and low performance in growing markets). The study contributes by showing how fuzzy-logic computing with words (Zadeh, 1966) advances strategic management research toward achieving requisite variety to overcome the theory-analytic mismatch pervasive currently in the discipline (Fiss, 2007, 2011) – thus, this study is a useful step toward solving the crucial problem of how to explain firm heterogeneity.