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This study examines the impact of chief executive officer (CEO) power, institutional investors and their interaction on green financing provided by Bangladeshi financial institutions and the moderating effect of government policy and CEO political connections on these relations.

We employ ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions and interaction terms among variables of interest for the empirical analysis.

Green financing decreases with CEO power, implying that CEOs of this country’s financial institutions are averse to green loans, whereas institutional investors increase green financing extended by these institutions. The government policy, which includes financial incentives for complying financial institutions, strengthens institutional investors' positive impact on green financing, but it does not change CEOs' aversion to green loans. Institutional investors have a positive moderating effect on the relationship between green finance (GF) and CEO power, but this positive moderating effect is negated in banks where the government owns a stake, possibly because CEOs of state-owned financial institutions are politically connected, which reduces institutional investors’ influence over them.

This study is unique in that it is the first to examine how the interaction among different stakeholders affects green financing in a unique setting. As the literature is almost silent on this topic, the findings of this paper are expected to raise policymakers’ awareness of the obstacles that hamper the efforts of developing countries to go green.

This study examines the impact of profitability, firm size and leverage on corporate tax avoidance in Bangladesh, an emerging South Asian economy.

A balanced panel data of 62 firms from Dhaka and Chittagong stock exchanges in Bangladesh from 2009 to 2020 were used to run the regression. This study employed the fully modified ordinary least squares (FMOLS) and dynamic ordinary least squares (DOLS) to examine the hypotheses.

The findings show that large firms positively impact corporate tax avoidance. Similarly, profitability and leverage are positively associated with tax avoidance, and the results are significant. Furthermore, the study conducts robustness tests that confirm the findings.

The use of cash effective tax rate (ETR) to investigate firms’ tax avoidance practices poses some limitations, and the results should be interpreted cautiously.

The current study may help policymakers better enhance tax collection from business firms. The findings could serve as a valuable input for effectively monitoring tax collection from large profit-earning firms.

To the authors' best knowledge, this is the first historical attempt in Bangladesh to use panel data to examine the relationship between the firm’s level characteristics and corporate tax avoidance. Panel data often provides greater flexibility with large data, simplifying calculation and statistical analysis.