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Based on earnings management (EM) practices, the purpose of this research is to analyze their market social consequences on corporate reputation. Moreover, this paper illustrates this impact in the context of family firms which are led and controlled by family members, whose main interest is the long-run survival through succession.

A sample comprising 1,169 international listed companies for the period 2006-2010 was used.

The empirical evidence shows the negative impact of these discretionary accounting practices on corporate image. However, family firms have more incentives for controlling and monitoring managerial decisions, avoiding information asymmetries and, thus, EM behavior and their subsequent loss of reputation. Therefore, fewer negative effects on corporate reputation are observed in highly concentrated ownership structures as a result of the negative link between family control and EM.

This study presents a number of contributions because of its focus on specific discretionary practices and on family firms. This study contributes to previous literature on family firms, as previous papers do not tend to focus on EM issues. Moreover, in contrast to most of the studies that have focused on only one country, we use an international panel database. This leads to potentially more powerful and generalized results. In addition, this paper is the first attempt (to the authors' knowledge) to study the possible impact of EM on corporate reputation in the family firm context.

This paper considers the association between family firms and managerial discretion, hypothesising that a higher degree of family ownership may decrease the conflict of interest between owners and managers, thus avoiding the risk of discretionary actions by the latter.

Our empirical analysis is based on a large sample of international listed companies from 20 countries including the Special Administrative Region of Hong Kong and covers the period 2002–2010. Methodologically, we use a logit model with marginal effects on the panel data.

Our analysis shows that family ownership is associated with greater control and monitoring of managerial decisions, thus avoiding information asymmetries and, therefore, the risk of discretionary actions. In other words, family owners impose a stronger discipline and dissuade non-family managers from using managerial discretion to act in their own interest. Finally, we clarify the inconclusive results reported previously about the effects of family ownership on discretionary practices.

Our paper contributes to the family firm literature by providing evidence of the impact of ownership structure on the level of discretionay practices. Furthermore, we explore the differences between family and non-family firms as each group has its own varied characteristics. Moreover, in contrast to most previous studies, which have focused on only one country, we extend the analysis to include an international sample of 20 countries. This leads to potentially more powerful and generalizable results.