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In this chapter, the authors take a close look at the current discourse of food system relocalization. From the perspective of theories of justice and theories of neoliberalism, food relocalization is wrapped up in a problematic, and largely unexamined, communitarian discourse on social justice. The example for California's localized governance of pesticide drift demonstrates that localization can effectively make social justice problems invisible. The authors also look at the EU context, where a different form of localization discourse emphasizes the local capture of rents in the value chain as a neoliberal strategy of territorial valorization. Examining Marsden et al.'s case study of one of these localization projects in the UK, the authors argue that this strategy does not necessarily lead to more equitable forms of rural development. In fact, US and EU discourses are basically two sides of the same coin. Specifically, in neoliberal biopolitical form, they both obscure politics, behind either the discourse of “value” in the EU or “values” in the US. Rather than rejecting localism, however, the authors conclude by arguing for a more “reflexive” localism that harnesses the power of this strategy while consciously struggling against inequality in local arenas.

In this book the terms ‘clean language’ and ‘clean language interviewing’ are written using lower case, according to the convention of the American Psychological Association (sixth edition). ‘Clean language interviewing’ is sometimes abbreviated to CLI.

A climate of austerity has gripped the politico-economic philosophy of many nation states across Europe and beyond as governments seek to rebalance budget deficits. This presents unique challenges for those engaged in purposeful acts aiming to regenerate communities of places – the regeneration managers.

England provides an interesting case study to examine some of the prime challenges facing regeneration managers by focusing on the ideologies that have informed successive UK governments’ policy responses and spatial strategies. The main body of research, including interviews, was carried out between 2010 and 2012, and was subsequently updated in early 2013.

Tracing an apparent transmutation of urban regeneration policy, the chapter helps to unmask a spatially unjust neoliberal toolkit, albeit pierced by some socially motivated actually existing regeneration initiatives. The transmutation of regeneration that has taken place is often concealed by de facto austerity measures and austerity politics.

The programme of interviews remains ongoing, as the research continues to track the shifting contours of state-led regeneration policy. Analysis is therefore provisional and explorative, with more detailed research reports and publications subject to follow.

The chapter explores emerging new agendas and sets out to identify some of the primary challenges that regeneration managers must face.

‘Regeneration’ as a state-led policy objective and political concern has been virtually expunged from the Coalition lexicon. The present policy preference is to target public resources in ‘value-added’ schemes that favour private oriented objectives in a highly unbalanced way.

The curtailment of broader regeneration debates has framed discussions limited to the depth of cuts, the speed of implementation and the spatial distribution of such measures. The result is that regeneration, understood as a capitalist policy instrument intended to respond to and assuage the outcomes produced by capitalist frameworks, is no more.

Social movements are made up of organized groups and individuals working together to accomplish shared objectives. Under what circumstances do active groups build and break their coalitions? Five conditions have been identified in the literature as influencing coalition formation: common identity, resources, organizational structure, historical connection, and institutional setting. Whereas coalition dynamics within a movement wave are best understood in terms of institutional opportunities and threats, further research is needed to determine how and to what extent these contextual elements influence coalitions. This chapter examines how threats posed by indiscriminate and selective repression affect the shape and structure of interorganizational coalitions during the 2019 Anti-Extradition Law Amendment Bill (Anti-ELAB) protests in Hong Kong. The analysis relies on an original political event dataset and an organization-event network dataset. These datasets were produced utilizing syntactic event coding techniques based on Telegram posts, which Hong Kong protesters used to distribute information, plan future actions, and crowdsource news. Furthermore, Telegram provides detailed information about state activities, event-level coalitions, and violent groups, which is difficult to access from other sources. This study investigates the coalition networks across the movement's four stages, each of which was marked by a particular type and degree of repression. The findings indicate that indiscriminate and selective repression have varied effects on coalition networks. A wide coalition disintegrates as a result of indiscriminate repression. Selective repression, however, leads to the formation of coalitions around activist groups targeted by repression.

Since the 1950s, and the steadily growing mobility of people and production (economic activity) as a result of the shift to road traffic, especially in North America, suburban areas have grown rapidly as residential areas and places of (post-industrial) economic activity (Hoffmann-Axthelm, 1998). People moved from ‘the country’ and, especially, the established central cities to the more spacious and cheap to develop peripheral locations. In Europe, differences have emerged on the basis of established planning law and thus availability of land for development, and of historic legacies in the relationship between ‘city’ and ‘country’. Thus, for instance, while in Germany cities were distinctly separate from their surrounding areas in legal terms and land ownership, in Italy, cities have been viewed as ‘owning’ or controlling the surrounding areas to the extent that these are subservient to the cities’ developmental needs (Heitkamp, 1998).

It is not in doubt that pollution prevention and resource efficiency projects can sometimes make good business sense for an individual enterprise. For organizations that have previously done little to address their environmental impacts, some opportunity frequently exists to lessen those impacts while raising production efficiency and keeping their basic approach to business intact. This was the experience of many businesses during the 1980s and the origins of the suggestion that the environment was a “win-win” issue for business (Walley & Whitehead, 1996). Simply updating production equipment can offer a double dividend, which is partly why so many businesses are able to claim they are getting greener while aggregate environmental conditions deteriorate (McDonough & Braungart, 2002). The unresolved issue is whether an ongoing commitment to improve environmental performance is reflected in ongoing gains in business performance. As expressed by one advocate of eco-industrial development, the issue is not about doing the same with less but rather about doing far more with far less (Cohen-Rosenthal, 2003, p. 22).

Refining and updating Harvey’s theorisation of the shift from managerialism to entrepreneurialism, this chapter charts the changing business of entrepreneurial governance through an examination of English economic development practice. Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs), sub-national entrepreneurial governance entities, provide the empirical lens to understand the contemporary role of private interests in the pursuit of public goals in securing innovative approaches to economic development.

Comparative analysis of the strategic priorities, ways of working and interventions of LEPs operating across Greater Birmingham and the North East of England is undertaken against the backdrop of a competitive environment where the mantra is ‘the market knows best’.

The key finding is that while some policy outcomes are prosaic, albeit across contextually distinct entrepreneurial governance places, more innovative policy approaches are emerging.

The chapter shows that there remains value in business involvement in urban governance in its present mode. A more permissive, entrepreneurial mode of governance with the liberation of private enterprise may be leading to imaginative as well as boosterist ways of securing sustainable growth.

The chapter suggests some options for policy-makers and a series of challenges for decision-makers.

This chapter considers how social capital is evolving in the era of globalization today especially under COVID-19 pandemic conditions globally. Definitions of social capital have varied: some broad others narrow. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), for example, currently has a broad research project on social capital. These researchers have defined social capital as comprising four key areas. These areas are:

• Personal relationships, referring to the structure of people’s social networks.

• Depth and breadth of social network support available to each person in their networks.

• Civic engagement activities such as volunteering and community action.

• Beliefs, attitudes, and action frames of reference such as trust and cooperative norms, of reciprocity.

Personal relationships, referring to the structure of people’s social networks.

Depth and breadth of social network support available to each person in their networks.

Civic engagement activities such as volunteering and community action.

Beliefs, attitudes, and action frames of reference such as trust and cooperative norms, of reciprocity.

Thus, there are tacit as well as explicit aspects of social capital though some of these may seldom if ever be articulated and delineated for others.

As Claridge (2020) indicates, there are distinct, but dynamically interrelated, levels of social capital. These levels range between the micro- or individual level. That is personal “habitus” – which Bourdieu (1977) describes as a person’s “taken-for-granted” – ways of being, thinking, and reacting to events and to other people. Then, the next level above the individual is the meso-level, which is “how things are done here amongst us,” that is, the level of a group’s social capital (such as a team, or an organizational or local community level). Lastly, and wider still, the top level is the macro- or cultural-societal structural level of the nation.

The social capital systems in any location encompasses sets of acceptable or culturally legitimated behavioral norms and rules of engagement between community members which include types of greetings, forms of cooperation, communications, and signaling between diverse members. Thus, social capital may be present in the tacit, or unspoken/taken-for-granted assumptions as much as in explicit or formalized codes of behavior. The forms of social interactions at each of the levels may have norms for specific types communication and address in particular sets of circumstances such as social gatherings at home or in public or when attending communal gatherings or ceremonial occasions, or between people of different social status. Social capital generates trust and social cohesion and some level of cultural and attitudinal consensus and interest, which in turn delivers a stable environment for the local community or larger society, business, or the economy.

• (1)

  Social capital is the development of relationships that help contribute to a more efficient production of goods and services as there is embedded trust, embodied in practice, that is, in behaviors regarded as trustworthy and socially helpful.

• (2)

  There are three types of social capital at each level of interaction – bonding, bridging, and linking. Bridging and linking are similar though they operate in different directions socially. Bonding social capital describes the connections between people in similar social levels or groups of people who share the same characteristic norms and beliefs, whereas linking social capital facilitates connects between different groups.

• (3)

  Social capital can therefore make or break businesses, especially small businesses or start-ups as those with the right kind and amount of social capital, such as good connections and contacts in the trade or profession, can usually thrive as they are able to get work done more quickly, effectively, and efficiently. Conversely, a lack of social capital denoting some distrust between groups can undermine social stability.

Social capital is the development of relationships that help contribute to a more efficient production of goods and services as there is embedded trust, embodied in practice, that is, in behaviors regarded as trustworthy and socially helpful.

There are three types of social capital at each level of interaction – bonding, bridging, and linking. Bridging and linking are similar though they operate in different directions socially. Bonding social capital describes the connections between people in similar social levels or groups of people who share the same characteristic norms and beliefs, whereas linking social capital facilitates connects between different groups.

Social capital can therefore make or break businesses, especially small businesses or start-ups as those with the right kind and amount of social capital, such as good connections and contacts in the trade or profession, can usually thrive as they are able to get work done more quickly, effectively, and efficiently. Conversely, a lack of social capital denoting some distrust between groups can undermine social stability.

The meso- or macro-levels of bridging type social capital ensures acceptance of established social roles locally and linking forms of social capital boost levels of acceptance of other roles such as those of leaders and followers.

All three forms of social capital and the three levels are not mutually exclusive but instead are mutually inclusive and interrelated. That is, they co-evolve, each impacting the other while dynamically interacting with the social capital anchored as it is emerging from the complex and interwoven fields of tacit and explicit norms of social interaction underpinning each of the levels of interaction over time.

There has been a tremendous decline in the use of the death penalty in the United States. Recent research using county-level data shows that a small minority of locales in the country account for death sentences and even fewer for executions. Drawing on theoretical work that seeks to account for why these locales continue to use capital punishment, we provide in this chapter a thick description of Maricopa County, Arizona, one of the most active death penalty locales in the contemporary United States. In doing so, we demonstrate how capital punishment operates in a field of violently defended racial boundaries. Our chapter shows the roles of various local actors across time in fortifying such racial boundaries through historical white terrorism and more recent reinforcement of zones of racial exclusion that are embodied especially in communicated fears of “illegal immigrant gangs.” We contend that the case of Maricopa County points to the importance of attending to racist localisms as a catalyst for the continued implementation of the death penalty in the United States.