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Recent theory and research suggests that local relational networks among business organizations play an important role in establishing and preserving a locale's identity. Such networks facilitate the development, dissemination, and enforcement of norms and cognitive frames that guide local business behavior. They also provide a vehicle for the consolidation of local business interests and for the coordination of local business strategic action. We examine the factors that influenced the likelihood that the CEOs of large corporations sat on the board of directors of large locally headquartered commercial banks in the 1960s. We focused on the 1960s because doing so allows us to make use of an exceptional comprehensive data set on the attributes and relationships of large firms and their leaders. We examine connections to commercial banks because these banks played a crucial role in community development in the 1960s. We find that both the class attributes of corporate CEOs (as reflected in their ownership of the firm and their affiliation with elite educational, social, and policy-making institutions) and the organizational attributes of their firms (as reflected in their financial structure, geographic reach, and age) influenced a CEO's propensity to sit on the board of a locally headquartered bank. These results suggest that future research on participation in local relational networks should take into account both class and organizational theories. They also suggest that future research on the class and organizational underpinnings of relational networks should pay closer attention to spatial relations.

This chapter investigates a shock transmission path between a home country (a country where globalized banks’ headquarters are located) and a host country (Indonesia as the emerging market) through the lending channel of global banks’ local branches (i.e., the internal transfer channel). Using novel data of monthly individual foreign bank’s balance sheet in Indonesia, the author finds the evidence that shocks to a parent bank and a home economy are transmitted to a host economy through the foreign banks’ internal capital market. With the Indonesia banks’ capital injections and their difficulty in financing dollar funds without risk premiums since the 1998s crisis, the foreign banks’ dollar lending in Indonesia is a good showcase of internal capital markets. A change in a home stock market index and industrial production appears to have a negative effect on growth rates in foreign currency loans of foreign banks in the host market. On the other hand, high growth rates in the parent bank’s stock price in the home market lead to an increase in foreign banks’ US dollar lending in the host country. This effect does not appear in local currency lending because limited hedging instruments against foreign exchange risk results in immobility of bank capital in the local currency.

Recent institutional scholarship has discovered new possibilities for change in both the accumulation of incremental transformations and in the skillful action, institutional work, and creative activities of political and institutional entrepreneurs. Lurking behind stability and change lie actors who can act reflexively within and with existing institutions, and who do so on a routine, rather than exceptional basis, redeploying, recombining, and transposing extant systems to solve problems of identity and control. This paper probes the potentials and limits of those possibilities – and the prospects for reform in American banking – via a case study of the Bank of North Dakota and efforts to transpose its hybrid model of state and community logics into other states. The analysis first finds a full range of institutional labors and skillful activities emphasized by recent work as the foundation for transposition. It finds crisis; the presence of multiple logics; the mobilization of boundary spanning networks; the use of conferences and theorization to sustain independent discourse and collective identities; skillful framing; and substantial editing and recombination to fit the model with receiving states’ institutions. It then juxtaposes these conditions with outcomes in the states, developing some implications for actor-centered institutionalisms, current preoccupations with mechanisms, and state-level strategies for financial reform.

We distinguish between two forms of local banks that build and maintain legitimacy in different ways: branches and unit banks. Branches gain legitimacy through the parent organization. Unit banks gain legitimacy through the personal reputation and social connections of the founders. Given the different ways in which legitimacy is built by these organizational forms, we think that the rural or urban nature of the community is likely to affect the founding rates of these two forms differently. Rural communities, in which personal and family relationships play an important role in both social and economic life, provide advantages to well-connected founders of unit banks. In these communities social networks serve as a demand buffer for unit banks, making the founding rate of this organizational form less sensitive to fluctuations in the demand for banking services in rural versus urban communities. In contrast, the founding rate of branches may not be greatly affected by the community context because branches gain legitimacy through a sponsoring organization whose legitimating characteristics are not local. Empirical analyses of foundings of local banks between 1976 and 1988 support these predictions. Supplemental empirical analyses also show no evidence of such buffering effect for unit retail establishments, which are expected to be less central in the social networks of rural communities than unit banks. Our results suggest that community organization channels resources to some kinds of organizations at the expense of others and that organizational research in general and organizational ecology in particular will benefit by paying more attention to community context.

The development of banking in Africa followed the demand of exchange networks from traditional indigenous economies to colonial exchange with the European world. The establishment of European banking institutions reflected the needs of the capitalist economy introduced by colonialism. The banking management of late nineteenth century and early twentieth century European banks adhered to the interests of shareholders. This chapter shows the emergence of well-managed banks in Africa, but after decolonization the political economy of African independence resulted in state capturing of financial institutions in most African countries. The South African banking system developed in close adherence to the British model. State-owned post-independence banks in Africa failed to deliver the development envisaged. The chapter shows the adverse impact of global economic developments on Africa, resulting in high debt levels. Structural adjustment of African economies and new market-oriented policies allowed the development of locally owned private banking institutions. The high-cost structure of the formal banking system from the dominant South African banks incentivised the mobile money innovation, an arena where African entrepreneurs lead global markets. Financial inclusion remains low in Africa.

The global recession has strongly affected the credibility of the international banking system, damaging also the real economy.

Developing countries, not fully integrated with international markets, seem less affected and local microfinance institutions might also allow for a further shelter against recession, even if foreign support is slowing down and collection of international capital is harder and more expensive.

Intrinsic characteristics of microfinance, such as closeness to the borrowers, limited risk and exposure and little if any correlation with international markets have an anti-cyclical effect. In hard and confused times, it pays to be little, flexible and simple.

Deregulation and other factors permit and encourage financial institutions to become more integrated, both within their own (financial) industries, such as banking and insurance, and across these industries. Financial regulators have responded with like integration. As financial institutions increasingly compete with firms from other industries and areas, financial regulators similarly compete more across borders. The resulting competition in financial regulation enhances innovation, choice, and efficiency. The advent of home-run regulation, which in general allows financial institutions to adhere only to the financial regulations of their home area and is spreading across the US and Europe, may allow numerous regulatory regimes within a given market.

This paper proposes that if a political system is more like to facilitate a unified government, to establish a strong executive body and to respond to the needs of the majority, financial reforms are more likely to emerge from the policymaking process and produce positive results. On the contrary, political systems that discourage those governing features are less likely to produce reforms. This chapter compares financial reform processes in China, Taiwan and New Zealand. All of them performed low level of financial reforms in the early 1980s but resulted in different situations later. In the mid-2000s, New Zealand heralded the most efficient and stable financial system; while Taiwan lagged behind and China performed the worst. Evidence showed that China’s authoritarian system may be the most superior in forming a unified government with a strong executive, but the policy priority often responds more to the interests of a small group of power elites; therefore the result of financial reform can be limited. Taiwan’s presidential system can produce greater financial reform when the ruling party controls both executive and legislative bodies, but legislative obstructions may occur under a divided government. New Zealand's Westminster system produces the most effective and efficient financial reform due to its unified government and a strong executive branch with consistent and stable supports from the New Zealand Parliament.