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Firms have typically tried to profit from their technical innovations by selling them indirectly, embedded in goods and services. Markets for technology, in which innovations are sold or licensed, have been much rarer. Yet, trade in technology has grown systematically over the past 20 years, as reflected in the growth of arrangements such as licensing agreements, R&D joint ventures, and contract R&D. Recent estimates indicate that royalties received by American corporations for industrial processes may amount to about a quarter of total U.S. R&D. A number of supporting institutions that facilitate effective dissemination of information, standardization, and contracting are vital to the rise and functioning of markets for technology. Intellectual property rights, and in particular patents, are one such institution. The main objectives of this survey are to review critically the literature on the relationship between trade in technology and patent protection, and to assess the contribution of stricter and better-defined patent protection to the emergence of technology markets. We start our survey by providing a tentative taxonomy of markets for technology and some recent evidence on their extent and evolution. We then explore several reasons why firms would be willing to act as suppliers in the market for technology. The core of the survey revolves around the idea that patents facilitate the development of markets for technology in several ways: They enhance the ability of the licensor to extract rents from its innovation; they reduce costs in technology trade by forcing an increased codification of knowledge; they reduce information asymmetries, opportunistic behaviors, and transaction costs. However, the literature also points to some potential costs of stronger patents, including litigation costs and the problem of “anti-commons.” Finally, we explore the implications of patents and markets for technology for entry, competition and industry dynamics.

Recent US federal court rulings have provided new guidance on the use of economic models of bargaining in estimating reasonable royalty damages in patent cases. After reviewing relevant case law and providing an overview of the bargaining range approach, we describe one analytic method (the Rubinstein Bargaining Model) for developing a quantitative starting point with which to divide a bargaining range and explain how it can be tied, at least in part, to the facts and circumstances of the parties around the time of the Hypothetical Negotiation. We also describe how this approach can be used in conjunction with an analysis of other quantitative and qualitative factors related to the bargaining power of the parties, to help estimate reasonable royalty damages.

This chapter explains the structure of two contracts commonly involved in university licensing: the license granting a company (or companies) outside the university rights to make, sell, or lease products or processes based on a university invention, and the nondisclosure agreement (NDA) that plays a role in the license negotiation process. In the context of the Bayh–Dole Act, the chapter explains that license contracts often contain a complex combination of payment terms intended to provide sufficient incentives for licensees to undertake the (often risky) development of embryonic research. The authors relate the intent of the Bayh–Dole Act to the concerns of university licensing professionals who often negotiate licensing agreements. The chapter then examines the same incentive issues (and the universal contract issues of money, risk, control, standards, and endgame) in the context of NDAs, used by potential licensing partners to protect their respective interests while sharing information about a licensable technology. The chapter concludes with an assignment that provides students with an opportunity to evaluate a license, not from the university's perspective but from that of a client interested in licensing an invention owned by the university.

Licensing from US universities is done within the overall legal framework of the Bayh–Dole Act of 1980 and the employment agreements of universities. This chapter explains common contracts used by universities to license technologies developed by their faculty and students within the context of these laws. In addition to the legal framework, the nature of license agreements is affected by the embryonic nature of most university inventions, which necessitates faculty and student involvement in development, and the entrepreneurial goals of the university. Universities have diverse goals in terms of revenue, licenses executed, inventions commercialized, patents filed, and number of startups formed. The somewhat obvious problem is that the goals of faculty, students, the university, and the licensee may not be aligned. Common contracts used are meant to align these goals. While some contracts include multiple terms such as upfront fees, running royalties, annual payments, and equity, Express Licenses are increasingly being used to accommodate the entrepreneurial environment. This chapter discusses these issues and also the importance of the rights to sublicense inventions.

In this paper we look at patents as alternative to trade secrets. We disentangle the disclosure motive for patent protection from the traditional reward motive by adjusting the level of patent protection so as to make the innovator just indifferent between patenting and keeping the innovation secret. Thus, we keep the reward (expected profits) to the innovator fixed and focus on ex post efficiency. When duplication is not feasible and secrecy only entails the risk of public disclosure (a leakage), patents and secrets are perfect substitutes. Yet, a distinctive features of trade secret protection is that it allows for independent creation. The duplicative efforts to reproduce a concealed innovation make patents and secrets imperfect substitutes. If such duplicative efforts are actually exerted under secrecy, patents provide the pre-specified incentive to innovate at least social cost. If, however, the threat of duplication induces the innovator to preemptively license her trade secret, and such licensing agreements allow the innovator to appropriate all the saved duplication costs, then secrets can reward innovative activity more efficiently than patents. Thus, the issue of whether patents are socially preferable to secrets boils down to an assessment of the prevalence and the efficiency of trade secret licensing. The available empirical evidence suggests that licensing of trade secret information is limited and so hints at the superiority of patents.

This chapter provides a selective survey of the theoretical and empirical literature to date on the relationship between intellectual property rights (IPRs) and measures of innovation and international technology transfer. The chapter discusses the empirical implications of theoretical work, assesses the theoretical work based on the evidence available, and identifies some gaps in the existing literature.

The author takes a comprehensive look at the accessibility of e-resources for all people, including those with disabilities, in the context of collection development (CD).

Employing a combination of research methodologies — policy analysis, content analysis, and phone survey—the author explores the extent to which the needs of people with disabilities are considered.

Several professional library organizations recommend accessibility-sensitive selection and procurement procedures. However, not all students enrolled in library school programs might learn about the issue. Few books on the subject cover the issue adequately. Nationwide, CD policies requiring conformance to accessibility standards are the exception; and when librarians meet to make decisions about the selection of specific e-resources, the needs of people with disabilities are rarely on their radar screens.

Researchers conducting similar surveys in the future might want to not only select a statistically more representative sample of academic libraries but also widen their focus and include both accessibility and usability in their investigations.

Textbook authors and course instructors in the area of CD need to address accessibility and usability. Librarians need to raise the issue with database and e-book vendors during license negotiations.

The acquisition of e-resources designed to be accessible and usable for all will enable people with disabilities to participate more fully in our information-driven society.

The data collected provide for a broad discussion of the extent to which the needs of people with disabilities are considered in connection with CD.

Purpose – The cost of new drug development is increasing every year. Pharmaceutical companies use R&D joint ventures, mergers, and outsource different stages of pharmaceutical R&D activities for a faster and cost minimizing method of innovation. Pharmaceutical companies outsource R&D activities to independent small biotech or pharmaceutical companies that specialize in different stages of pharmaceutical R&D. This chapter examines the determinants of the payment structure of research contracts between large bio/pharmaceutical companies and specialized research firms.

Methods – Determinants of R&D contracts are analyzed using detailed R&D contract data between bio/pharmaceutical companies and independent research firms for 10 years. A multinomial logit model is used in order to understand the determinants of three different types of contracts; royalty contracts, fixed payment contracts, and the mixed contracts.

Findings – Under uncertainty, the likelihood of a royalty contract rises for the early stages of the research and with the patent stock of the research firm. It is more likely to observe both royalty and fixed payment if the pharmaceutical client has past contracts with the same research firm. The results also suggest that if Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is more stringent in any disease area in reviewing the new drug application, then the likelihood of signing pure royalty contract decreases.

Implications – Understanding the nature of R&D contracts and the effects of FDA's behavior on the pharmaceutical R&D contract is important because these contracts not only affect the cost of new drug invention but also the quality and the rate of invention.

Value – Results are useful for both the pharmaceutical companies and the economic/business researchers.