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This paper focuses on an analysis of the factors that contribute to differences in political attitudes and political participation of Russian capital owners. Such factors may include different size and type of capital, the degree of past political socialization, the respondents’ age and generational experiences, past/present well-being comparisons and education. The paper begins with a discussion of different theories that make hypotheses about the political behavior of capital owners. These hypotheses were tested in a small, exploratory study of Russian capital owners that I conducted in Russia in the late 1990s. The results of the study are then analyzed within two different but closely interrelated contexts: the wider historical context of social, political and economic changes of the first decade of post-Soviet transformation, and the micro-context of the respondents personal political, economic and social history. In the end, I return to the analyses of the original hypotheses and conclude with a discussion of which theory comes closest to predicting and explaining the results of the study.

This paper examines the origins and the institutions, strategies, and policies of the shift to transition toward capitalism and democracy as the aspired system of political economy of Boris Yeltsin and his supporters in Russia in the early 1990s. The paper argues that this process of radical change is very “rocky”, and that its outcome is not yet clear. The shift from socialist democratization under Gorbachev to capitalist transformation under Yeltsin had multiple origins; but a core element in the process was the very likely abandonment of the ancien régime by party, state, and industrial élites themselves. Key factors in the transition in the early 1990s were: continuity amid change in political leadership and governance institutions; the absence of a developed political party system that could have united Yeltsin and the new Russian parliament; and the underlying socioeconomic conditions and attitudes of the Russian population.

The purpose of this paper is to identify the link between political ideology and the management of tourism in countries. The authors stipulate that the predominant political ideology in the country influences the nature and logic of state interventions in the tourism industry.

The paper elaborates several case studies from various countries – Bulgaria, Cyprus, Scandinavia, Russia, USA, China, Japan, Indonesia, and North Korea.

Countries with predominant (neo)liberal ideology do not typically interfere in tourism regulation, while nationalism leads governments to stimulate inbound and domestic tourism. Communist ideological approaches tend to be burdensome, inhibiting growth while stressing the promotion of the socialist achievements of a country. Countries that are traditionally thought of as social democratic have been evolving in recent years to regulate tourism in ways that are more liberal in nature than social democratic.

Political ideologies shape the acceptability of government support for private tourist companies, legislation in field of tourism, limitation/stimulation of inbound/outbound tourist flows. For the future the authors expect greater politicisation of tourism, active tourism “wars” between countries, greater control of governments on populations, thriving nationalism, “aggressive” environmentalism.

This is one of the first papers to discuss the impact of the political ideology on the management of tourism at the national level.

With a general election due shortly, this article sets out the main platforms of the three main political parties and discusses some of the central proposals and their implications. Policies from all parties are being trimmed to take account of anticipated reductions in public expenditure and have tended to focus on traditional areas of policing and prisons. They also focus on questions of accountability and implementation ‐ the how as opposed to the what things are done. The implications for academics and practitioners are, whatever government takes office later this year, to not only see if it is able to achieve beneficial outcomes but also to start testing its delivery mechanisms against evidence.