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This chapter analyzes the construction of secrecy under the current U.S. export control regime for dual-use technologies and discusses its application for two technologies: research on a class of semiconductors used in military and civilian applications and biotechnology research on select agents. We argue that the assignment of technologies and countries to categories controlled under the export regime is an exercise in creating secret knowledge, in which the broad category of “the other” is subdivided between those who are forbidden to know and those who are not (and thus implicitly are qualified to become a party to the secret). We draw attention to the social cost of errors made in applying these categories, and point to some remaining issues.

Heavy metals play a crucial role in the economic development of any nation. Industries utilizing heavy metals, consequently, emanate a large volume of metal-containing liquid effluents. Since metals are non-renewable and finite resources, their judicious and sustainable use is the key. Hazardous metal-laden water poses threat to human health and ecology. Apart from metals, these industrial effluents also consist of toxic chemicals. Conventional physical–chemical techniques are not efficient enough as it consumes energy and are, therefore, not cost effective.

It is known that biomaterials namely microorganisms, plants, and agricultural biomass have the competence to bind metals, in some cases, selectively, from aqueous medium. This phenomenon is termed as “metal biosorption.” Biosorption has immense potential of becoming an effective alternative over conventional methods. The authors in the present chapter have used secondary data from their previous research work and attempted to develop few strategic models through their feasibility studies for metal sustainability.