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This paper re-examines the relationship between interest rate changes and bank stock returns using the Japanese experience. Specifically, we test the relationship under two different regulatory regimes. During the first regime (1975–1983), there was strict regulation of the financial system and significant oversight of bank activities, whereas the latter regime (1984–1994) represented a period of financial liberalization and interest rate deregulation. The results presented here indicate that interest rate changes negatively affected Japanese bank equity in the post-regulatory period, but not during the period of heavy regulation. Additionally, we also find that most of the short-term rate effects were channeled through volatility proxies while long-term effects were channeled through yield spread and shape effects. These findings represent new and important insights into the relationship between interest rate changes and bank stock returns.

Using a sample of 466 grants of stock options to executives of Japanese firms over the years 1997–2001, this study tests the managerial power theory of compensation design developed by Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker (2002) and Bebchuk and Fried (2004). This theory argues that managers of firms with weak corporate governance will use their “power” to design executive compensation that is “manager-advantageous.” Using our option grants sample, we test to determine if any of the firm's governance mechanisms are able to limit managerial self-dealing with respect to executive stock options. We find that smaller boards and a higher percentage of independent directors are important governance mechanisms for the control of managerial influences in the design of stock-option compensation. An alternative hypothesis, that firms elect to grant advantageously designed options to encourage risk taking by managers, is not supported by our empirical results. Finally, we determine that the market response to the announcements of such grants varies inversely with the extent to which the options are managerially advantageous. Overall, we conclude that managerial power effects are present in the design of executive stock options and that theory of managerial power advanced by Bebchuk et al. holds internationally.

The change in CEO pay after their firms make large corporate investments is examined. Whether the change in CEO pay is a beneficial practice or harmful practice to firms is investigated.

A sample of firms that make large corporate investments is identified. For this sample, we identify the change in CEO pay before and after the investment, and we also measure the pay-for-size sensitivity of these investing firms.

For firms that make large corporate investments, CEOs get significantly more option grants when their firms’ stock returns are negative after the investments and these investing CEOs get more option grants than noninvesting CEOs.

The present study suggests that firms may have to increase CEO pay after large corporate investments to encourage investment. However, the results may also be consistent with an agency cost explanation. Future research should try to distinguish between the two explanations.

The study reveals a potential way to prevent CEOs from underinvesting.

The study provides important insights to shareholders on how to encourage CEOs to get their firms to invest, and on how to view CEO pay increases after their firms invest.

Purpose – The relation between research and development (R&D) expenditures and bondholder wealth is examined.

Methodology/approach – A sample of firms that increase R&D expenditures is partitioned into two subsamples: firms with high default risk versus firms with low default risk. For each subsample, we examine the effect of R&D increases on bond returns and default risks.

Findings – For firms with high default risk, R&D increases have a negative impact on bond returns and default risk. Further, there is a wealth transfer from bondholders to stockholders surrounding R&D increases. Neither of these results is found for firms with low default risk.

Research limitations/implications – The present study highlights the importance of assessing firm's existing default risk to understand the effects that R&D expenditures have on bondholders.

Social implications – The study reveals a potential social welfare and economic cost, as it reveals that stockholders may be able to gain wealth at the expense of bondholders.

Originality/value – The study provides important insights to bondholders on how firms’ investment policies, such as R&D expenditures, may affect their wealth.

Due to the existence of keiretsu networks and influential bank shareholders, managerial-ownership is not viewed as important in Japan. With the recent decline in the power and influence of Japanese banks, this view might now be obsolete. We present evidence that managerial ownership has become an alternative mechanism for corporate governance in Japan. Using 1993 and 1996 data, we find that firms with significant managerial equity ownership are typically non-keiretsu firms and hold less bank debt. Further, these same manager-owned firms exhibit more control potential and make more discretionary expenditures than do other firms. Overall, our findings suggest that managerial equity ownership is a substitute governance mechanism for monitoring by banks and keiretsu.