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At the dawn of the twenty-first century, Boeing and Airbus, the leading manufacturers of large aircraft, were locked in a battle for market share that drove down prices for their new planes. At about the same time, the two industry heavyweights began developing new aircraft families to address the future market needs they each projected.

Aircraft take many years to develop, so by the time the new planes made their inaugural flights, significant changes had occurred in the global environment. First, emerging economies in the Asia-Pacific region and elsewhere were growing rapidly, spawning immediate and long-term demand for more aircraft. At the same time, changes to the market for air travel had created opportunities for new products. These opportunities had not gone unnoticed by potential new entrants, which were positioning themselves to compete against the market leaders.

In October 2007, the Airbus superjumbo A380 made its first flight. The A380 carried more passengers than any other plane in history and had been touted as a solution to increased congestion at global mega-hub airports. Four years later the Boeing 787, a smaller long-range aircraft, was launched to service secondary cities in a point-to-point network.

The case provides students with an opportunity to analyze the profit potential of the global aircraft manufacturing industry in 2002 and in 2011. Students can also identify the actions of participants that weakened or intensified the pressure on profits within the industry.

Audio format (.mp3 file) available with purchase of PDF. Contact cases@kellogg.northwestern.edu for access.

Hedge fund Magnetar Capital had returned 25 percent in 2007 with a strategy that posed significantly lower risk to investors than the S&P 500. Magnetar had made more than $1 billion in profit by noticing that the equity tranche of CDOs and CDO-derivative instruments were relatively mispriced. It took advantage of this anomaly by purchasing CDO equity and buying credit default swap (CDS) protection on tranches that were considered less risky. Now it was the job of Alec Litowitz, chairman and chief investment officer, to provide guidance to his team as they planned next year's strategy, evaluate and prioritize their ideas, and generate new ideas of his own. An ocean away, Ron Beller was contemplating some very different issues. Beller's firm, Peloton Partners LLP, had been one of the top-performing hedge funds in 2007, returning in excess of 80 percent. In late January 2008 Beller accepted two prestigious awards at a black-tie EuroHedge ceremony. A month later, his firm was bankrupt. Beller shorted the U.S. housing market before the subprime crisis hit, and was paid handsomely for his bet. After the crisis began, however, he believed that prices for highly rated mortgage securities were being unfairly punished, so he decided to go long AAA-rated securities backed by Alt-A mortgage loans (between prime and subprime), levered 9x. The trade moved against Peloton in a big way on February 14, 2008, causing $17 billion in losses and closure of the firm.

This case analyzes the strategies of the two hedge funds, focusing on how money can be made and lost during a financial crisis. The role of investment banks as lenders to hedge funds such as Peloton is explored, as well as characteristics of the CDO market and an array of both mortgage-related and credit protection-related instruments that were actively used (for better or worse) by hedge funds during the credit crisis of 2007 and 2008.