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In their well-known contribution to the “varieties of capitalism” debate, Peter Hall and David Soskice (2001, Ch. 1) highlight the distinction between a “coordinated market economy” as exemplified by Germany and a “liberal market economy” as exemplified by the United States. Under the heading, “Liberal Market Economies: The American Case”, Hall and Soskice (2001, p. 27), argue:Liberal market economies can secure levels of overall economic performance as high as those of coordinated market economies, but they do so quite differently. In LMEs, firms rely more heavily on market relations to resolve the coordination problems that firms in CMEs address more often via forms of non-market coordination that entail collaboration and strategic interaction. In each of the major spheres of firm endeavor, competitive markets are more robust and there is less institutional support for non-market forms of coordination.

Outlines the characteristics of Japanese keiretsu (vertically integrated firms interlinked through industrial groups) and reviews the history of financial keiretsu and associated research. Compares the performance of Japanese and US banks 1989‐2000; and examines Japanese bank profit inefficiency by developing a mathematical model and applying it to 1992‐1999 bank data. Shows a “zig‐zag” pattern of profitability change over the period and concludes that the Japanese banking industry is “barely holding its own in profitability”. Points out the particular importance of this to the real economy in Japan and briefly considers the implications for government policy.

How did Japan rise to challenge the U.S. economic supremacy? We argue that the foundation of Japan's rise from a defeated nation in 1945 to an economic powerhouse is the raw materials that Japanese firms have turned into cars, ships, consumer electronics, and of other industrial products. A small island nation that lacked adequate domestic supplies of virtually all the raw materials essential to industrial production became a world leader in the production of steel and of products which required millions of tons per year of raw materials. Japanese firms and the Japanese state turned an apparent material and economic disadvantage, the need to import large volumes of raw materials, into a competitive advantage over the U.S., Europe, and the rest of the world economy by driving down the cost of importing raw materials over long distances. We argue that the strategies of Japanese firms and the Japanese state to resolve the problems of procuring bulk cheaply and reliably from multiple distant locales drove the technical and organizational innovations that underlay Japan's rapid industrial development and restructured the world economy in support of Japan's development. Contrary to claims that globalization supercedes the national state, we find that the actions of the Japanese state, in coordination with firms and industry sectors, were crucial in developing and applying these strategies. The linchpin of these strategies were the MIDAs (Maritime Industrial Development Areas) built on land reclaimed by the Japanese state. This economic success in Japan was also critically dependent on the extraction of billions of dollars of wealth from its raw materials peripheries, most notably Australia, Brazil, and Canada.

Joseph A. Schumpeter advocated a corporatist principle of economic organization enunciated by Pius XI in the encyclical Quadragesimo Anno. Schumpeter insisted that a corporatism of associations could provide social leadership and economic co‐ordination to ensure a stable, high employment economy, while maintaining individual freedom. To implement a corporatist system, moral reform would be necessary. Recently, economists have asserted that post‐war Japan approximates to Schumpeter′s corporatist model. Suggests that Japan′s post‐war economy is in conflict with two of the fundamental features of Schumpeter′s corporatism. First, the problem of resource allocation is often solved by bureaucratic intervention rather than by co‐ordination by private producers. Second, Japanese morals and ethics emphasize group efforts rather than Schumpeter′s requisite individual egoistic ethic. Concludes that the practicality of Schumpeter′s corporatism is not substantiated by post‐war Japan.

In the modern knowledge-intensive economy, a nation’s competitiveness depends on the ability of its constituent firms to innovate. Extant research in national systems of innovation highlights institutions and public policies toward innovation as key determinants that affect firms’ innovation activities. This paper aims to widen the investigation by arguing that co-inventor connectivity allows firms to access the most tacit knowledge within global innovation systems. Therefore, it is one of the key factors that underpin a nation’s ability to develop and sustain its competitiveness.

Using a data set of 406,168 patents from US Patent and Trademark Office during the period of 1975-2004, this study analyzed the Japanese system of innovation through co-inventor networks.

Surprisingly, the authors found that compared to other advanced countries such as Germany and Denmark, the Japanese innovation system is quite closed.

The dimension of tacit knowledge is crucial in the current environment of rapid cycle time, short product lifespans and increasing emphasis on exploratory innovation. Hence the authors speculate that closedness to global innovation systems could be one of the reasons why many of Japan’s traditionally powerful multinational enterprises exhibit weak performance in recent years.

Analyses some of the hidden barriers in exporting to Japan. It looks at Japanese industrial organisation and the role of the large corporations in controlling import and distribution outlets. The Japanese wholesale and distribution system is much larger than would be the case in Europe or North America. There are also differences in patterns of consumer behaviour in Japan compared to Europe. Japan’s Ministry of International Trade and Industry also plays a more active role in the business environment. Also examines the problems involved with negotiating with the Japanese. It looks at a number of the obvious sources of confusion and misunderstanding between Japanese and Westerners during the negotiation process.

This paper presents some rather complicated empirical work employing econometric modelling to demonstrate the validity of a quite simple proposition: the use of a product's price as an indicator of quality is only justified when the market is free of trade barriers and other imperfections. It demonstrates that individuals are well aware of this fact, making use of price as a quality indicator only where trade barriers have not distorted prices. Thus, it is not possible to make very strong generalisations about the existence of a universal price‐quality relationship. The managerial implications of the findings are briefly discussed.

This analysis of the Japanese textile sector illustrates how intra-industry cleavages are becoming an integral feature of Japanese trade policymaking. In the past, a pattern of cross-sectoral variation in trade policy could be observed, as the government protected declining industries at home and sought to open foreign markets for the competitive export sector. The internationalization of Japanese firms, however, has radically affected the articulation of corporate trade policy preferences. There is an ongoing breakdown in solidarity among industry members based on their degree of multinationality and/or their reverse importing strategies. These clashes put contradictory pressures on the Japanese government, making it more difficult to predict the course of trade liberalization in Japan.

Japan has long occupied a unique place in East Asia and continues to do so in an era of increased global interconnectivity. Beginning with the Meiji Restoration (1868), it became the first in the region to make a decisive, sustained, and highly successful attempt to “modernize” its political, economic, and social structures, thereby largely avoiding Western domination. This particular historical trajectory built directly on social foundations laid during the prolonged closure of the Tokugawa period and largely allowed Japan free reign to craft its own version of modernity, educational and otherwise. One result of this conscious, directed process of “catch-up” was an impressive “compression” of the transition to modernity – a phenomenon that had stretched out over hundreds of years in most Western countries – to little more than a half century (Kariya, 2010); a feat unmatched by any country in the first half of the twentieth century. Following the devastation of the Second World War, Japan redoubled its efforts to “catch-up” and through a combination of high birth rates following the war, export-driven economic growth leading to an explosion of manufacturing jobs, a commitment to egalitarian growth and full employment, and the creation of an educational meritocracy that meticulously selected the country's best and brightest, the country quickly moved up the value-added chain until, by the early 1980s, the Japanese economy was globally dominant (Katz, 1998; Okita, 1992). As such, by the 1980s, Japan became unique, first, in being the only country in the region whose social conditions facilitated genuine comparison with the “advanced” countries of the West and, second, a model for “modernization” that other countries in the region could emulate, first the four Asian Tigers and then (although rarely explicitly) China in the post-Mao “Reform and Opening” period (Rappleye, 2007; Kojima, 2000).

What are US policymakers, stakeholders, and analysts thinking about the state of US‐Japanese telecommunications policy relations? What are their top priorities for the years ahead? What steps could be taken to enhance the two countries’ ability to manage the unique “behind the borders” political challenges associated with deepening international economic integration? This paper considers these and related questions.