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We argue that change management has become ideological and that by selective use of complexity research has used the imperative for change to further political and economic agendas. We seek to redress this situation by developing a critical perspective on change and a new metaphor, the zone of entanglement, to assist critical analysis of change. Central to our argument is that a dynamic of change is non‐change. In this vein, we show that there are deep, robust and persistent structures that dampen change and which, if recognized, may help in achieving organic change, resulting in positive social transformations.

Aarhus Kommunes Biblioteker (Teknisk Bibliotek), Ingerslevs Plads 7, Aarhus, Denmark. Representative: V. NEDERGAARD PEDERSEN (Librarian).

IT IS TO BE hoped that by the time these words are being read the dispute over the Electricians' Union and the TUC will have been solved; and, we hope, with satisfaction to both parties.

By the beginning of the war, Germany's over‐all self‐sufficiency in food had reached a level of approximately 83 per cent., on the peace‐time basis of 2,200—2,400 calories per person per day. In respect to some types of food, however, the situation was not satisfactory. For example, before the war she produced approximately 73 per cent. of fish requirements, 12 per cent. of corn, 50 per cent. of legumes, and 60 per cent. of fat within her own boundaries. The country could be fed at a reduced level by the produce raised within its own boundaries if food were perfectly controlled and evenly distributed. However, in practice, individual provinces were much less favourably situated in this respect. Western Germany, an area of relatively small and diversified farms, was critically dependent on the eastern provinces for its flour, grain, and potato supplies. It is clear that all German civilians could be fed at a uniform level of adequacy during a war only by control of the country's food supply at the national level and by the continued operation of the new transportation network of the country. For this reason the bombing of rail and inland water transportation facilities became such a serious threat to national uniformity in food distribution. Of the many kinds of centralised food processing industries known in the United States, only a few played an important role in the food supply of German civilians. The principal examples of these were grain milling, sugar production and refining, and the large bakeries of urban areas. The damage or destruction of these facilities, incidental to air attack on other industrial targets, seriously decreased their production capacity. Bombing destroyed the mills for processing 9 per cent. of the German rye output and 35 per cent. of the wheat output. Of the sugar refineries four plants producing 300,000 tons annually, were destroyed. This represents a 38 per cent. decrease in production of sugar. Similarly bombing of chemical plants was largely responsible for the decrease in the supply for fertiliser nitrogen. In 1939, 718,000 tons of fertiliser nitrogen were available, but by 1945 this had decreased to 140,000 tons. The significance of this destruction of facilities vital to the feeding of a country already on a border‐line diet is ominous. Reliable estimates indicate that aerial bombings destroyed 35 per cent. of Germany's total (approximately 460,000 square metres) cold storage capacity. The increased use of cold storage intensified their dependence on transportation and on the continuity of the power supply. Aerial attack, as a result, not only decreased usable cold storage space, but also seriously interfered with the operation of the remaining space by impeding shipments and interrupting sources of power. It was the constantly reiterated opinion of all food officials that the bomb destruction of the transportation network was the largest single factor contributing to the disruption of the food supply. Bulk shipments which had been carried on inland waterways were seriously impeded by the bombing of canals. Aerial attack against railway lines, bridges and terminal facilities caused widespread interruptions in service and destroyed rolling stock, freight en route and handling facilities at terminals. It is not possible at this time to state exactly in what measure the curtailment of the national diet contributed to the ultimate defeat of Germany. The evidence available indicates, however, that it was an important factor. There is in any case no doubt that strategic bombing is the major element contributing to the present shortage of food in Germany. It was not apparent that the Germans considered the vitamin and mineral content of food in determining the ration allowances of the people. Immediately with the beginning of the war, all the principal foods were rationed, so that the lack of recognition of the importance of the vitamin and mineral content of this ration actually was an additional point of vulnerability for the German diet. With a food economy so vulnerable it is not surprising to have found that the basic food rationing programme was abandoned early in 1945 when the destruction of transport and communications by the strategic air offensive attained major proportions. This necessitated falling back on the inadequate system of regional self‐supply. The destruction of large food stocks, processing plants and cold storage plants by bombing also contributed to the general deterioration of the German food supply. There is ample evidence for the conclusion that as a result of the strategic air offensive the nutritional demands for the continued health of the German people could not be met.

Artists operating under a studio model, such as Andy Warhol, have frequently been described as reducing their work to statements of authorship, indicated by the signature finally affixed to the work. By contrast, luxury goods manufacturers decry as inauthentic and counterfeit the handbags produced during off-shift hours using the same materials and craftsmanship as the authorized goods produced hours earlier. The distinction between authentic and inauthentic often turns on nothing more than a statement of authorship. Intellectual property law purports to value such statements of authenticity, but no statement has value unless it is accepted as valid by its audience, a determination that depends on shared notions of what authenticity means as well as a common understanding of what authenticity designates.

The old year has gone, leaving its trail of never‐to‐be‐forgotten memories of strife and turbulence, calamity, disaster, and a huge burden of worries for us to face in the New Year. Few if any will not be deeply grateful to see the passing of 1985. Except for the periods of calm there cannot be a year within living memory to equal it in terms of violence, unparalleled in times of “peace”, collosal in terms of soaring social and public expenditure and financial loss, and in disasters in the world beyond the shores of these islands. It would not be an exaggeration to state that the enormous indebtedness which the year has heaped upon the people will never be wiped off, and it has got to be done mainly by those innocent of any misconduct, and their descendants. The unprecedented scale of street and community violence, the looting, thieving and general crime committed behind the screen of it.

THE sudden death, at a comparatively early age, of Mr. Franklin Trengrouse Barrett, of the Fulham Public Libraries, removes from the ranks of librarians, one of the most promising, highly‐trained, and best‐loved of those younger men whose work is making itself so strongly felt in this country. His death came as a severe shock to most of his friends, and particularly to his father, Mr. Francis T. Barrett, the universally‐esteemed City Librarian of Glasgow, who was quite unprepared for such a sudden and bitter bereavement. To him, as to Mrs. Franklin Barrett, a lady well‐known and much respected by London librarians, I am sure the deepest sympathy of all librarians and other colleagues will go forth. The sad event has already produced a great many messages of sympathy from many kind friends, and for these, and other efforts of consolation and comfort, the family are deeply grateful.

In the year 1900 Koch expressed the view that human and bovine tuberculosis were distinct diseases, that the bacillus of bovine tuberculosis could not produce this disease in the human subject, and that the bacillus of human tuberculosis could not set it up in the bovine species. As is now well known. these conclusions have not received the slightest confirmation from other workers in the same field, and it may be said that the consensus of scientific opinion is now to the effect that the bacilli of human and bovine tuberculosis are identical—at any rate, so far as the effects attributed to them are concerned. The Royal Commission appointed in 1901, and consisting of the late Sir MICHAEL FOSTER, Drs. SIMS WOODHEAD, SIDNEY MARTIN, MACFADYEAN, and BOYCE, have issued a further interim report on their investigations. The first interim report was published in 1904, the conclusions stated in it being to the effect that the human and animal diseases were identical, and that no characteristics by which the one could be distinguished from the other had been discovered. The report now issued shows that these conclusions are confirmed by the results of a very large number of fresh experiments. The main conclusions set forth in the present report are as understated :—