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This study examines the relationship between board composition and firm value, and the extent to which this relationship may be affected by a company’s investment opportunity set. There is little research that examines this issue, particularly for the New Zealand market. Of the research that exists, and generally for the research that examines how board composition affects firm performance, the findings have been mixed. Using a randomly chosen sample, which improves the external validity of results from prior studies, we find that board composition of high growth option firms is positively related to firm value, and this relationship is maintained when more refined measures that proxy the characteristics of outside directors (such as tenure of outside directors, the level of outside director equity ownership, the number of other board positions held by outside directors, and the total proportion of non‐executive directors, including grey directors) are recognised.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effects of investment opportunities and corporate finance on dividend payout policy.

This issue is tested with a sample of 34 emerging market countries covering a 17‐year period, 1990‐2006. Fixed effects panel model is employed in our estimation.

A significantly negative relationship between investment opportunity set and dividend payout policy is found. There are, however, insignificant effects of the various measures of corporate finance namely, financial leverage, external financing, and debt maturity on dividend payout policy. Profitability and stock market capitalization are also identified as important in influencing dividend payout policy. Profitable firms are more likely to support high dividend payments to shareholders. However, firms in relatively well‐developed markets tend to exhibit low dividend payout policy.

The main value of the paper is in respect of the fact that it uses a large dataset from emerging market countries. The results generally support existing literature on investment opportunity set and dividend payout policy.

Summarizes previous research on factors affecting the market value of a firm’s equity and puts forward a mathematical model based on the idea that its investment opportunity set is positively related to reputation, multinationality, size and profitability; and negatively related to leverage and systematic risk. Tests this on 1987‐1993 data on US multinational companies, explains the methods used and shows that the relationship is as hypothesized, although the results depend on the choice of surrogate measures for the variables. Calls for further research.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) on high growth firms’ corporate governance. Specially, the study examines whether there is a negative impact of SOX on the interactive effect of board independence and investment opportunity set on firm performance.

Sample firms were selected from the Investor Responsibility Research Center Directors’ database. Both accounting- and market-based firm performance measures are used. Regressions are run to test the hypothesis.

It was found that the impact of SOX on the interaction effect of board independence and investment opportunity set on firm performance is negative.

The results suggest that the impact of SOX in corporate governance and regulatory environment mitigates the effect of board independence on the relationship between investment opportunity set and firm performance, consistent with the notion that the enactment of SOX increases monitoring costs of board governance especially for high-growth firms.

Explains the concept of the investment set (IOS: i.e. chances to invest for expansion, new products, cost reduction etc.) and its effects on firm value. Reviews previous research on the theoretical relationships between IOS and optimal contracting resulting from shareholder/debtholder conflict, agency costs and performance measurement problems; and empirical research on its links with company policy on financing, dividends and compensation. Goes on to discuss research on measuring IOS by using various proxies; and summarizes the main findings.

Summarizes previous valuation models based on accounting information, extends the basic model to include dividends and retained earnings, and develops hypotheses on the relationship between share prices, dividends and earnings for firms with different investment opportunity set (IOS) levels. Tests them using 1992‐1998 data on a sample of US multinationals and shows that the share prices of firms with high IOS levels are related to retained earnings and less strongly to dividends; while for low IOS firms dividends are more relevant than earnings.

Using recent panel data on U.S. and Japanese firms and time-series, cross-sectional analysis, this study documents that in both countries controlling for the investment opportunity set, investments are significantly positively influenced by internal cash flows. This relationship strengthens with the degree of constraints faced in Japan but not in the U.S. Our findings indicate that firms in both countries operate in financially imperfect markets using a pecking order in financing. As expected for Japanese companies, investment by Keiretsu member companies was significantly less influenced by cash flow and more influenced by the investment opportunity set compared to investment by non-member companies.

Refers to previous research on investment opportunity sets, financing policies, board monitoring and directors’ shareholdings and the proportion of non‐executive directors (NEDs) on the board on the negative relationship between investment opportunities and leverage. Tests them on 1998 data from 437 top Australian companies, explains the methodology and presents the results, which suggest that the negative relationship (i.e. asset substitution or underinvestment) decreases with higher levels of executive director shareholdings or higher proportions of NEDs; and that underinvestment is greatest for firms with low management share ownership. Recognizes the limitations of the study and suggests some avenues for further research.

Given the growing market awareness concerning responsible investments in recent years, the purpose of this paper is to bridge the gap between real estate companies which implemented a corporate social responsibility (CSR) agenda and the possible role within a multi‐asset portfolio optimisation framework. The behaviour of the asset class sustainable real estate (SRE) together with its diversification characteristics are the main focus.

The study is an explorative empirical analysis applying a portfolio optimisation algorithm. First, the authors developed a sustainable real estate index comprehending listed real estate companies from 2004 until 2010 acting in line with a CSR agenda. Second, the authors introduced SRE into the opportunity set of an UK investor and finally, generated the theoretical optimal asset allocation of SRE within different risk‐return portfolios.

The unique risk‐return pattern of SRE enables the asset class to be allocated across all portfolios ranging from low to high risk along the efficient frontier. In the low‐risk levels, SRE behaves as a diversifier whereas in the medium‐ to high‐risk portfolios SRE is represented as the main allocated asset. Sustainable real estate thus offers opportunities to numerous investors in view of their investment preferences and corporate strategies.

The results could encourage institutional investors to take investments in CSR‐driven listed real estate companies into account and to rethink their strategic asset allocation approach in view of the identified asset characteristics and the behaviour within a portfolio framework.

The paper provides a first insight in the field of portfolio management by introducing SRE into the opportunity set of a UK investor. The study raises SRE to an aggregated level and delivers theoretical as well as empirical evidence of the role sustainable real estate is playing within a multi‐asset portfolio.

Uses previous research on firms’ potential investment (i.e. growth) opportunities, profitability and political cost/risk to suggest that a high level of growth opportunities may encourage managers to use income reducing accruals. Tests this on 1987‐1990 data from a sample of US multinationals classified into high or low growth groups. Explains the methods used to estimate discretionary accruals and to measure the investment opportunity set. Presents the results which suggest that discretionary accruals are higher in high growth firms; and support the political cost hypothesis of Watts and Zimmerman (1978) and the political risk hypothesis of Monti‐Belkaoui et al (1999)