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Nuclear energy investments contribute significantly to the energy independence of countries. This situation helps countries to develop both economically and socially. Therefore, countries need to develop strategies to increase their nuclear energy investments. However, radioactive waste generated in nuclear reactors is one of the most important disadvantages of this type of energy. Due to this situation, the wastes generated must be disposed of effectively for nuclear energy investments to be effective. In this study, it is aimed to create optimal strategies for the effective waste managements generated in nuclear power plants. Within this framework, four different balanced scorecard perspectives are considered as the criteria. In the analysis process, Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) methodology is taken into consideration. It is identified that learning and development is the most critical factor for the effective radioactive waste management created in nuclear power plants. On the other side, internal factors are the second most important criterion in this framework. Hence, it is understood that nuclear energy investors should give priority to the technological development for effective waste management in nuclear power plants. With the help of these technological improvements, the wastes can be disposed more successfully. As a result, environmental sustainability can be provided much easily.

The expansion of bike-sharing enterprises has led to a series of social problems, and due to the high breakage rate and high recycling cost of bike sharing, enterprises are reluctant to maintain them. Therefore, government regulation does play a leading role in maintaining bike sharing. This study’s purpose is to investigate how the government should regulate the bike-sharing enterprises that maintain bicycles.

Firstly, the authors assume that there is only one bike-sharing enterprise and establish a game model that the government regulates the enterprise. Furthermore, the authors extend the model to the case that there are two competing enterprises in the market. Finally, through numerical analysis, the influence of various factors on the government strategy and revenue is analyzed.

The authors find that the regulatory probability of two enterprises are regulated by the government is larger than that of one enterprise. When two bike-sharing enterprises compete without government regulation, both will choose the non-self-discipline strategy, thus falling into the Prisoner's Dilemma. If the government regulates them, then both enterprises will choose the self-discipline strategy. Finally, through numerical analysis, it is found that the self-discipline behavior of bike-sharing enterprises is related to the government regulatory probability, the cost of self-discipline, the probability of being reported and the penalties. Interestingly, the cost of government regulation will not affect the regulation probability of government.

This research provides a theoretical reference for the government to make the regulation strategies of bike sharing and achieve the sustainable development of bike sharing.

This research provides a theoretical reference for the government to make the regulation strategies of bike sharing and achieve the sustainable development of bike sharing.