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We analyze the impact of monetary policy instruments on interbank lending rates and retail bank lending in China using an extended version of the model developed by Porter and Xu (2009). Unlike the central banks of advanced economies, the People’s Bank of China (PBoC) uses changes in the required reserve ratios and open market operations to influence liquidity in money markets and adjusts the regulated deposit and lending rates and loan targets to intervene in the retail deposit and lending market. These interventions prevent the interbank lending rate from signaling monetary policy stance and transmitting the effect of policy to the growth of bank loans. Since the global financial crisis, the PBoC’s monetary policy has gone through a full cycle. The combining effects of using different policy instruments simultaneously within a short period of time were quite effective in bringing the credit and money growth in line with its desired level. Most recently steps have been taken to speed up the interest rate liberalization. Effective July 2013, the PBoC removed the floors of the benchmark lending rates.

A full Edgeworth cycle of deposit rate is divided into two phases: an “overcutting cycle” in which the banks battle for deposits, and a “relenting cycle” in which the banks cease battling and instead choose to restore a temporarily low deposit rate. Such strategies have two testable implications on overall market movements. First, deposit rate decreases are more likely to be initiated when the deposit rate is near the upper bound of a cycle. Second, deposit rate decreases are more sensitive than increases to market interest rate changes. This chapter empirically confirms this pattern and shows strong evidence for the presence of Edgeworth cycles in deposit rates after Hong Kong’s interest rate deregulation.

This study seeks to explore the presence and the relative strength of market efficiency in the onshore and offshore Renminbi (RMB) forward markets.

In the onshore and offshore foreign exchange markets, the RMB forward contracts are designed in similar ways. However, the underlying economic forces and regulatory frameworks are very different in these two markets. We first analyze the functioning of each market, by examining the covered interest rate parity (CIRP) conditions. Second, we explore the CIRP deviations in the two markets and quantify the role of market frictions and government interventions.

We find that the CIRP condition does not hold in either the onshore or the offshore RMB forward markets. We also find that the offshore market is more efficient than the onshore market in conveying private information about investors’ expectation.

Our results reveal that the onshore RMB forward market provides an imperfect platform for investors to manage their currency exposures. We suggest that by opening the offshore market to domestic participants and the onshore market to more foreigners, the forward rates may become more informative with a greater investor mix. These liberalization efforts are important steps in the right directions to improve market efficiency in the Chinese FOREX market.

This chapter studies banks’ loan pricing behavior in mainland China during 2003–2013 by applying panel regressions to firm-level loan data and the estimated default likelihood for listed companies. The authors find that with the progress of market-oriented financial reforms, banks generally require compensation for their exposure to borrowers’ default risks. It is even more so if the borrower is a non-state-owned enterprise (non-SOE), mainly due to the pricing behavior of the Big Four banks. Bank lending rates are shown to be less sensitive to the default risks of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Our results also reveal that banks priced in firm default risks before 2008 financial crisis, but not necessarily so after the crisis. As for industries, we find that after the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, the real estate sector and other government-supported industries tended to enjoy better terms on loan pricing in terms of default risks. We believe the main reason is that the government stimulus policies tilted toward those industries that have played crucial roles in China’s economic growth.

In March 1999, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand changed its method of implementing monetary policy from targeting settlement cash to specifying an (official) Overnight Cash Rate (OCR). This paper explores some of the impacts of this, by comparing market movements before and after the change.

We find that, since the introduction of the OCR, key lending interest rates have been found to be more responsive to changes in official monetary policy, with a significant shortening of the half-life of interest rate changes. This suggests that monetary policy is now more efficient, while the speed of response supports the case for regarding the New Zealand banking market as competitive.

This chapter examines factors that cause violations of regularity conditions and biases in estimates of substitution. In the context of the Fourier demand system, failing to impose curvature restrictions but correcting for serial correlation results in few violations of the curvature conditions. In contrast, imposing curvature restrictions without correcting for serial correlation biases substitution estimates and can cause violations of monotonicity. For serially correlated data, results suggest that correcting for serial correlation may be more important than imposing curvature. Furthermore, the artificially break-adjusted data that are inconsistent with consumer optimization can severely bias estimates. Results from the Bank of England's (BOE) preferred non-break-adjusted data establish that money and goods are substitutes in demand.