Search results

This study aims to examine the association between institutional investors’ ownership (IOW), politically connected firms (POCF) and audit report lag (AUDRL).

This study employs a feasible generalised least squares (FGLS) model for panel data to examine the association between IOW, POCF and AUDRL for Malaysian publicly listed companies.

The findings reveal a statistically significant negative relationship between IOW and AUDRL, with this negative relationship being more pronounced amongst POCF. Additionally, the results demonstrate that the relationship between IOW and AUDRL varies depending on the domicile of IIs (local vs. foreign). Specifically, local institutional investors exhibit a negative and statistically significant relationship with AUDRL, whilst foreign institutional investors show a positive and statistically significant relationship with AUDRL.

The results of this study provide a new understanding of auditor responses to institutional investor monitoring and political connections (PCs) in an emerging economy.

The purpose of this study is to examine the influence of corporate governance (CG) mechanisms on earnings management (EM) within the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) countries. In addition, the impact of firm’s political connections (PCs) on EM is investigated, as well as whether it moderates the relationship between CG and EM.

Fixed-effects model is used on a sample of non-financial firms across the GCC countries to test the hypotheses. Moreover, a two-stage least squares method and a propensity score matching procedure are used to mitigate potential reverse causality and sample selection bias.

This study reveals that CG mechanisms such as board size and board independence are negatively associated with EM, while CEO duality is positively association with EM. In addition, this study shows that institutional ownership and blockholders do not influence EM. Furthermore, PCs are shown to play a moderating role in the relationship between CG and EM. The results of this study are robust to endogeneity testing and to alternative measures of CG.

Because of a lack of data, the authors do not consider additional CG attributes such as tenure, education and age of board members. Future research could explore the impact of these attributes when data becomes available.

This study provides valuable insights for government officials, policymakers, standard-setters, regulators and corporations by presenting new evidence on the relationship among CG, PCs and EM. Moreover, this study underscores that, in the absence of a strong institutional infrastructure and investor protection, relying solely on strong CG and Islamic values and GCC culture may have a limited impact on effective monitoring of opportunistic managerial behaviors.

This study contributes to existing literature with a specific focus on the unique political, legal, institutional, social and cultural setting of the GCC region. Moreover, this study provides new insights that PCs serve as a governance mechanism in mitigating EM because relatively little attention has been given to the impact of PCs in improving accounting outcomes, especially in the context of the GCC region where Islamic ethical norms often shape business practices.

This study aims to analyze the existing body of knowledge concentrating on institutional investors’ behavior. It seeks to track how this domain has evolved through collaborative networks, as well as significant contributors, themes and research opportunities for future work.

The present study applies bibliometric analysis to examine the trends in the selected research field, using 446 articles from highly recognized journals indexed in the Scopus database.

The authors discovered that research on institutional investors’ behavior has significantly increased over the past four decades due to academic interest in the topic. This study observed five themes that unite the research in this field: institutional investors and corporate behavior; determinants of institutional investors’ trading patterns and performance; trading activity and its outcomes; herding, causes and consequences; and institutional investment and corporate performance. Moreover, future directions are penned down, such as how institutional investors’ control influences governance disclosures.

This study serves as a guide by mapping and analyzing the intellectual development of the research literature on institutional investors’ behavior. The authors contribute to the knowledge base by providing a solid foundation for further studies.

This study explores the association between institutional investors’ stewardship activity, disclosed under Japan’s Stewardship Code, and the R&D investments of their investee companies.

Recognizing the pivotal role of R&D investment in long-term value creation, this study uses comprehensive data from institutional investor disclosures to assess the impact of stewardship activity on their investee companies.

The findings show that investor stewardship activity is a factor that influences strategic R&D investment. Specifically, a positive association is found between code-compliant institutional investor shareholding and R&D investment, contingent on high levels of stewardship activity.

By using stewardship disclosures to measure stewardship activity, this study sheds new light on institutional investors’ role in promoting R&D investment. The findings suggest that stewardship regulation is a valid governance policy mechanism to the extent that it promotes stewardship activity. Moreover, the findings show that stewardship disclosures provide valuable information about the potential value enhancement associated with institutional shareholding.

This study examines the effect of stable institutional investors on firms' product quality failures. Furthermore, the authors investigate the channels through which institutional ownership stability enhances product quality management.

This study uses probit, ordered probit and negative binomial regression frameworks to investigate the research questions. In addition, the authors utilize the three-stage least-squares to address the endogeneity issues.

Using a sample of product recall incidents from 2012 to 2021, the authors find that firms with more stable institutional ownership have a lower probability, frequency and severity of recall incidents and adopt a proactive product recall strategy. Institutional investors with significant and persistent holdings improve quality management by reducing overinvestment and the use of option-linked and relative performance executive compensations. Furthermore, the influence of stable institutional owners on product quality failures is more pronounced in firms with low managerial ability and specialist CEOs. Lastly, the empirical evidence demonstrates that stable holdings by active investors have a more substantial impact on reducing product recalls than passive and other stable institutional holdings.

This study is the first to examine the impact of institutional ownership stability on firms' product recalls. The authors contribute to the literature on the benefits of stable institutional ownership on firm outcomes and the determinants of product quality failures.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the role of institutional investors in the cost of equity for Chinese firms, especially state-owned enterprises (SOEs).

By using data from Chinese firms with a unique state ownership structure, we provide empirical evidence on whether institutional investors can help reduce the cost of equity for SOEs and non-SOEs, respectively, and if so, identify the underlying channels.

We find that an increase in the shareholdings of institutions, especially independent institutions, can lead to a reduction in the cost of equity. This effect is particularly prominent in SOEs compared to non-SOEs. Moreover, institutional investors promote corporate social responsibility activities and innovation activities of invested firms, thereby reducing the cost of equity.

This paper contributes to a comprehensive understanding of the effects of institutional shareholdings with heterogeneity on the cost of equity and their influential mechanisms in the process of mixed ownership reform.

There is still an ongoing debate on the value relevance of capital structure and its determinants. Recently the issue has been explored in family firms after being explored in mature firms. This paper investigates the role of institutional investors and the firm's innovation activity in influencing the firm's decision and ability to acquire debt capital.

A large sample of 700 privately-held family firms in Italy from 2010 to 2019. Two analysis techniques are used: panel analysis and path analysis. The value of debt and the debt ratio are used as leverage measures. The value of patent (as a proxy for innovation) and institutional investor are the explanatory variables.

The results show that institutional investors have no relationship with financial leverage measures except when controlling for an interaction variable (Institutional investors × Lombardy region). The patent value is positively correlated with debt; however, the ratio patent-to-asset is negatively related to financial leverage indicating higher risk exposure. The nonlinearity test demonstrates a turning point when the relationship between patent value and debt inverts.

Firms should monitor their innovation activity since excessive innovation increases risk exposure and affects financing opportunities and value. The involvement of institutional investors does not always enhance value.

Existing literature focuses separately on family firm innovations and financial leverage as outcome variables, emphasizing the role of institutional investors in both fields by adopting agency theory and socioemotional wealth framework. In this study, the authors go further by merging both relationships, investigating the dynamics of the institutional-family firm innovation relationship in influencing the firm's capital structure. The authors contribute to the ongoing debate by providing original findings on capital structure, governance and innovation, supported by rigorous methods to enhance family firms' decision-making.

This paper investigates the relationship between institutional ownership and idiosyncratic volatility in Chinese and the USA stock markets and explores the potential explanations.

In this paper, the authors use the panel data regressions and the dynamic tests of two-way Granger causality in the panel VAR model to examine the relationship between institutional ownership and idiosyncratic volatility in Chinese and the USA stock markets.

The authors find that the institutional ownership in the Chinese (the USA) stock market is significantly and positively (negatively) related to idiosyncratic volatility through various tests. This paper indicates that institutional investors in the USA are more prudent and risk-averse, while the Chinese institutional investors are not because of high risk-bearing capacity.

This paper deepens the authors’ understanding on the relationship between institutional ownership and idiosyncratic volatility and in the USA and the Chinese stock markets. This paper explains the opposite relationships between institutional ownership and idiosyncratic volatility in the stock markets in China and USA.

This paper examines whether the adoption of Japan’s Stewardship Code by institutional investors influences their preference for investee companies' governance quality. The Code, introduced by the Financial Services Agency in 2014, promotes constructive engagement between institutional investors and investee companies. Engagement with investees should improve institutional investors' ability to assess governance quality across their portfolios. The paper examines if this results in a positive relationship between the levels of Code-compliant institutional shareholding and investee governance quality.

The association between Code-compliant institutional shareholding levels and a governance quality score is examined for Nikkei 500 companies.

A positive association is observed between shareholdings by Code-compliant institutional investors and investee governance, with board independence playing a key role. Analysis shows that the association between institutional shareholding and governance is stronger for the Code-compliant shareholding than for overall institutional shareholdings. In addition, no significant relationship is found between the levels of shareholding by non-Code-compliant institutional investors and the governance quality score of investee companies. Taken together, the results suggest that Code adoption strengthens institutional investors' preference for high-quality investee governance.

Despite the introduction of stewardship regulation worldwide, there is a scarcity of empirical research that examines its operation. The study contributes to the existing literature by providing insights into how compliance with stewardship regulation influences institutional investor decision-making.

This paper aims to investigate the relationship between corporate environmental, social and governance (ESG) ratings and leverage manipulation and the moderating effects of internal and external supervision.

The authors draw on a sample of Chinese non-financial A-share-listed firms from 2013 to 2020 to explore the effect of ESG ratings on leverage manipulation. Robustness and endogeneity tests confirm the validity of the regression results.

ESG ratings inhibit leverage manipulation by improving social reputation, information transparency and financing constraints. This effect is weakened by internal supervision, captured by the ratio of institutional investor ownership, and strengthened by external supervision, captured by the level of marketization. The effect is stronger in non-state-owned firms and firms in non-polluting industries. The governance dimension of ESG exhibits the strongest effect, with comprehensive environmental governance ratings and social governance ratings also suppressing leverage manipulation.

Firms should strive to cultivate environmental awareness, fulfil their social responsibilities and enhance internal governance, which may help to strengthen the firm’s sustainability orientation, mitigate opportunistic behaviours and ultimately contribute to high-quality firm development. The top managers of firms should exercise self-restraint and take the initiative to reduce leverage manipulation by establishing an appropriate governance structure and sustainable business operation system that incorporate environmental and social governance in addition to general governance.

Policymakers and regulators should formulate unified guidelines with comprehensive criteria to improve the scope and quality of ESG information disclosure and provide specific guidance on ESG practice for firms. Investors should incorporate ESG ratings into their investment decision framework to lower their portfolio risk.

This study contributes to the literature in four ways. Firstly, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, it is among the first to show that high ESG ratings may mitigate firms’ opportunistic behaviours. Secondly, it identifies the governance factor of leverage manipulation from the perspective of firms’ subjective sustainability orientation. Thirdly, it demonstrates that the relationship between ESG ratings and leverage manipulation varies with the level of internal and external supervision. Finally, it highlights the importance of governance in guaranteeing the other two dimensions’ roles by decomposing overall ESG.