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Taking advantage of a unique measure of corporate culture obtained from advanced machine learning algorithms, this study aims to explore how corporate culture strength is influenced by board independence, which is one of the most crucial aspects of the board of directors. Because of their independence from the corporation, outside independent directors are more likely to be unbiased. As a result, board independence is commonly used as a proxy for board quality.

In addition to the standard regression analysis, the authors execute a variety of additional tests, i.e. propensity score matching, an instrumental variable analysis, Lewbel’s (2012) heteroscedastic identification and Oster’s (2019) testing for coefficient stability.

The results show that stronger board independence, measured by a higher proportion of independent directors, is significantly associated with corporate culture. In particular, a rise in board independence by one standard deviation results in an improvement in corporate culture by 32.8%.

Conducting empirical research on corporate culture is incredibly difficult due to the inherent difficulties in recognizing and assessing corporate culture, resulting in a lack of empirical research on corporate culture in the literature. The authors fill this important void in the literature. Exploiting a novel measure of corporate culture based on textual analysis, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is the first to link corporate culture to corporate governance with a specific focus on board independence.

This paper aims to investigate the impact of the revised Code of Corporate Governance 2017 (CCG-2017) clauses pertaining to board independence, mandatory inclusion of female directors, audit committee (AC) chair independence and directors’ expertise on earnings manipulation.

Using an unbalanced panel of 323 listed companies from 2015 to 2019, this study uses panel data regression models with a robust methodology called difference-in-differences to tackle the potential endogeneity.

This study’s findings show that, as compared to the pre-CCG-2017 period, board- and AC-related variables increased significantly in the post-CCG-2017 period. Furthermore, financial experts on the board and board independence have a negative effect on discretionary accruals (DAs), whereas female directors and DAs are positively related, as is real activity manipulation. The AC-related variables, such as AC independence, expertise in AC, and AC chair independence, are significantly different from the preperiod to the postperiod, whereas their relationship is not according to the hypotheses of the study. Moreover, these results are robust to additional analysis of the alternative proxies for female directorship and the endogeneity problem.

The findings of this study have implications for regulators and practitioners who are concerned with the functions of the board of directors (BOD). The findings of this research study show that earnings management (EM) may be reduced by independent and expert directors. However, board gender diversity is not reducing the EM. Therefore, the decision to appoint female directors to the board should be based on their business and professional attributes rather than simply filling quotas or blindly adhering to regulations. Moreover, the findings of this research may assist the regulator in encouraging listed firms to enhance board governance via independence, diversity and competency, which are useful for effective monitoring.

This study fills a gap in the literature by providing the first evidence of country-specific regulation (CCG-2017), concerning the BOD and AC-related clauses on EM in Pakistan, which is missing in the relevant literature general and in Pakistan in particular.

This study examines the non-linear effect of board independence on the investment efficiency of listed firms worldwide. This study further tests whether the COVID-19 pandemic, industry competition and economic development influence the relationship between board independence and investment efficiency.

The data are retrieved from the Thomson Reuters (Refinitiv) database and include international data from 33 countries, comprising 21,363 firm-year observations. The authors' regression analyses include firm-specific variables as controls that may impact investment efficiency. The authors also perform various robustness tests including, alternative measures of investment efficiency, weighted least squares regression, quantile regression and endogeneity issues.

The results reveal a non-linear relationship between board independence and investment efficiency. Specifically, the relationship follows a U-shaped pattern, indicating that the negative impact of board independence on investment efficiency becomes positive after it reaches its optimal point, thus supporting optimal board structure theory. Interestingly, the authors find no significant evidence of board independence’s effect on investment efficiency during the pandemic. In contrast, the relationship between board independence and investment efficiency is significant only during the non-pandemic period. Furthermore, the authors discover evidence of a U-shaped relationship in both emerging and developed markets, as well as in industries with high and low competition.

The authors' study discovers new evidence on the non-linear impact of board independence on investment efficiency, which has not been explored previously in existing research.

This study has practical implications for investors by emphasising the importance of corporate governance and the appointment of independent directors. Investors should consider the findings of this study when making decisions related to corporate governance, as they can impact a firm's investment efficiency.

Despite a considerable body of literature exploring the link between corporate governance and investment effectiveness, there is a dearth of research on the non-linear effects of board independence. Furthermore, the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, industry competition and economic development remain unexplored.

This paper aims to examine the relation between SEC regulations centered on board of director independence and financial reporting quality and investigates the different routes to board independence.

The sample includes 1,248 firm observations whose board composition is compared between 2001 and 2008. Each firm is categorized based on how they increase board independence. The authors test the hypotheses using ordinary least squares regression models.

Results show that firms choose between multiple routes when complying with the independence requirements, and how firms operationalize the SEC requirement impacts financial reporting quality. Specifically, firms that achieve increased board independence through increased board size are associated with higher financial reporting quality. However, there is no association between higher financial reporting quality and a subsequent increase in audit fees. Suggesting the reporting quality results from the board monitoring function and not from an increase in auditor effort.

No evidence exists on how a firm’s chosen route to increased board independence relates to financial reporting quality.

This study aims to examine the direct influence of workplace bullying (WB) on internal auditors’ independence using the nexus between the agency theory and social exchange theory. From the internal auditors’ perspective, the investigation covered both government and private colleges and universities in one of the Middle East countries.

A survey was administered and delivered to internal auditors at each of the 85 educational institutions. A total of 267 valid questionnaires were analysed. The study’s measurement and structural models were tested and evaluated by using SmartPLS v.4 and partial least squares-structural equation modelling.

The study results indicated that bullying is common among senior managers, and that it has a significant, negative, high-level and direct effect on the independence of internal auditors in the higher education sector.

Regulators and other stakeholders should make a deliberate effort to promote positive behaviours and abandon negative ones regarding the independence of internal auditors and the performance of audit teams, which play a crucial role in enhancing the efficiency of audit units. For example, enhancing coordination and communication internally and externally. In addition to providing the internal auditors with equitable advancement and learning opportunities, senior management should also support their professional development.

To the best of the author’s knowledge, this study is the first to examine the relationship between WB and the internal auditor’s independence in the context of government and private organisations in Southwest Asian countries.

The growing international legal agenda and the fast development of corporate governance rules are now prompting firms to put emphasis on anti-corruption procedures. On the other hand, wide-ranging concerns have been raised by regulators and policymakers regarding the effectiveness of audit committees in promoting ethical behavior and safeguarding auditor independence from the adverse consequences of purchasing non-audit services. The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between the adoption of anti-corruption measures and perceived auditor independence in the context of audit committees.

After conducting the Breusch–Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test and the Hausman test, the random-effect model is used as the most appropriate estimator. Several endogeneity tests are also used to account for the endogenous nature of the corporate governance variables in the models.

Using a sample of UK FTSE 350 firms, this paper provides evidence that anti-corruption efforts are associated with lower purchases of non-audit services and lower economic bonding between auditors and their clients. Furthermore, the findings of this paper reveal that the adoption of anti-corruption efforts substitutes the role of audit committees in enhancing perceived auditor independence and that audit committees do not play a significant incremental role.

To the best of the author’s knowledge, this is the first study of its kind to focus on bolstering perceived auditor independence while enhancing the control and ethical environment from the clients’ side instead of the auditors’ side.

This study aims to understand independence in internal auditing by investigating how internal auditor independence is constructed when analysed in its corporate governance context.

A critical discourse analysis (CDA) of the corporate governance reports of Swedish large stock market listed non-financial companies, for three consecutive years, is undertaken, using a theoretical lens of organisational embeddedness and operational coupling to understand independence as a situated practice.

The study develops four archetypes of internal auditor independence – autarchic, instrumental, symbiotic and subservient – and discusses each archetype's implications for independence, related to tripartite relations with management and the audit committee, regarding who has the mandate to direct work and how the work is done. It finds that internal auditors always have a capacity to be independent. Although they are not independent in relation to agents in the subservient archetype, they are independent of those down the organisational chain of command, suggesting independence is both situational and relational.

The analysis contributes a novel approach to the literature and develops a conception of independence using the dimensions of embeddedness and coupling. The archetypes offer an analytical framework for future studies on independence.

Internal auditors may understand their practice differently through the archetypes that result from this study.

Internal auditors' power relations within corporate governance further an understanding of the pressures on internal auditors and their role.

This study contributes new knowledge on the situatedness of independence by showing how internal auditors are embedded and coupled helps build their independence.

This study aims to provide an understanding of how directors perceive the relationship between board independence and corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance which has remained under-researched.

The qualitative data were collected through semi-structured interviews of 19 directors from 14 organisations operating in Australia. Data were analysed following the six-phase process of thematic analysis.

The findings indicate that independent directors contribute to board CSR decisions in two major ways: they bring an outsider view to the board, and they monitor managers in taking decisions that consider the interests of the broader stakeholder groups.

The in-depth analysis of director independence and CSR highlights the structural and behavioural aspects of director independence and CSR playing out in board rooms. Propositions are offered which can be tested to advance the research in this arena.

The findings suggest that efforts are required at organisational policy level to ensure the effectiveness of director independence for CSR.

This study provides insights into the “black box” of boardroom dynamics highlighting important contextual factors influencing director independence and CSR decisions previously under-explored.

This study aims to critically analyse the independence of the internal audit function through its relationship with management and the audit committee.

Results are based on a critical comparison of responses from questionnaires sent out to Australian chief audit executives (CAEs) versus existing literature and best practice guidelines.

With respect to the internal audit function's relationship with management, threats identified include: using the internal audit function as a stepping stone to other positions; having the chief executive officer (CEO) or chief finance officer (CFO) approve the internal audit function's budget and provide input for the internal audit plan; and considering the internal auditor to be a “partner”, especially when combined with other indirect threats. With respect to the relationship with the audit committee, significant threats identified include CAEs not reporting functionally to the audit committee; the audit committee not having sole responsibility for appointing, dismissing and evaluating the CAE; and not having all audit committee members or at least one member qualified in accounting.

This study introduces independence threat scores, thereby generating analysis of the internal audit function's independence taking into account a combination of threats.

The purpose of this study is to establish whether Irish listed firms comply with the substance of corporate governance guidance rather than the letter of the rule in the determination of director independence. The paper examines non-executive director independence from three perspectives: the first is from the viewpoint of the sample firms, the second from that given in corporate governance guidance when applied to the sample firms, and the third based on extensive financial statement analysis, prior research and prior literature. By exploring multiple perspectives of director independence, disparities in the interpretation of non-executive director independence can be identified.

Descriptive statistics and non-parametric statistical analysis are used to examine for differences between multiple perspectives of non-executive director independence.

The study identified significant disparities in the interpretation of independence by Irish listed firms. This may be explained by a misunderstanding of what director independence means, a deliberate choice to ignore pre-existing norms regarding NED independence or the desire to exceed such norms. The findings suggest Irish financial institutions exhibit higher levels of NED independence than the remaining sample firms explained in part by linkages with the institutions themselves. Findings suggest a lack of adequate oversight in the sample firms, which could ultimately lead to greater agency costs for shareholders.

Policymakers and other stakeholders valuing director independence may need to reassess guidelines for interpreting director independence and related reporting, policies regarding adherence to such guidelines and associated director training requirements.

This study is timely, topical and the first of its kind in relation to Irish listed firms and provides evidence into the lack of compliance within Irish listed companies with best practice guidance. The findings clearly identify a notable lack in a consistent means of interpretation in the sample firms as to what non-executive independence is and why it is an important part of good corporate governance. The paper provides a basis for future research. Such research may include studies of firm motivation in interpretation choice and comparative studies with other jurisdictions.