Search results

This chapter examines and discusses the unintended outcomes of the production bonus scheme the mine had instituted to motivate and increase the productivity of the frontline mining teams. This is crucial given that the maladministration of the bonus system could lead to a range of undesired outcomes such as deteriorating levels of trust between management and frontline workers, prioritisation of production at the expense of safety, poor work relations and ultimately low levels of organisational, employee and team performance. There are a number of organisational, management and labour factors that can render a production bonus scheme effective or ineffective. These factors influence the nature and extent of worker reactions to the bonus scheme.

This chapter examines and discusses the factors that influenced the reaction of the mining teams to the team-based production bonus scheme and the extent to which mine management fulfilled its side of the bargain in the implementation of the production bonus. The chapter highlights the manner in which the team-based bonus system influenced teams of stope workers to engage in their informal organisational practice of making plan (planisa) in order to offset the snags that jeopardised their prospects of earning the production bonus. The chapter reveals that, to a large extent, the productivity bonus generated conflict rather than cooperation at the point of production down the mine. As a result, the incentive scheme failed to live up to expectations by not eliciting the desired levels of organisational, worker and team performance at the rock-face.

Recent corporate scandals such as WorldCom, Enron, and others suggest a failure of corporate governance, that is, of the allocation of power and its lawful use and accountability within the corporation.

This chapter presents a game theoretic model for analyzing the power dynamics among the three groups responsible for oversight in the Anglo-American corporate model – namely the Board of Directors through its audit committee, corporate management, and the external auditors.

The chapter shows, among other findings, that the current governance structure results in an extreme imbalance of power among the three groups that not only permits but even induces management to conceal necessary financial data and often to ignore the long-term interests of the firm.

The chapter also derives changes in principles of governance that can right such imbalances and prevent defalcations from taking place through institutionalizing effective ex-ante checks and balances of power in addition to the ex post measures that come into play only after a wrong has been committed and which are the case with recent exchange rules and Congressional enactments.

None.

No prior analysis along these lines.

This chapter analyzes and discusses the empirical results of the study. The discussion is organized under the following themes: independent director, audit committee, auditor independence, corporate code of conduct, adoption of IFRS, and measures for improvement. Three main findings emerge from the analysis. First, the current institutional environment does not yet fully support the Anglo-American practices. Second, in recent years the quality of financial reporting has improved considerably, which is largely attributable to strengthened accounting rules and regulations. However, the imported Anglo-American models of corporate governance and financial reporting, except for enhancing auditor independence, have had only a minor impact on financial reporting quality. Third, although the imported practices are not working as intended, the vast majority of interviewees stated that it was appropriate to move toward internationally acceptable principles and standards. Improving laws and regulations seems to be the main measure for rendering the institutional environment in China more supportive of Anglo-American models of corporate governance and financial reporting.

Taking a micro-perspective of governance that includes problem-solving and stakeholder involvement capabilities as part of the strategic steering role, we wish to contribute to the understanding of the human side of governance. Thus we have studied the relationships between the board and its management and stakeholders, and in so doing we recognize internal and external actors as well as the board itself, and how they all contribute to the implementation of the governance function.

Based on an interpretative approach that focuses on change over time, we performed a qualitative empirical study of the governance of Robotdalen, a small non-profit public organization in Sweden that is a joint public and private collaboration. This chapter forms part of a longitudinal study that has been carried out since 2009. It is based primarily on interviews with board members, management and other stakeholders, and complemented by document studies and observations.

Governance practice entails multiple and multilevel tasks, and the tensions between representativeness/professional boards, conformance/performance, and controlling/partnering up with management, are prevalent in both small non-profit and public organizations. According to our results the apparent choice between the extremes of each tension is, however, not a choice at all but rather a balancing act. In trying to balance tensions through collaboration between managers, board, financiers, and the hosting university, new governance structures and practices emerge at the organizational level.

By following the process of the emergence of a new board, we illustrate how various actors work together to co-produce governance functions in practice. In the past little or no effort has been made to take into account contextual factors such as organizational size – an aspect that may influence or shape board characteristics and work methodology. We therefore attempt to do so in our chapter, by studying the emergence of a new board in a small public organization, what possible paradoxes and tensions are involved in such work, and how such tensions are managed.

Intrapreneurship (IP) and Strategic Human Resource Management (SHRM) are a paradigm in which the current global scenario of increased homeoffice and professional globalization can have the capacity to stimulate professionals’ autonomy and new business orientations able to re-invent new strategies, services, technologies and even leadership development. This study, of an exploratory nature, aims to analyze the synchronicities between IP and SHRM, raised by relational dynamics translated into leadership, organizational culture and individual practices having as a facilitating factor technology as an agent of change for continuous improvement (based on the Kaizen philosophy). It is supported by a qualitative analysis through a case study of a leading Portuguese group, Grupo Salvador Caetano, which has been in existence for 75 years.

The results demonstrate that dynamic relations are the synchronicities of IP and SHRM as long as stimulated and transmitted to collaborators, and that technology, facilitated these processes. The flexibility of SHRM, the sequence of delegation and implementation of relational dynamics must be the key for the synchronicities of SHRM and IP to be two phenomena that go side by side and contribute to more effective performance and evolution among collaborators, as they support each other in creating firms’ value for customers. Some contributions to theory and practice, raised through a logic of “in-house entrepreneurship,” are also presented at the end of the study.

To consider Critical Management Studies as a social movement.

The purpose is fulfilled by reflecting upon the history of Critical Management Studies by reference to social movement theory, institutional theory and the social theory of hegemony.

Critical Management Studies is plausibly understood as a social movement.

The chapter offers a fresh perspective on Critical Management Studies by representing it as a movement rather than as a specialist field of knowledge.

The wide spread application of projects to many areas of society has led us to identify five generic elements that every project will have to address. They are: project management, project task, stakeholders, resources, and project environment. Each element will be further divided into five sub-elements. This five-by-five model will be used to identify the nature of a specific project and to develop appropriate approaches and means. It will also allow a circular planning process that gradually will lead to coherence among the five elements.

To illustrate the broad spectrum of projects that we see in practice, we have identified five types that will be characterized by the five-by-five model.

In view of the complex nature of most projects, the chapter will introduce four complementary perspectives: a technical, a business, an organizational, and a stakeholder perspective. Each perspective will describe key features of a project and is supported by theories, models, and methods. Although the perspectives are complementary, they are strongly interdependent.

The chapter will give an overview of the book.