Search results

In February 2018, Jerome Powell had taken over as chair of the FOMC. At first glance, the macroeconomic conditions inherited by Powell appeared favorable for continued stability: unemployment and inflation were low, and the economy had been steadily growing for nearly a decade. Yet despite the appearance of stability, the economy faced significant risks that required the Federal Reserve's attention. Was an uptick in inflation imminent, and if so, should Powell raise rates to limit any inflationary pressure? Or was the economy still operating below capacity, and if so, should the Federal Reserve take a more accommodative stance? To gain perspective, Powell needed to look back at the past fifty years of monetary policy in the United States.

In mid-February 2009, amid the global financial crisis, the news was grim. The U.S. economy had been in recession since December 2007. If the downturn lasted into early spring, it would become America's longest postwar recession. The economy had shed 3.5 million jobs over the previous 12 months, the worst 12-month period on record. Bank lending was plummeting; the few banks with funds available were holding onto them. With this massive shift into liquid assets (cash and cash equivalents) and away from lending of any sort (even for productive uses or, in many cases, the working capital firms needed to survive), the economy would likely grind to a halt. On this brisk mid-February day in Washington, Timothy Geithner and Ben Bernanke rolled up their sleeves and reevaluated their plans to address the nearly impossible task of righting the ship. In terms of monetary and fiscal policy, were they doing all they could to halt this epic slide? Were they doing too much?