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A time charter allows the charterer of a vessel to have its use for a predetermined period of time. The charterer is entitled, subject to certain restrictions, to employ the vessel as he wishes during the charter period, but is under an obligation to redeliver it to its owner upon the termination of that period. Timely redelivery is of considerable commercial importance to the shipowner, for the vessel may have been committed to another charter commencing immediately upon scheduled redelivery. On the other hand, the charterer will wish to maximise the number of voyages undertaken during the charter period. Given the large amounts of money involved in chartering a vessel as well as the degree of profit or loss that could be at stake in a single voyage, a charterer may find himself in a position where he feels obliged to give last voyage orders knowing full well that the vessel cannot be redelivered within the contractually agreed time. In Torvald Klaveness A/S v Ami Maritime Corporation, The Gregos the House of Lords attempted to reconcile the competing commercial requirements of shipowners and charterers and considered the effect in law of a charterer ordering a vessel on a so‐called illegitimate last voyage.

Gone are the days when a bank could concentrate on providing a reliable service to its customer, and maintain that as part of that service it could guard the confidentiality of all information learnt in the course of the customer's banking. Formerly, a customer could be relatively confident that information about his or her business affairs would not be disclosed save in fairly limited circumstances, and the bank would not trouble itself as to how these affairs were conducted. Current legislation and regulation requires a bank to be aware of the commercial background to its clients' dealings and, in certain circumstances, to take steps to report criminal conduct or to account to third parties.

Enforcement of regulatory controls has traditionally been left to the criminal law. In the last 15 years there has been an increasing interest in using civil remedies for this purpose. Most of the attention has been on financial services, but there have been recent developments in the UK planning system, which provide interesting parallels.

Information is power — so it has been said — and nowhere has this statement been realised more significantly than in the banking industry. IT and banking in the 1990s and going forward to the next millennium are tightly bonded. It is now more difficult to determine whether business drives technology or the other way round. Given this scenario, one of the most important facets of managing IT in a bank is that of information security.

Section 2 of the Criminal Justice Act 1987 abrogates the right to silence since a suspect is required to answer questions in pre‐trial investigations by the SFO, although the answers are inadmissible as evidence unless proceedings are brought under s. 2(14) for giving false information or by s. 2(8), where the individual ‘makes a statement inconsistent with it’. In a previous article, the writer has considered the necessity and effectiveness of s. 2 powers. It is also instructive to analyse the conceptual basis of s. 2 powers since this will aid in the interpretation of statutory ambiguities and will allow the courts to have a uniformity of approach when seeking to resolve the statutory ambiguities. The conceptual basis is also important as concerns the resolution of where the line lies between the effective investigation of offences pursuant to s. 2 and the rights of the individual subject to such questioning. A critical examination of the above issues demands steering a careful course between normative rules and theory: in this area above all others it is impossible and undesirable to divorce one from the other.

The short answer is no. Notable examples of anti‐corruption laws are available. But there is probably no single example that one would elevate to a definitive universal model. This short briefing will focus first on the multilateral efforts of the Organization of the American States (OAS) against corruption and secondly, on the new anti money‐laundering legislation of the Bahamas with references to other major countries, as another perspective apart from the perspectives of other regions.

In most jurisdictions a suspect has the right to remain silent during criminal proceedings and he cannot be penalised for making false statements. This is loosely known as the ‘ban on self incrimination’ and is regarded as an important factor in due process protection of individuals subject to criminal proceedings. The right to silence applies only to the stage of criminal proceedings, and up to date it has surprisingly not been seriously debated. A criminal may have caused individuals and society major loss, damage or suffering; in principle one would expect that he would be obliged to assist in the clearing‐up of the case, particularly if this could ameliorate or repair the negative consequences of the crime. But this is not the way it is looked at. The suspect is under pressure, and must not be faced with the choice of lying or confessing.