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To show that differences in the extent to which firms engage in unrelated diversification can be attributed to differences in ownership structure.

We draw on longitudinal data and use a panel analysis specification to test our hypotheses.

We find that unrelated diversification destroys value; pressure-sensitive Anglo-American owners in a firm’s equity reduce unrelated diversification, whereas pressure-resistant domestic owners increase unrelated diversification; the greater the firm’s free cash flow, the greater the negative effect of pressure-sensitive Anglo-American owners on unrelated diversification.

We contribute to corporate governance and strategy research by bringing in owners’ institutional origin as a shaper of owner preferences in particular with regards to unrelated diversification. Future research may expand our investigation to more than one home institutional context, and theorize on institutional origin effects beyond the dichotomy between Anglo-American and non-Anglo-American (not oriented toward shareholder value maximization) owners.

Policy makers, financial analysts, owners, and managers may want to reflect about the implications of ownership structure, as well as promoting or joining corporations with particular ownership configurations.

A shareholder value-destroying strategy, such as unrelated diversification has adverse consequences for society at large, in terms of opportunity costs, that is, resources could be allocated to value-creating activities instead. Promoting an ownership configuration that creates value should contribute to social welfare.

Owners may not be exclusively driven by shareholder value maximization, but can be influenced by normative beliefs (biases) stemming from the institutional context they originate from.

This paper uses an unbalanced panel of 129 French firms over the period 1981–1991 to test the effects of two participatory schemes – profit sharing and employee share ownership – on voluntary quits. The effects of sharing schemes on productivity are well documented and most studies show positive and significant effects on productivity but their effects on quits have been less studied. This paper is the first French study looking at the effects of profit sharing and employee share ownership on quits. Our empirical investigation shows that employee share ownership reduces voluntary quits significantly whereas pure profit sharing has no significant effect.

Purpose – This chapter presents the results of an exploratory study carried out on activist institutional investor strategies. It aims to identify the way in which different types of institutional investors are reacting to new institutional pressures in the French context.

Design/methodology/approach – Our methodology is based on a series of semi-directive interviews, combined with additional relevant data.

Findings – The interpretation of results makes use of institutional theory, more specifically the work of Oliver (1991). Our study shows that active institutional investors may opt for different responses when confronted with new institutional pressures, and that these responses would seem to depend on antecedents underlined by Ryan and Schneider (2002), which in turn depend on the nature of their business relationships with the firm in which they invest. Whereas pressure-sensitive investors (such as banks and insurance companies) generally adopt acquiescence responses, pressure-resistant investors (such as pension funds and investment funds) pursue joint strategies of co-optation, influence or control with key actors such as local and international proxy advisors and French investor associations. Acting conjointly, certain pressure-resistant investors are often considered as institutional entrepreneurs in that they initiate changes and actively participate in the implementation of new norms in the field of shareholder activism in the French context. In parallel to this ongoing professionalization, other pressure-resistant investors such as activist hedge funds seem to lack sufficient legitimate power to be effective.

Originality/value – This chapter illustrates that the level of institutional investor activism depends largely on the relevant national legal framework. It also shows how institutional investor coalitions take advantage of new institutional pressures to enhance their legitimacy or increase the effectiveness of their action.

The paper explores the pattern of early closure risks for worker cooperatives, whether this pattern involves a “liability of newness” or a “liability of adolescence” and whether it applies identically to coops created from scratch, to rescues of failing firms and to conversions from sound conventional businesses to the cooperative form. Non-parametric hazard curves are estimated using data on the 2,740 worker cooperatives created in France in 1977–1993, 1,660 of which exited during the period. Comparisons are drawn with conventional French firms whenever data for the same cohorts are available.

This paper seeks to provide an understanding of the relationship between the management control policy of emerging economy (EE) firms and the knowledge transfer with the acquired firm, as well as the mechanism by which specific management control policy facilitates knowledge transfer with the acquired firms.

Employing an organizational learning theory, this paper examines the knowledge transfer from acquired firms to acquiring EE firms through multiple-case study of three EE firms.

Based on organizational learning theory and the results of case studies, this paper finds that the cooperation and willingness of employees in the acquired firm and language barriers are the main factors influencing the relationship between management control policy and the parent company’s knowledge transfer process.

This study sheds light on cross-border knowledge transfer to EE firms from an organizational learning perspective and broadens the understanding of post-acquisition knowledge transfer in an emerging market context.

This study suggests that the low-level management control facilitates knowledge transfer from acquired firms. This is especially true when the parent company from the EE has limited learning experience and faces substantial language barriers between itself and its acquired firm.

This paper extends existing research by exploring how low-level control of acquired firms in developed markets facilitates knowledge transfer of EE firms after cross-border acquisition. Future research can extend this line of research by examining the knowledge transfer mechanism of EE firms through qualitative and quantitative methods.

This chapter investigates the impact of venture capitalists on the operating and market performance of firms going public on the French Nouveau Marché, the German Neuer Markt and the British techMARK. Considering different variables that reflect the quality of venture-backing, the findings suggest that venture-backed firms do not generally outperform those without venture-backing. However, a subgroup of internationally operating venture capitalists has positive effects on the performance of portfolio firms. The outcome is interpreted as evidence of heterogeneity among venture capitalists in the European market.

The aim of this chapter is to analyze the sources of earnings dispersion between trainees and nontrainees. We stress three mechanisms by which investment in general training may affect wage inequality: directly via participation to a general training program and indirectly via the selection process of trainees or the existence of heterogeneous returns on training. This chapter adopts an approach originally proposed by Fields (2003) but extends it to the breakdown of inequality by population subgroups – those who received training and those who did not. The empirical illustration is based on four French surveys, the 2006 Adult Educational Survey and the 2004, 2005, and 2006 Labor Force Surveys that complement it.

Mastering aesthetics is a precious source of competitive advantage in creative industries. In fashion, innovation is reflected by how and how much styles change. Elite designers claim to be the only endogenous force shaping fashion innovation season by season. Yet, each season, fashion critics vet the new collections these designers introduce, assessing what is original as opposed to reworked and uninspired, in this way playing a fundamental role as gatekeepers in setting taste within the industry. In this research, we document how stylistic innovation, vis-à-vis the styles premier design houses introduced each season, is impacted, among the others, by the specific exogenous force of critics' assessments of designers' past work. Our data, which include 61 measures detailing the styles introduced by 38 prestigious Italian and French design houses over a nine-year period, suggest designers move further away from styles reviewed less favourably while adhering more closely to styles reviewed more positively. Additionally, the styles a designer introduces are shown to depend on critical assessments of competing designers' styles, revealing how design houses attend to each other's work. This work documents the strong correlation between style dynamics and critics' feedback. It also has important implications for any company trying to find a balance between independence and conformity in setting its own unique positioning into the market.