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Prior family business research has been dominated by an agency theory perspective, narrow definitions of what constitutes family wealth, and a preoccupation with business governance mechanisms to the exclusion of family governance mechanisms. This chapter presents the findings of examining the role of a broader range of governance mechanisms (for the business; for the family) in achieving more comprehensive wealth (economic and non-economic) family business goals in the Australian context. Based on survey responses from around 400 family businesses, the findings from this study show that both family and business governance mechanisms contribute significantly to achieving both the business’s financial performance and the achievement of family-centered goals that are important to the owning family. The results also suggest that the relationship between governance and performance in the family business context is much more complex than that acknowledged in prior research and has implications for both future research and practice.

Because of growing corporate tax scandals, there is an enhanced focus on corporate taxation by governments, institutions and the general public. Transparency in tax matters has been identified as critical for effectively managing and promoting socially responsible tax behaviour. This study aims to explore the impact of ownership structure, board and audit committee characteristics on corporate tax responsibility (CTR) disclosure.

This research collected data from the annual reports of Pakistani-listed firms over 12 years, from 2009 to 2020. Consequently, the data set encompasses a total of 1,800 firm-year observations. This study uses regression analysis to test the relationship between corporate governance and CTR disclosure.

The results show that board gender diversity, managerial ownership and audit committee independence promote tax responsibility disclosure. In contrast, family board membership, CEO duality, foreign ownership and family ownership negatively impact tax responsibility disclosure. Additional analyses reveal the specific information categories that produce the overall effects on tax responsibility disclosure and assess the moderating impact of family firms on the governance and CTR disclosure nexus.

Corporations can use the results to encourage practices that enhance transparency and improve the quality of disclosures. Regulatory authorities can use the findings to stipulate better protocols. Doing so will be vital for developing countries such as Pakistan to improve tax revenue and cultivate economic growth.

While this research represents, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, one of the first empirical investigations of the association between corporate governance and CTR, the results contribute to the corporate governance literature and offer fresh insights into CTR, an emerging dimension of corporate social responsibility.

This paper aims to examine the nature of corporate governance systems in Ghanaian Family-owned Businesses (FOBs). Specifically, the study investigates the nature of boardroom decisions structures, sources of governance regulations and family roles in corporate governance.

Drawing on Bourdieusian perspectives of the field, capital, habitus and doxa, a case study design is used to gather detailed insights about the phenomena. Purposively, the study conducts 20 interviews with participants from 15 FOBs in Ghana. The interview data are complemented with secondary sources, such as FOB handbooks, website information, legal documents and scriptures. Subsequently, data gathered were thematically analysed.

The study finds that human actors blended traditionally tacit and legally expressed boardroom decisions structures in FOBs governance. Again, traditional values, social acceptance of religious sociology and regulatory frameworks of the field dictate corporate governance practices in FOBs. In multiple family ownerships, orthodoxy of doxa is challenged; hence, power struggles and family roles in governance depend on capital possessed by social actors.

To continue as a going concern, FOBs must be mindful of traditional, religious sociology of family and regulatory frameworks within the field in which they operate. This is because, without this, the going concern of FOBs becomes suspicious and highly unlikely, especially where there are multiple family ownership and generations.

The previous literature predominantly focussed on formal boardroom structures in addressing FOBs' corporate governance issues. Notwithstanding, family governance risk of domineering and distrust associated with traditional and relational governance mechanisms remain under-represented and inconclusive, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa.

We investigate the effect of the adoption of formal board structure and board processes on firm performance in Colombian family firms, in a context where firms can choose specific aspects of board structure and processes. We deploy insights from the behavioral governance perspective to develop arguments about how family businesses may choose board elements based on their degree of control over the firm (absolute control or less), and its effect on firm performance.

We use an unbalanced data panel of 404 firm-year observations. The data was obtained from the annual financial and corporate governance reports of 62 Colombian stock-issuing firms for the period 2008–2014 – due to change in regulation, data could not be added beyond 2014. Panel data technique with random effects was used.

The results show that board structure is positively associated with financial performance, however, this relationship is negative in businesses where family has absolute control. We also found that there is a negative association between board processes and performance, but positive association in family-controlled businesses.

Our research contributes to research streams on effects of family control in firm choices and on the interactive effect of governance choices and institutional context and more generally how actors interact (rather than react) with their institutional context.

This study aims to theoretically investigate the effect of activating corporate governance (CG) mechanisms on the association between adopting corporate social responsibility (CSR) and tax avoidance (TA). Based on the analyzing of the previous studies, the authors support the results of studies that found a positive effect for activating CG on the adoption of CSR. Also, they found that there is a negative impact of activating CG mechanisms on TA, as CG includes controls and procedures that contribute to limiting opportunistic behaviors of management and ensures making decisions that maximize value for shareholders. To the best of the authors' knowledge, it is the only chapter that examines the effect of activating CG mechanisms on the association between CSR and TA.

Justice perceptions describe an individual's evaluation of whether decisions or actions are fair or unfair. These perceptions are important because they affect individual attitudes and behaviors in different situations. Family firms develop and implement governance policies and structures (i.e., governance systems) to diminish the problems that can arise from the overlap between the business, the family, and the ownership systems of a firm. Governance systems help family firms have a clear structure of accountability and a clear understanding of the rights and responsibilities that family and non-family members have toward the family enterprise. Research on governance to date has focused on the practices and policies that exist and their effects on the family firm. However, in the governance context, individual perceptions are important because they are likely to affect the attitudes that family and other members have toward the family enterprise and the likelihood that they will follow the different policies when they are implemented. This chapter takes a receiver perspective to explain how individuals create justice perceptions based on governance mechanisms and the effects of these perceptions. The goal is to understand how we can use this information when developing governance practices in family firms.

Family businesses are essential to the global economy but often grapple with family-related issues, especially during succession. This study explores how governance tools like the family protocol (FP) mitigate conflicts by setting standards for family firm management and continuity. Pioneering the use of game theory and adverse selection setups in family business governance, this research uncovers FP determinants.

This research employs game theory and adverse selection setups to delve into the strategic decision-making processes of stakeholders in family firms. The authors break new ground by applying principal–agent theory (PAT) to family business governance structures. This innovative approach uncovers the determinants of the FP, enhancing the authors’ understanding of family firm dynamics.

The authors emphasize the importance of custom governance structures, such as the FP, in managing complex family-business interactions. These structures mitigate conflicts and promote smoother transitions during succession, ensuring family firm continuity. This study identifies key determinants, and these results will aid founders, families and practitioners in achieving smoother transitions, ensuring family firm continuity.

This research pioneers game theory and PAT applications in family business governance, shedding light on the effectiveness of customized governance mechanisms. By identifying FP determinants, the authors contribute to a deeper understanding of family firm dynamics. The findings have practical implications for founders, families, practitioners and consultants, promoting the long-term success and harmony of family firms in the global economy.

In recent years, the corporate governance structures of family businesses have become increasingly important to the public. This is due not only to the increasing number of corporate successions but also to the (still) lower degree of formalization of corporate governance in family-owned companies. In this chapter, the authors analyze theoretical and empirical findings on family governance with a focus on family constitution and present the results of their own exploratory empirical survey conducted in 2017.

This study aims to examine the effect of corporate cash holdings on financial performance. Additionally, it investigates the moderating effect of corporate governance and family ownership on the link between corporate cash holdings and financial performance.

This study uses secondary data regarding the sample of 81 firms listed in the Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE) 100 index from 2011 to 2020. The present study applies the system generalized method of moments (GMM) to estimate the dynamic financial performance models.

The findings reveal that corporate cash holding is significantly positively linked with financial performance. Further, the findings indicate that the board size and chief executive officer (CEO) duality strengthen the association between cash holdings and financial performance, whereas CEO gender and family ownership weaken the positive effect of cash holdings on financial performance. Furthermore, the findings suggest that Covid-19 significantly negatively affected the financial performance of Pakistani firms.

The findings have several policy implications. First, policymakers need to increase the board of directors' role in observing the firms' cash-holding behaviour. Policymakers may also formulate policies providing stronger protection for minority shareholders from majority shareholders.

To the best of the authors' knowledge, this study is the first to examine how corporate governance and family ownership influence the link between corporate cash holdings and financial performance in the context of Pakistan.