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A hedge-fund strategist had two decisions to make. First, what was the path of core euro zone long-term interest rates likely to be over the next year? Was the dramatic decline in German long rates over the past few years an aberration that would soon be reversed, or was it part of the “new normal” that would persist for some time? Second, how would periphery long rates evolve relative to core rates? That is—the spread between long rates in the likes of Greece, Spain, and Ireland and those in Germany—how would they evolve over the next year? Was the dramatic divergence in euro zone long rates likely to persist, or would the coming year see a continuation of the modest reconvergence that has occurred since mid–2012? He knew many factors influenced long-term interest rates; he would have to use his entire toolkit to address this issue. The evidence was in no way clear-cut. Some factors pointed toward lower German rates, some toward higher, some toward a widening of euro zone spreads (even a dissolution of the euro zone as we know it?), and some toward reconvergence.

After experiencing long, multiyear surges and slides in past decades, by summer 2013, the dollar had been range-bound against the euro. In this case, by assessing potential capital flows, students consider whether global currency market trends would propel the dollar higher, or if the past few years were just a pause in a much longer dollar depreciation episode. Suitable for both core and elective MBA courses in global financial markets and international finance, this case explores factors pointing to further euro appreciation and to others favoring the dollar. Sorting through mounds of evidence is necessary before forecasting the exchange rate's likely path. Filtering that evidence requires thinking about FX markets, prospective monetary policies, and past and prospective international capital flows.

In January 2011, during the World Economic Forum's annual meeting in Davos, Switzerland, Jason Sterling, a hedge fund manager, was conducting online research to see if he could trade on any newsworthy information emerging from the summit. Sterling's fund traded primarily in sovereign debt, and he needed to figure out if European leaders would be able to come up with a viable solution to the crisis or whether the debt crisis would lead to the default of several European nations. He knew that if a solution was not found in the coming weeks, the sovereign debt markets could be thrown into turmoil.

In September, 2011, to prevent its currency from appreciating after the Global Financial Crisis, the Swiss National Bank (SNB) decided to peg its currency to EUR and announced that it would not let CHF go beyond 1/1.20 EUR. Maintaining the peg required the SNB to purchase foreign currency assets virtually endlessly in response to the worsening Eurozone crisis. By end of 2014, its foreign currency exchange reserves amounted to almost 80% of its GDP. In an attempt to deter capital flows and reduce its balance sheet size, in December, 2014, the SNB first bought the interest rate on commercial bank deposits to negative levels and then, facing impending quantitative easing by the European Central Bank, announced the removal of the peg on January 15, 2015. The case describes the backdrop and the circumstances leading up to removal of the peg.

This case is a sequel to the “IndiGrid: Creating India's First Power Transmission InvIT (A)” case. It describes the deal that would replace the trust's original sponsor, Sterlite Power, with a new set of KKR-led financial investors. It provides an opportunity to discuss the consequences of this change on the new investment manager's outlook for management and future acquisitions. The new investment manager, freed from the limiting interest of the original sponsor, had to search for investment opportunities from the perspective of incoming financial investors, which included the new sponsor. It also provides an opportunity to evaluate the trade-offs in investing in operational utility-scale renewable energy assets by the IndiGrid, which had so far only acquired operational transmission assets in its portfolio.

Corporate finance, strategic financial management, financial innovation and financial engineering.

The case is suitable for graduate level management students.

In early April 2011, Mr Ramakrishnan, the CFO of Tata Power Ltd and members of his team were busy re-evaluating fundraising options for financing Tata Power's capital expenditure requirements, for refinancing of debt, for working capital related to current projects and for liquidity to support potential acquisition bids. The team had the task of evaluating different innovative funding options as the challenge was to strike a fine balance between maintaining the owners' equity without dilution of control and avoiding any adverse impact on credit rating that could increase the cost of capital; these constraints reduced flexibility for fund raising. Keeping in mind the global market scenario and estimating the investor appetite were factors critical to the structuring of a funding instrument.

The case will help students to be comfortable in thinking about evaluating markets, financial instruments and weigh rating considerations and regulatory constraints for taking capital structure decisions.

Teaching notes are available for educators only. Please contact your library to gain login details or email support@emeraldinsight.com to request teaching notes.

An estimate of the fair rate of return on capital is a critical input into tariff regulation. A too high estimate will lead to high tariffs for consumers; a too low estimate will not provide adequate incentives for investment. The Airport Economic Regulatory Authority of India has issued a consultation paper for finalizing the norms and procedure for estimating the fair rate of return. It now needs to reconcile the differing view and approaches of different stakeholders.

The primary teaching objective is to discuss the capital raising efforts of a firm under financial distress. It also provides supporting data to calculate cost of capital, DuPont/modified DuPont values and Altman’s Z-Score that can appropriately be incorporated into the discussion. Case-B provides information and data of the company’s recent performance and to changes in bankruptcy law in India. Overall, this case study provides ample scope to discuss, understand and provide the solution to the following key corporate finance themes as follows: 1. Analyzing accounting statements and examine potential earnings quality issue. 2. Predicting default and bankruptcy using qualitative analysis, financial ratios, traditional and modified DuPont models and Altman’s Z score model. 3. Examining the capital raising efforts of a distressed firm, which has already defaulted on borrowings. 4. To explore the impact of changes in regulation on the turnaround efforts of the firm as well as on the promoters of the firm.

Since 2005, Amtek Auto moved at a breathtaking speed with the goal of reaching $10bn in sales, from the current level of about $1.2bn. The group had acquired more than a dozen companies spending about Rs.5,000cr. ($850m) during this period primarily through borrowed funds. However, the market and business expansion was not happening as expected. The company’s capacity utilization was just about 40% (approx.) during much of this period. The mounting fixed costs of operation and debt servicing grew to the level of unsustainability, led the firm to default on its borrowing. Now the company had to quickly recapitalize itself to run its operations and retain the premier position in auto component industry. The company and its promoters were considering various methods of debt restructuring, asset sale and further equity infusion.

Introductory and elective level corporate finance.

Teaching notes are available for educators only.

CSS 1: Accounting and Finance.

In April 2012, JPMorgan Chase & Company was struggling with large losses that had the potential to damage the reputation of the company, of its Chairman, Jamie Dimon, and of its Chief Investment Officer, Ina Drew. The losses arose from large credit derivative trades in the London office that Dimon described as “bad strategy … badly executed … poorly monitored”.

In August 2007 the Mainsail II SIV-Lite was frozen by its trustee as a result of the ongoing credit crisis. The state of Maine held $20 million of Mainsail commercial paper in its Cash Pool portfolio, a short-term portfolio that puts temporary, excess state revenues to work. When word of the potential loss became public, the Treasurer came under attack. The case introduces the functions of a state Treasury department, with particular emphasis on the investment objectives and guidelines for the cash pool as well as its composition. The case reviews the events leading up to and including August 2007, the month when the credit markets first began to seize and when the financial crisis effectively began. It examines securitization, structured finance, and the Mainsail SIV-Lite structure in some detail.