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The purpose of this paper is to analyze the implications of the target valuation uncertainty on the wealth distribution between the target and acquirer firms in successful mergers. The paper specifically analyzes the division of the total dollar gains between the two parties and also whether the target and/or the acquirer experience a positive/negative gain in mergers when valuation of the target company is more uncertain.

The analyses contrast the implications of the uncertainty in three well‐known merger hypotheses; the market‐for‐corporate‐control, hubris and synergy.

The results are supportive of the implications of the synergy hypothesis. As target valuation uncertainty decreases, it is more likely that both parties experience positive gains from the transaction although more of the gains from the merger significantly shift towards the target company.

Results suggest that both parties are bargaining on the synergy gains and the target is able to negotiate a greater portion of the synergy gains when the value of the target becomes more predictable.

Reports the results of two experimental tests of the extent to which the large disparity between people’s valuation of gains and losses, and related fairness determinations, are used in judging the acceptability of alternative negotiating or conflict resolution proposals. Participants acted as arbitrators and selected their preferred resolution of conflicts, involving either the division of gains or sharing responsibility for losses. Different cases were presented in which one or the other party incurred varied combinations of direct or opportunity costs, or received varied forms of payments. Contrary to conventional economic assumptions, but consistent with earlier behavioural findings, direct costs incurred by one party to the negotiation were far more important than opportunity costs in setting the terms of a more acceptable resolution. The results strongly suggest that recent behavioural findings might be used to improve the design of negotiating and conflict resolution proposals.

Agency theory suggests that if managers are not monitored, takeover negotiations may be contaminated by agency conflicts, which may weaken a firm's bargaining position. This paper argues that some blockholders are more effective monitors than others, and tests whether the negotiating power of a target or bidder is influenced by their respective blockholder composition. The paper aims to discuss these issues.

This paper classifies target and bidder outside blockholders as either aggressive monitors or moderate monitors, and tests whether the degrees of monitoring effectiveness influence a firm's share of the total wealth created by the takeover (a proxy for bargaining power).

This paper finds that firms that have the types of outside blockholders with a greater tendency to monitor managers elicit higher takeover gains. This suggests that negotiating power in takeovers is conditioned on the types of blockholders that monitor the target and bidder. The results support the premise that better monitoring leads to higher gains for shareholders in a takeover. In particular, the findings suggest that the greater the tendency of outside blockholders to monitor managers, the lower the level of takeover-related agency conflicts and the stronger a firm's relative bargaining power.

These findings imply that agency conflicts on either side of a takeover bid may be reduced by better monitoring, but especially among bidders.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze a contract-based relationship for value co-creation and gain-sharing between two companies for the purpose of industrial maintenance services. After five years of good results for both parties, the relationship was terminated, thus raising questions regarding on the actual gains shared by both partners from joint actions.

The research method is the longitudinal case study. The research question is: why would a contractual relationship of co-creation of value be terminated given the fact that it yielded good financial results for both parts over the course of five years? The main research techniques were structured interviews with relevant actors and documental analysis from both parts involved in the contract.

Even valuable contracts can be terminated if the external scenario changes significantly: it matters very little the good job done together if the result became poor due to external reasons, as buyer’s sales drop in the period. In the inner scenario, mistruth can arise if the buyer maintains parallel structures for performing similar tasks to those of the service provider, showing some kind of independence from the supplier.

The main limitation is that inherent to case studies: the lack of generalization.

When companies decide to contract regular long-term maintenance services, preventions to revenue reductions of the main activity the must be present, for the continuity of the contract.

To the date of this research, no similar study was found, regarding the influence of the external results in the internal relationships in co-creation value contracts.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the origin of economics as a separate science.

A very comprehensive approach is presented for determining the origin of economics as a science. Three kinds of inter‐related issues are discussed: how to interpret and evaluate earlier, particularly ancient, writings, the specification of the requirements for declaring economics as a science and the definition, scope and methodology of economics.

Application of the most stringent requirements for declaring economics as a separate science to Kautilya's Arthashastra validated A.K. Sen's claim that it is the first book on economics.

According to Kautilya, economics is a separate science but not independent of other disciplines and particularly of ethics. Whereas, most of the current research ignores this inter‐dependence and consequently does not fully capture reality.

It implies that the inter‐dependence between economics and other disciplines should be encouraged and vigorously explored.

It validates Redman's assertion, “The history of economics as a science is, in my view, still waiting to be properly written”.

The purpose of this paper is to show that existing theories, principally Dunning’s OLI model, Mathews LLL model and Rugman’s version of internalization theory are unable to explain the rise of emerging market multinationals (EMNEs). The reason is that they over-emphasize the strategic importance of intangibles and ignore that of complementary local assets. Taking complementary local assets into account makes it possible to understand why EMNEs are able to finance their intangible-buying sprees and, often with the help of their governments, to swap market access for technology.

This is a conceptual paper based on the bundling model (JIBS 2009) and backed by the case histories of four EMNEs.

The author shows that EMNEs have much better prospects vis-à-vis established MNEs than generally thought in Western Europe and the USA and that they will become serious competitors.

This is, as far as the author knows, the first explanation of why EMNEs have the bargaining power and the resources necessary to swap or buy technology from established MNEs.

The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate how the practice of program management can be used to manage strategically‐oriented initiatives such as mergers and acquisitions (M&As).

The methodology applied is high‐level reflective retrospective qualitative field research conducted by a practitioner‐scholar in response to the research question: How does the program management approach applied to a small‐scale acquisition compare to the current joint bodies of program management and M&A theory and practice?

The practice of program management provides a means for managing strategically oriented initiatives such as small‐scale acquisitions.

This paper is constrained by a high‐level literature review of English language publications only, and high‐level reflective retrospective qualitative field research conducted by a single practitioner‐scholar upon a single relatively small‐scale acquisition, which cannot necessarily be scaled up to be representative of a larger‐scale acquisition, nor given the differences between M&As be used as a direct template for other M&As. Also, as a purely qualitative field research study into an area of intermediate maturity, the response to the research question lacks statistical support.

M&As are increasing in frequency and yet continue to have relatively high‐failure rates. Based on the findings of this paper, the practice of program management provides a means of managing strategic initiatives such as acquisitions.

This paper adds to the bodies of program management and M&A literature, from the dual perspectives of practice and research, particularly with reference to small acquisitions and acquisitions in the small and medium enterprise sector.

This study aims to investigate how three critical governance decisions by foreign firms impacted their survivability post-initial public offerings (IPO): the choice of CEO (founder vs non-founder); the power the founder CEO wields relative to the board in terms of CEO duality; and board size.

This study uses data from 86 foreign firms that completed IPOs in the US market between 2000 and 2008 and adopts a Cox proportional hazards model to examine how the founder, founder CEO duality and board size influence foreign firm delisting post-IPO.

A founder CEO or a founder CEO with duality (i.e. when a founder CEO is also chair of the board of directors) does not support a foreign firm’s survival post-IPO. Expectedly, board size has a negative impact on post-IPO firm survivability; however, founder CEO duality positively moderates this negative relationship. Therefore, founder CEO duality plays a positive indirect role in the context of post-IPO firms with large boards.

First, while the benefits of CEO duality have been empirically ambiguous, this study clarifies how founder CEO duality manifests its positive impacts in foreign listings. Second, by focusing on board cognition, this study confirms the negative impact of large boards, but highlights that this can be mitigated by governance leadership structure. Finally, despite organizational life-cycle theorists’ advocacy of the replacement of founder CEOs with professional CEOs in sizable ventures, this study shows the benefits of their retention when the board is large.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate how customer relationship management (CRM) implementation affects internal capital allocation efficiency, the efficiency with which a firm allocates its capital across its business segments.

The authors use a statistical regression method to analyze a sample of 801 unique firms in the USA from COMPUSTAT and the Computer Intelligence database. This analysis examines the relation between CRM implementation and internal capital allocation efficiency and identifies the conditions under which firms benefit more from CRM implementation. They also use instrumental variables (IVs) to address endogenous concerns with a two-stage least squares (2SLS) model.

The authors find that CRM implementation is positively related to internal capital allocation efficiency. The results are robust to the 2SLS analysis with IVs. This positive relation is more pronounced for firms with effective internal control and for those operating in highly competitive markets.

The research implies that that CRM can have a significant cross-functional effect on corporate financing and budgeting. This also suggests that when chief marketing officers plan marketing initiatives and implement CRM, they should communicate to chief financial officers not only the direct effect but also the indirect strategic benefits of such initiatives to a firm.

The authors reveal a previously overlooked aspect of marketing accountability by suggesting marketing’s impact on internal capital markets. They also enrich the body of literature on CRM benefits by showing a cross-functional benefit from marketing to finance (or capital allocation).

The development of the large modern corporation, and the separation of ownership from control, has raised questions about the objectives these companies set themselves. Discusses the markets and hierarchies model of organizational structures. Analyses the claim that specific organizational structures lead to superior profitability. Concludes that relatively few firms have adopted the structure claimed to yield the highest profits and that there is no evidence to support the view that internal structure and profitability are linked in the manner described by the model.