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This chapter looks critically at the changed language of education due to the adoption in the last two or three decades of a ‘business model’ for improving education. It briefly…
Abstract
Purpose
This chapter looks critically at the changed language of education due to the adoption in the last two or three decades of a ‘business model’ for improving education. It briefly traces the history of these changes which have rarely been brought to the attention of the public.
Methodology
This chapter delves more deeply beneath this language in order to explore the unacknowledged philosophical assumptions – referring to Wittgenstein’s aim which was to help people to pass from a piece of disguised nonsense to the recognition of it being patent nonsense.
Findings
This points out how, given the managerial language, this distorts our understanding of what it means to educate – there is an inappropriate ‘logic of action’.
Originality
The ethical dimension to educational leadership gets distorted or ignored. There is a need therefore to examine more carefully what is meant by an ‘educational practice’ – otherwise leadership coursed might be good at teaching ‘effectiveness’ in teaching to the test, but have little to do with education.
Details
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The power of the executive to refer cases involving criminal conviction back to an appellate court is a mechanism for guarding against miscarriages of justice and regulating the…
Abstract
The power of the executive to refer cases involving criminal conviction back to an appellate court is a mechanism for guarding against miscarriages of justice and regulating the inherent fallibility of the criminal justice system. These cases typically come before the executive by way of a petition that claims a person has been wrongfully convicted. In Australia, however, there are few guidelines and little information as to the criteria and standards by which the executive decides whether to refer a petitioned case. The test the petitioner must meet is not clear. This chapter therefore has two purposes. The first is to examine the types of petitions most likely to be referred to the appellate court by the executive. These cases are shown to fall into particular categories. The second is to argue that, from these categories, inferences may be drawn about the test the executive uses in deciding whether to refer a petition. These inferences follow from the common principles and links between the cases in each category. The chapter identifies the test the petition should meet to have optimal chance of referral.