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Gary Parr, deputy chairman of Lazard Freres & Co. and Kellogg class of 1980, could not believe his ears. “You can't mean that,” he said, reacting to the lowered bid given by Doug Braunstein, JP Morgan head of investment banking, for Parr's client, legendary investment bank Bear Stearns. Less than eighteen months after trading at an all-time high of $172.61 a share, Bear now had little choice but to accept Morgan's humiliating $2-per-share, Federal Reserve-sanctioned bailout offer. “I'll have to get back to you.” Hanging up the phone, Parr leaned back and gave an exhausted sigh. Rumors had swirled around Bear ever since two of its hedge funds imploded as a result of the subprime housing crisis, but time and again, the scrappy Bear appeared to have weathered the storm. Parr's efforts to find a capital infusion for the bank had resulted in lengthy discussions and marathon due diligence sessions, but one after another, potential investors had backed away, scared off in part by Bear's sizable mortgage holdings at a time when every bank on Wall Street was reducing its positions and taking massive write-downs in the asset class. In the past week, those rumors had reached a fever pitch, with financial analysts openly questioning Bear's ability to continue operations and its clients running for the exits. Now Sunday afternoon, it had already been a long weekend, and it would almost certainly be a long night, as the Fed-backed bailout of Bear would require onerous negotiations before Monday's market open. By morning, the eighty-five-year-old investment bank, which had survived the Great Depression, the savings and loan crisis, and the dot-com implosion, would cease to exist as an independent firm. Pausing briefly before calling CEO Alan Schwartz and the rest of Bear's board, Parr allowed himself a moment of reflection. How had it all happened?

An analysis of the fall of Bear Stearns facilitates an understanding of the difficulties affecting the entire investment banking industry: high leverage, overreliance on short-term financing, excessive risk taking on proprietary trading and asset management desks, and myopic senior management all contributed to the massive losses and loss of confidence. The impact on the global economy was of epic proportions.

The case integrates frameworks on business models, the business model canvas (BMC) and Porter’s generic strategies in the context of the coffee industry in China. The case enables students to construct a Business Model Canvas for competing companies, analyze the canvas to deduce the generic strategy they are pursuing, and formulate recommendations based on this analysis.

The case is derived from secondary sources, including publicly available reports and information about Starbucks and Luckin.

This case looks at Starbucks in China as it faces a fierce Chinese competitor and evolving consumer behavior. Luckin, a Chinese coffee store company, had seen explosive growth since its inception in Beijing in 2017. By late 2019, its number of brick-and-mortar locations surpassed the number of Starbucks’ coffee stores in China, which had entered the Chinese market two decades earlier in 1999. Luckin’s focused on convenience through leveraging technology and reducing costs by limiting physical stores. Although Luckin’s fortunes turned in March of 2020, after an accounting scandal came to light, Luckin’s success suggests that consumers were attracted to its positioning as a “fast coffee pickup and delivery” provider. The case describes Starbucks’ strategy in China, which it sees as an important long-term growth market. It also describes the strategic activities of fast-growing, Chinese coffee company Luckin and discusses Chinese culture and consumer behavior.

The case is written for undergraduate students enrolled in a business strategy or corporate entrepreneurship course. Given that the case centers on China, it could also be used in international entrepreneurship/business courses.

This case examines the April 2007 decision of British music company EMI to suspend its annual dividend as the company struggled to respond to the effect of digital audio distribution on its core business. The EMI case is intended to serve as an engaging introduction to corporate financial policy and themes in managing the right side of the balance sheet. The case contrasts EMI's storied success with artists such as the Beatles, the Beach Boys, Pink Floyd, and Norah Jones with its recent inability to succeed in financial markets. In light of takeover threats and restructuring costs, EMI's CFO Martin Stewart must recommend EMI's dividend policy.

After decades of successful expansion, The Reader's Digest Association's products were mature. With an average readership age for the flagship Reader's Digest magazine of 50.3 in 2004, efforts to develop new products had so far failed to entice a significant number of younger customers. Following a financial downturn in 1996, positive financial results remained illusive. Several major changes instituted by Thomas O. Ryder, CEO since 1998, including acquisitions, re-capitalization, restructuring and systematic re-engineering of the corporate culture, had proven mildly successful, but RDA, as well as the entire publishing industry, faced a persistent decline in profitability. Could RDA fulfill its stated mission to create “products that inform, enrich, entertain and inspire people of all ages and cultures around the world”, and could it do this by continuing to rely on the 80-year old Reader's Digest magazine?