Search results

This paper uses contingent claims analysis to evaluate the implicit government guarantee to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac prior to their placement into conservatorship. The main findings of the paper indicate that the expected value of the guarantee was in line with the size of capital injections under the Treasury Preferred Stock Purchase Agreement and that the market expected the government to cover nearly all expected losses on senior debt. However, simulations reveal that the eventual total cost to recapitalize the GSEs may be significantly higher than provided for under the original terms of the conservatorship.

The purpose of this chapter is to outline new methodological developments in business valuation, with particular attention to how those developments are being used in litigation involving lost profits and the value of operating businesses. In addition to methodological developments, the chapter also includes a discussion of recent legal developments, particularly selected cases that affect the use and standards for business valuation techniques within litigation settings. Finally, the chapter includes a mathematical appendix.

In this paper, we develop a specific valuation model far the American perpetual put option with uncertain exercise price and empirically verify that the closed-end fund (CEF) discount puzzle can be explained by a put model.Using available sample data of 56 CEFs for the most recent seven years, we find strong empirical evidence for our discount approach. We find no significant differences between the average discounts and average returns of domestic and international funds. However, the international funds seem to have significantly greater volatility of returns than that of domestic funds, implying that foreign financial assets could be priced differently from domestic funds.

This paper provides a fuller characterization of the analytical upper bounds for American options than has been available to date. We establish properties required of analytical upper bounds without any direct reliance on the exercise boundary. A class of generalized European claims on the same underlying asset is then proposed as upper bounds. This set contains the existing closed form bounds of Margrabe, (1978) and Chen and Yeh (2002) as special cases and allows randomization of the maturity payoff. Owing to the European nature of the bounds, across-strike arbitrage conditions on option prices seem to carry over to the bounds. Among other things, European option spreads may be viewed as ratio positions on the early exercise option. To tighten the upper bound, we propose a quasi-bound that holds as an upper bound for most situations of interest and seems to offer considerable improvement over the currently available closed form bounds. As an approximation, the discounted value of Chen and Yeh's (2002) bound holds some promise. We also discuss implications for parametric and nonparametric empirical option pricing. Sample option quotes for the European (XEO) and the American (OEX) options on the S&P 100 Index appear well behaved with respect to the upper bound properties but the bid–ask spreads are too wide to permit a synthetic short position in the early exercise option.

The new Basel Accord (known as Basel II) attempts to introduce more risk-sensitive capital requirements. We propose a multiperiod deposit insurance pricing model that incorporates specific regulatory capital requirements and the possibility of capital forbearance and moral hazard. We estimate the cost of deposit insurance under alternative regulation regimes based on the building block approach of the 1988 Basel Accord (known as Basel I) and internal model-based (IMB) capital regulation. In contrast to the building block of Basel I, Basel II's IMB capital regulation links more closely the capital requirement to a bank's actual risk. We develop a multiperiod pricing model while incorporating the effects of capital forbearance and moral hazard. The fairly-priced premium rates are computed by assuming that a bank's asset value follows a GARCH process. In contrast to previous studies based on the building block capital standard, we find that forbearance and the potential moral hazard behavior will not increase the cost of deposit insurance in the scheme of Basel II's IMB capital regulation.