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Boards of directors often attempt to foster corporate entrepreneurship by replacing a firmʼs chief executive officer (CEO). Compelling theoretical arguments and anecdotal evidence suggest that when firm performance has suffered, a new CEO is best suited to lead the firmʼs creative endeavors. On the other hand, among firms that retain their existing CEO after a decline in performance, manipulating the CEOʼs compensation package is a common governance practice used by boards to encourage innovation. In these cases, some have argued that increasing the CEOʼs pay will encourage corporate entrepreneurship, because the CEO has been compensated for assuming additional risk. Counter to these propositions, this study develops theoretical arguments that a firmʼs existing CEO is better equipped to foster corporate entrepreneurship and that this probability increases when the CEOʼs cash compensation is decreased. Results from a sample of 100 single-product manufacturing firms suggest firms that retain their current CEO and decrease the CEOʼs cash compensation are most likely to engage in corporate entrepreneurship. Implications that this research has for corporate entrepreneurship, corporate governance, and firm performance are discussed.

This paper aims to study the impact of audit quality on the components of executive cash compensation. It is predicted that as audit quality improves, greater emphasis will be placed on the incentive components of cash compensation, and lower emphasis on the salary (fixed) component. Specifically, it is predicted that as audit quality enhances, greater emphasis will be placed on earnings and sales revenues in determining executive cash compensation. Using auditor specialization as a proxy for audit quality, empirical support is provided for all of our predictions.

This paper provides empirical support with agency theoretic predictions.

This paper developed the following hypotheses: H1 – in executive cash compensation, more weight is being placed on earnings-based measures as auditor specialization improves; H2 – in executive cash compensation, more weight is also being placed on sales revenues as auditor specialization improves; H3 – in executive cash compensation, salary levels decrease as auditor specialization improves; and H4 – the impact of auditor specialization on the weight on earnings, sales and the salary levels is lower in the post-Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) period compared to pre-SOX period.

First, the article limits itself to cash compensation, while current executive compensation is largely made of equity. Second, the measure of audit quality used, ‘national level auditor specialization’, may not be as effective in the post-SOX era.

Compensation committees should pay attention to audit quality (in whatever way it may be proxied by) in determining executive compensation.

This is the first paper to show that audit quality not only improves the earnings response coefficient in firm valuation but also enhances the weight placed on earnings (and sales revenues) in executive compensation.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the empirical relationship between gray directors (non-executive non-independent directors) and executive compensation among companies listed in India’s National Stock Exchange (NSE). The paper also examines the possible interplay of relationships between controlling shareholder duality (controlling shareholder being the CEO), ownership category and executive compensation.

A sample of 438 firms listed in the NSE of India was studied using data spanning five financial years, 2012–2013 to 2016–2017.

Empirical evidence suggests that there is a positive association between the proportion of gray directors on the board and executive compensation. The sensitivity of executive compensation to gray directors is found to be higher among family controlled firms. This research has also found that CEOs who belong to controlling shareholder groups received higher pay than professional CEOs. The authors conjecture that these results suggest cronyism and may contribute to lower levels of corporate governance practices in the country.

The hybrid board structure, which India has adopted with the desire to bring the best of Anglo Saxon and Japanese board philosophies, has paradoxically led to self-serving boards. Exploration of alternative thinking to bring about changes in the regulatory framework is, therefore, necessary.

Serious problems are identified with the philosophy behind board composition mandated by Listing Requirements for Indian firms with empirical evidence showing how the existing rules generate cronyism and unfairness to minority shareholders.

Environmental Accounting (EA) practices have developed rapidly in some countries and have a positive impact on their organizations. Sustainability report (SR) as an indicator of EA practices helps company gain a better reputation and it is set by management. However, some ASEAN countries including Indonesia do not have relevant accounting standards on the environment. EA practice is still not widely known in Indonesia, although, internationally there have been standards that provide guidelines for aspect of the environment such as the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI). Another aspect in GRI is remuneration. Remuneration is part of personnel cost which is a motivation about the positive effects of EA practices to disclose management concern. This research introduces a tool to evaluate a remuneration structure and the consistency of EA practices in the Sustainability Report.

Based on stakeholder, agency and institutional theory, this study aims to examine the role of institutional ownership in the relationship between environmental, social and governance practices and CEO compensation.

Utilizing a fixed-effect panel regression analysis, this research utilized a panel data approach, analyzing data spanning from 2014 to 2021, focusing on US companies listed on the S&P500 stock market index. The dataset encompassed 219 companies, leading to a total of 1,533 observations.

The analysis identified that environmental scores significantly impact CEO equity-linked compensation, unlike social and governance scores. Additionally, it was found that institutional ownership acts as a moderating factor in the relationship between the environmental score and CEO equity-linked compensation, as well as the association between the social score and CEO equity-linked compensation. Interestingly, the direction of these moderating effects varied between the two relationships, suggesting a nuanced role of institutional ownership.

This research makes a unique contribution to the field of corporate governance by exploring the relatively understudied area of institutional ownership's influence on the ESG practices–CEO compensation nexus.

To investigate the effects of payor–provider integration on the operational performance of health service provision. The research explores whether integration governs agency problems and tilts the incentives of diverse actors toward more systematic outcomes.

A two stage multimethod case study of occupational health services. A qualitative stage aimed to understand the reasons, mechanisms, and outcomes of payor–provider integration. A quantitative stage evaluated the performance of the integrated hospital against fee-for-service partner hospitals with a sample of 2,726 patients.

Payor–provider integration mitigates agency problems on multiple levels of the service system by complementing formal governance mechanisms with informal mechanisms. Compared to partner hospitals, the integrated hospital yielded 9% lower the total costs of occupational injuries achieved primarily by emphasizing conservative care and faster recovery.

Focuses on occupational health services in Finland. Provides initial evidence of the effects of payor–provider integration on the operational performance.

Vertical integration may provide systematic outcomes but requires mindful implementation of multiple mechanisms. Rigorous change management initiative is advised.

For patients, the research shows payor–provider integration of health services can be implemented in a manner that it reduces care costs while not compromising care quality and customer satisfaction.

This study provides a rare longitudinal analysis of payor–provider integration in health-care operations management. The study adds to the knowledge of operational performance improvement of health services.

This study aims to examine whether chief executive officer (CEO) pay-performance sensitivity to shareholder wealth is related to the use of non-financial performance measures in incentive contracts.

Using hand-collected performance measure data in a sample of S&P 500 firms across the period 1994–2010, this study investigates the sensitivity of CEO bonus and cash pay to shareholder wealth of firms that use non-financial performance (NFPM) measures of varying types and contractual weights in their bonus contracts along with financial measures (NFPM firms) in comparison to that of firms using financial measures only (FPM firms).

This study finds evidence that the pay-performance sensitivity is stronger in NFPM firms than in FPM firms. These results are driven by the use of CEO individual goals and operational efficiency. Furthermore, when using environmental, social and governance factors, the pay-performance sensitivity is stronger in terms of accounting performance only. This study also finds that using NFPM enhances pay-performance sensitivity more as their contractual weights increase and as financial risk increases.

These findings are important to stakeholders, and especially regulators in understanding incentive effects of alternative performance measures. This study also sheds light on what types of non-financial measures are better in helping firms align CEOs’ incentives to shareholders’ interests.

This study contributes to prior research on benefits of non-financial information within the context of executive compensation. This study presents original results about the effects of contractual weights of non-financial measures and financial risk on CEO pay-performance sensitivity. This study also presents new insights regarding how different types of non-financial measures affect CEO pay-performance sensitivity.