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The first Principia Mathematica (1686) by Sir Isaac Newton with reference to natural philosophy and his system of the world has largely contributed to the first revolution in scientific thinking in modern times. It has created the conceptual basis of modern science in the classical tradition by providing the tools of analysis and the technique of reasoning in terms of stability—from—within or, as we would say today, the model of stable equilibrium conditions.

Nobody concerned with political economy can neglect the history of economic doctrines. Structural changes in the economy and society influence economic thinking and, conversely, innovative thought structures and attitudes have almost always forced economic institutions and modes of behaviour to adjust. We learn from the history of economic doctrines how a particular theory emerged and whether, and in which environment, it could take root. We can see how a school evolves out of a common methodological perception and similar techniques of analysis, and how it has to establish itself. The interaction between unresolved problems on the one hand, and the search for better solutions or explanations on the other, leads to a change in paradigma and to the formation of new lines of reasoning. As long as the real world is subject to progress and change scientific search for explanation must out of necessity continue.

Presents the first chapter in this work with regard to the search for new ideas and better interpretations in the growth and development of new ideas. Investigates the exchange of views between thinkers of different points of view. Invites co‐operation between various factions to investigate unification of all known sciences (natural and economic) and to include the arts. Mentions all the great thinkers in these areas and unreservedly discusses their contribution in the school of thought. Proffers that modern technology cannot and should not be slowed down and that for the social economy of human solidarity should be aimed for, to begin a new era for humanity.

This is the second part of a long investigation under the title of, Principia Oeconomica; the first having appeared in this journal in 1986. The substance of the argument in this contribution is in the form of a dialogue with Henri Guitton, member of l'Institut de France and author of a book in French, De l'Imperfection en Economie (1979). Guitton is leading a new French Economic School critical of a modern economy characterised by ‘Econosm” or “Economy of Counter‐sense”. Economism refers to the practice of conceiving problems of a modern society in strictly economic‐accounting terms and neglecting a host of social and human aspects. The second term means that the sole attention given to growth in production did not increase the happiness of man but on the contrary it created for him new problems (pollution, noise, atomic radiation and other hazards). To cope with these problems, the French school recommends wise policies which Guitton called “creative imperfection”. Guitton's presentation is followed step by step, with an interpretation in terms of stable equilibrium. The recommendation stresses structural reforms to solve the same problems but following a road of “creative perfection” leading to the same goal sought by Guitton: a better world of tomorrow.

The article makes a comprehensive study of the development of social economic thought in the history of economic doctrines. Traces of social economic development are dated back to the Physiocrats and moral philosophers and reference is made to the early Arab works in the developments of these social economic doctrines. The social economic thought in the classical school of economic theory is critically studied. It is shown that with the advancement of economic theory in the hands of the neoclassical school and its latter‐day developments social economic doctrines receded from mainstream economics. The contemporary social economists in North America have fallen into the trap of these neoclassical approaches applied to the study of social economic phenomena. The article also shows that similar neoclassical and ethically neutral traces continue in the works of the mixed economy theorists, institutionalists, macroeconomists, monetarists, rational expectations hypothesists, public and social choice theorists of all types. Thus, the whole gamut of mainstream economics is shown to be trapped in an epistemological and methodological quandary as to how ethical phenomena are to be treated rationally in the framework of economic theory.

It was not until the late 1960s that housing attracted much attention from academic social scientists. Since that time the literature has expanded widely and diversified, establishing housing with a specialised status in economics, sociology, politics, and in related subjects. As we would expect, the new literature covers a technical, statistical, theoretical, ideological, and historical range. Housing studies have not been conceived and interpreted in a monolithic way, with generally accepted concepts and principles, or with uniformly fixed and precise methodological approaches. Instead, some studies have been derived selectively from diverse bases in conventional theories in economics or sociology, or politics. Others have their origins in less conventional social theory, including neo‐Marxist theory which has had a wider intellectual following in the modern democracies since the mid‐1970s. With all this diversity, and in a context where ideological positions compete, housing studies have consequently left in their wake some significant controversies and some gaps in evaluative perspective. In short, the new housing intellectuals have written from personal commitments to particular cognitive, theoretical, ideological, and national positions and experiences. This present piece of writing takes up the two main themes which have emerged in the recent literature. These themes are first, questions relating to building and developing housing theory, and, second, the issue of how we are to conceptualise housing and relate it to policy studies. We shall be arguing that the two themes are closely related: in order to create a useful housing theory we must have awareness and understanding of housing practice and the nature of housing.

In this article we shall argue that the Keynesian revolution was a revolution in the sense of Kuhn and that Kuhn's conceptual framework provides a better understanding of the convulsive changes that took place in macro‐economics in the twenties and thirties than alternative growth of knowledge theories that are being discussed in the economics literature at the present time. In the last ten years or so economists have become increasingly interested in the various growth of knowledge theories that have been developed by philosophers of science such as Kuhn, Popper, Lakatos and others. This heightened interest on the part of economists is to be explained by the fact that these new theories are based on the actual behaviour of scientists. The new philosophers of science devote their attention not to “correct scientific method” but to the actual behaviour of scientists. It is because of this revolution in the historiography of science that economists have been able to relate these new theories to their own work and to the development of economic theories in the past.

Argues that Joan Robinson′s interest in teaching and her students was inherently connected to her views on the nature, scope and methodology of economics. More specifically, like the classical economists, she defined economics broadly as the study of the causes of material wealth and growth rather than the more narrow science of allocation of scarce resources. Like J.S. Mill, A. Marshall and J.M. Keynes, she viewed economics as a moral science rather than excluding ethics and politics from economic considerations. Most ⊃4importantly, she believed in the central role of history and thus uncertainty in economic analysis. This emphasis on history in turn implied that she did not consider the tools of economic analysis to be universally applicable across time and space. It is argued here that these beliefs directly affected her views on teaching economics.

The rediscovery and analytical reconstitution are present tendencies in much of social science, especially economics and sociology. The emergence and expansion of the so‐called new institutional economics exemplify these tendencies as do attempts at revival and rehabilitation of the old institutional economics. Analogous tendencies have been manifested in sociology by the further development of economic sociology, especially by various reformulations of its classical premise of institutional structuration and embeddedness of economic behavior. Nevertheless, much of mainstream economics tends to neglect or play down certain salient divergences between the latter's neoclassical or orthodox institutionalism, and heterodox or critical institutionalism advanced by the old institutional economics as well as by economic sociology. Identifies and elaborates such divergences between these seemingly homologous varieties of institutionalism. Since institutionalist varieties and tendencies in both economics and sociology are considered, represents a contribution to an interdisciplinary treatment of social institutions, a treatment originally proposed by the old institutional economics of Veblen et al., the German historical school as well as by Weberian‐Durkheimian classical economic sociology.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the origin of economics as a separate science.

A very comprehensive approach is presented for determining the origin of economics as a science. Three kinds of inter‐related issues are discussed: how to interpret and evaluate earlier, particularly ancient, writings, the specification of the requirements for declaring economics as a science and the definition, scope and methodology of economics.

Application of the most stringent requirements for declaring economics as a separate science to Kautilya's Arthashastra validated A.K. Sen's claim that it is the first book on economics.

According to Kautilya, economics is a separate science but not independent of other disciplines and particularly of ethics. Whereas, most of the current research ignores this inter‐dependence and consequently does not fully capture reality.

It implies that the inter‐dependence between economics and other disciplines should be encouraged and vigorously explored.

It validates Redman's assertion, “The history of economics as a science is, in my view, still waiting to be properly written”.