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This whistleblowing case study engages students in discussions about when and how to disclose differences of opinion on a revenue recognition matter with higher-ups in an organization. Factors to consider include the morality of whistleblowing, confidentiality obligations, the rules of conduct in the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) Code, Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX), Dodd–Frank, and the US Supreme Court ruling in Digital Realty, Inc. v. Somers that addresses when to report matters to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Case questions are designed to promote students’ critical thinking skills, ethical reasoning skills, and decision-making. A flowchart of AICPA ethics rule 2.130.020 (Subordination of Judgment) provides the framework for making decisions when differences exist in financial reporting. The case provides learning objectives, implementation guidance, and teaching notes. The case was used in an accounting ethics course taught at the undergraduate senior level but can also be used in auditing, fraud examination, and advanced financial reporting courses.

To effectively integrate sustainability education into accounting, the needs of stakeholders such as educators, practitioners, regulators, students, and politicians must be considered. While existing literature reflects their separate perceptions, this study considers their influence on the integration process. Sustainability accounting can play a key role in supporting sustainability practices, which businesses need to be accountable for. This study focuses on how sustainability accounting education can improve corporate sustainability practices. However, most existing studies only consider one stakeholder group, and there is a gap in literature on sustainability accounting education in developing countries, particularly in the Middle East. This study informs future researchers about various research gaps in sustainability education.

The importance of auditors blowing the whistle when they encounter a situation of perceived wrongdoing cannot be overstated. Unfortunately, however, the initial report of wrongdoing is often insufficient to remedy the situation. Thus, this chapter investigates auditors’ whistleblowing persistence, measured as the number of times an auditor is willing to repeatedly report the wrongdoing, if he/she is not satisfied with the initial and/or subsequent responses received. Specifically, this chapter examines auditors’ persistence when reporting the wrongdoing of a peer auditor on the same audit team. Results show communication medium utilized within the audit team (instant message vs video) and client importance (high vs low) influence persistence in a 2 × 2 experiment. The manipulation for communication medium uses actual prerecorded videos and instant messages. Results related to one of our four hypotheses show that whistleblowing persistence is affected by client importance; that is, auditors are more likely to persist in reporting when working on a less important client. Furthermore, the findings suggest that client importance and communication medium interact such that communication medium affects persistence on more important clients, but not less important clients. Specifically, when working on a more important client, auditors are more likely to persist in reporting when interacting with their peers via video compared to via instant message. Given that whistleblowing persistence is often necessary to obtain a satisfactory resolution to the issue at hand, our results suggest avenues to encourage whistleblowing persistence should be further explored.

This chapter addresses one of the most crucial areas for critical thinking: the morality of turbulent markets around the world. All of us are overwhelmed by such turbulent markets. Following Nassim Nicholas Taleb (2004, 2010), we distinguish between nonscalable industries (ordinary professions where income grows linearly, piecemeal or by marginal jumps) and scalable industries (extraordinary risk-prone professions where income grows in a nonlinear fashion, and by exponential jumps and fractures). Nonscalable industries generate tame and predictable markets of goods and services, while scalable industries regularly explode into behemoth virulent markets where rewards are disproportionately large compared to effort, and they are the major causes of turbulent financial markets that rock our world causing ever-widening inequities and inequalities. Part I describes both scalable and nonscalable markets in sufficient detail, including propensity of scalable industries to randomness, and the turbulent markets they create. Part II seeks understanding of moral responsibility of turbulent markets and discusses who should appropriate moral responsibility for turbulent markets and under what conditions. Part III synthesizes various theories of necessary and sufficient conditions for accepting or assigning moral responsibility. We also analyze the necessary and sufficient conditions for attribution of moral responsibility such as rationality, intentionality, autonomy or freedom, causality, accountability, and avoidability of various actors as moral agents or as moral persons. By grouping these conditions, we then derive some useful models for assigning moral responsibility to various entities such as individual executives, corporations, or joint bodies. We discuss the challenges and limitations of such models.

Due to its high leverage nature, a bank suffers vitally from the credit risk it inherently bears. As a result, managing credit is the ultimate responsibility of a bank. In this chapter, we examine how efficiently banks manage their credit risk via a powerful tool used widely in the decision/management science area called data envelopment analysis (DEA). Among various existing versions, our DEA is a two-stage, dynamic model that captures how each bank performs relative to its peer banks in terms of value creation and credit risk control. Using data from the largest 22 banks in the United States over the period of 1996 till 2013, we have identified leading banks such as First Bank systems and Bank of New York Mellon before and after mergers and acquisitions, respectively. With the goal of preventing financial crises such as the one that occurred in 2008, a conceptual model of credit risk reduction and management (CRR&M) is proposed in the final section of this study. Discussions on strategy formulations at both the individual bank level and the national level are provided. With the help of our two-stage DEA-based decision support systems and CRR&M-driven strategies, policy/decision-makers in a banking sector can identify improvement opportunities regarding value creation and risk mitigation. The effective tool and procedures presented in this work will help banks worldwide manage the unknown and become more resilient to potential credit crises in the 21st century.