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The purpose of this paper is to re‐examine the issue of financial analysts' reaction to enterprise resource planning (ERP) announcements by employing actual firm data and archival earnings forecast observations. As an extension of prior ERP studies, this paper also tests whether forecast revisions vary with the timing of adoption.

Based on 188 firms that announced ERP plans during the years 1993 through 2002, this paper investigates the financial analysts' reaction to ERP announcements by comparing their earnings forecasts issued immediately before and after the ERP announcement. To examine the effect of adoption timing, this paper partitions the sample into three groups: early (1993‐1997), middle (1998‐1999) and late (2000‐2002) adopters.

Results show that significantly positive revisions occur in longer term forecasts (i.e. three‐year‐ahead forecasts) but not in the shorter term predictions such as one‐ and two‐year‐ahead forecasts. In addition, there is some weak evidence that financial analysts react less positively to middle adopters than to early or late adopters. This finding could be attributed to the fact that many firms adopted ERP systems to work out the Y2K problems during the 1998‐1999 period.

The main finding confirms that financial analysts consider ERP implementations beneficial to the adopters in the long term. Companies contemplating ERP adoption should take this time horizon into account.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the relation between audit tenure and how clients manage the annual earnings surprise.

A sample of 5,029 firm‐year observations from 1996 to 2003 were employed to examine whether audit tenure is negatively related to the incidence of accrual‐based‐upward earnings management to avoid negative earnings surprises; and whether audit tenure is positively related to the incidence of downward forecast guidance to avoid negative earnings surprises.

Empirical results indicate a substitution of downward forecast guidance for upward earnings management as audit tenure lengthens.

The paper provides evidence that, as the auditor‐client relationship lengthens over time, firms turn to downward forecast guidance as a substitute for upward earnings management. One possible limitation of the sample period involves the implementation of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002. Because of the increased financial reporting scrutiny on both management and auditors that accompanies SOX, it is likely that constraints on earnings misstatements increase after SOX. Any decrease in upward earnings management resulting from SOX would thus work against finding a relation between audit tenure and the substitution of downward forecast guidance to prevent negative earnings surprises.

This paper supports the notion that audit tenure affects firms' choices among various tactics in their attempts to avoid negative earnings surprises. The results also contribute to the ongoing debate on mandatory audit firm rotation by showing that audit quality increases with audit tenure.

Barton and Simko argue that the balance sheet information would serve as a constraint on accrual‐based earnings management. This paper aims to extend their argument by examining whether the balance sheet constraint increases managers' propensity to use either downward forecast guidance or real earnings management as a substitute mechanism to avoid earnings surprises.

Following Barton and Simko, the paper uses the beginning balance of net operating assets relative to sales as a proxy for the balance sheet constraint. The argument is that because of the articulation between the income statement and the balance sheet, previous accounting choices that increase earnings will also increase net assets and therefore the level of net assets reflects the extent of previous accrual management. Models from Matsumoto and Bartov et al. are used to measure forecast guidance. Following Rochowdhury and Cohen et al., a firm's abnormal level of production costs and discretionary expenditures are used as proxies of real earnings management. The empirical analysis is conducted based on the 1996‐2006 annual data for a sample of nonfinancial, nonregulated firms.

The paper finds that firms with higher level of beginning net operating assets relative to sales are more likely to guide analysts' earnings forecasts downward, and more likely to engage in real earnings management in terms of abnormal increases in production costs and abnormal reductions in discretionary expenditures.

Overall, the paper's evidence suggests that managers turn to real earnings management or downward forecast guidance as a substitute mechanism to avoid negative earnings surprises when their ability to manipulate accruals upward is constrained by the extent to which net assets are already overstated in the balance sheet.

This study adds to prior literature that examines how managers trade off different mechanisms used to meet or beat analysts' earnings expectations. It also contributes to the extant literature by providing further insights on the role of balance sheet information in the process of managing earnings and/or earnings surprises.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the association between audit committee characteristics and a firm’s ability to guide analysts’ forecasts downward to meet or beat earnings benchmarks.

The authors expect that a more effective audit committee would be able to reduce managers’ propensity to use downward forecast guidance to avoid negative earnings surprises. Four committee characteristics are used to measure its effectiveness: independence, diligence, expertise and size.

For the pre-SOX (Sarbanes-Oxley Act) period (1996-2002), none of the four audit committee characteristics are significantly associated with managers’ propensity to use downward forecast guidance to avoid negative earnings surprises. For the post-SOX era (2003-2004), however, the likelihood of engaging in downward forecast guidance is significantly lower for firms with larger and more independent audit committees. In addition, the likelihood is significantly lower for audit committees that are more diligent and have a higher proportion of the committee members with accounting or finance-related expertise.

Overall, the authors results suggest that, in response to the increased regulatory and listing requirements in the post-SOX era, audit committees have played a more active role in scrutinizing earnings guidance. Our results also suggest that a more effective audit committee in the post-SOX era curbs managers’ tendency to use downward forecast guidance to meet or beat quarterly earnings targets.

To the authors knowledge, this study is one of the first to examine the role of the audit committee in reviewing managerial earnings guidance. As earnings guidance plays an important role in the overall financial reporting process over time and given the increasing importance of downward forecast guidance in earnings surprise games in recent years, the authors believe this study addresses an important question and adds to prior literature. Also, this study contributes to their understanding of the changing nature and scope of audit committee oversight activities since the passage of SOX.

This research uses accounting information to supplement abnormal returns evidence in order to gauge the performance of greenmailed firms. Our results support the management entrenchment hypothesis; target firm earnings are poor relative to industry in the years surrounding the greenmail event, and earnings do not significantly improve as would be expected under the shareholders' interest hypothesis. This result holds after adjusting for greenmail premia net of tax effects. Evidence on investment spending suggests firms that pay greenmail differ substantially from their industries, but in a negative direction. In contrast, the industry‐adjusted earnings of non‐greenmail repurchasing firms are significantly greater than the earnings of greenmailed firms. Together, these results are consistent with the contention that greenmailed firms are not managed in shareholders' interests; they underperform their industry, the poor operating results are not attributable to higher investment outlays associated with a long‐term strategic focus, and performance does not improve. This is consistent with observed negative abnormal returns being attributable to both a lost takeover premium and a lost opportunity for improved corporate performance.