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The purpose of this study is to examine how the childhood trauma experiences of CEOs influence firms’ internationalization.

The research used a difference-in-difference method with constructing a treatment group whose chief executive officer (CEO) experienced the great famine in China between the ages of 7 and 11, and a control group whose CEO was born within three years after 1961.

The study reveals a significant inverse correlation between CEOs’ childhood trauma experiences and firm internationalization. However, this correlation is weaker in the case of state-owned enterprises and firms led by CEOs with overseas work experience.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is the first to extend the theoretical framework to elucidate firms’ internationalization by introducing childhood trauma theory into the field of international business literature. Second, the authors link the literature on the effect of CEO explicit traits and psychological traits on firm internationalization by exploring how CEOs’ childhood trauma experience shapes their risk aversion, which, in turn, influences firm internationalization. Third, the authors address the call for examining the interplay of CEO life experiences by scrutinizing the moderating effect of CEO overseas work experience on the association between CEOs’ childhood trauma exposure and firm internationalization.

This study aims to examine the nexus of corporate governance with firms' financial risk-taking behavior under the corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosures in the context of non-financial listed firms of an emerging economy.

This study investigates the relationship between corporate governance as evaluated by an index and several financial risks, including idiosyncratic, default and systematic risks. The connection of corporate governance with financial risks is also studied while considering the moderation of CSR disclosures. The data are collected from 2014 to 2018 of 73 top 100-index listed non-financial firms of Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX). Panel regression fixed effect and 2-step generalized method of moments techniques are applied to confirm the hypothesis along with the diagnostic tests to confirm that all outcomes of models must be authentic and reliable.

The study’s findings confirm that enhancing the overall corporate governance measures resulted in an augment in the firm’s risk due to weak control and regulations prevailing in emerging economies. Moreover, CSR disclosures enhance stakeholder information, lessen information asymmetry about management policies and mitigate the risk associated with operational uncertainties.

This study has a practical implementation to policymakers that effective monitoring and controlling measures facilitate the corporate management for minimizing the financial risks. Further, the study’s findings shed light that implementing corporate governance measures is not enough to mitigate financial risks until supervisory measures in the form of CSR disclosures are not taken to analyse corporate governance effectiveness.

This paper enhances the key findings in the literature by examining the role of corporate governance measures with respect to firms’ financial risks considering the moderating role of CSR disclosures. Furthermore, this research adds to the body of knowledge regarding the implementation of monitoring measures that assist in the mitigation of firms’ financial risks hence firm value.

This paper examines how board structure influences real earnings management and the interaction effect of CEO narcissism on board structure-real earnings management relationship.

The authors used panel data derived from secondary sources from publicly listed firms in Kenya during 2002–2017. Hierarchical regression analysis was used to test the hypotheses.

The results indicate that board independence, board tenure and size have significant negative effect on real earnings management, while CEO duality positively affects real earnings management. Further, the interaction results show that CEO narcissism moderates the relationship between CEO duality and real earnings management.

The results suggest that real earnings management reduces when boards are independent, large and comprising of long-tenured members. However, when the CEO plays dual role of a chairman, real earnings management increases. The authors also find that when CEOs are narcissists, the monitoring role of the board is compromised.

The study adds value to the understanding of how board structure and CEO narcissism influence the monitoring role of the board among firms listed at Nairobi Securities Exchange.