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The study aims to address a critical gap in existing healthcare payment schemes and care service pricing by recognizing the influential role of patients' decisions on self-management efforts. These decisions not only impact health outcomes but also shape the demand for care, subsequently influencing care costs. Despite the significance of this interplay, current payment schemes often overlook these dynamics. The research focuses on investigating the implications of a novel behavior-based payment scheme, designed to align incentives and establish a direct connection between patients' decisions and care costs. The primary objective is to comprehensively understand whether and how this innovative payment scheme structure influences key stakeholders, including patients, care providers, insurers and overall social welfare.

In this paper, we propose a game-theoretical model to incorporate the performance of self-management with the demand for healthcare service, compare the patient's effort decision for self-management and provider's price decision for healthcare service under a behavior-based scheme with that under two implemented widely payment schemes, that is, co-payment scheme and co-insurance scheme.

Our findings confirm that the behavior-based scheme incentives patient self-management more than current schemes while reducing their possibility of seeking healthcare service, which indirectly induces the provider to lower the price of the service. The stakeholders' utility under various payment schemes is sensitive to the cost of treatment and the perceived health utility of patients. Especially, patient health awareness is not always benefited provider profit, as it motivates patient self-management while diminishing the demand for care.

We provide a novel framework for characterizing behavior-based payment schemes. Our results confirm the need for modification of the current payment scheme to incentivize patient self-management.

This paper seeks to examine the effect of monetary policy rate (MPR) on the lending rates of commercial banks in Ghana.

The paper employed the autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) model as well as the non-linear autoregressive distributed lag (NARDL) model econometric techniques on a quarterly time series data from 2002 to 2018.

The ARDL results revealed that, MPR has a positive and significant effect on lending rate in the long and short run. Although there exists a direct relationship between MPR and lending rate, from the NARDL revealed an asymmetric effect of MPR on lending rate to the effect that, lending rate in Ghana responds more to positive shock (a rise in MPR) compared to a negative shock (a decrease in MPR) both in the long and short run.

The paper contributes to policy and literature in Ghana by providing empirical evidence on the asymmetric effect that MPR has on lending rates in Ghana. The paper recommends among others, the establishment of a rating system of banks according to their monetary policy compliance, where highly rated banks could have for instance a reduction on borrowed reserves from the central bank.