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The most significant recent reform in international bank regulation has been in the area of capital adequacy, first instigated by the BASLE Committee and formally introduced in 1988. These reforms have had, and continue to have, significant economic consequences. However, the concept of capital adequacy and its usefulness in bank regulation has attracted a significant amount of criticism from the academic community. This raises the question as to why it was that capital adequacy was adopted as a tool for international bank regulation, despite major concerns with its rationale and effectiveness. Although the topic of capital adequacy has attracted an increasing body of research, the reasons behind the adoption and implementation of capital adequacy by international bank regulators have remained unexamined in the literature. This paper investigates the rationale for capital adequacy, citing documentary and interview evidence surrounding the key decisions, and in the process traces the dynamics of international bank regulation. The principal finding is that regulatory reform was influenced by tradition, convenience and likely acceptability rather than by any serious considerations of regulatory objectives and potential effectiveness of the capital adequacy reforms. This corresponds to findings about the origin and dynamics of regulation in the political economy literature.

The FDIC Improvement Act of 1991 sets out five categories of capital and mandates corrective action for banks. Each bank based on its capital amount fall in the certain categories or states. The purpose of this paper is to consider the effect of banking regulations and supervisory practices on capital state transition.

First, the authors investigate how much the practices influence banks' capital adequacy using a dynamic panel data method, the generalized method of moments. Then, to scrutinize the results of the first phase, the authors estimate the effect of practices on some characteristics of capital state transition such as transition intensity, transition probability and state sojourn time using multi-state models for panel data in 107 developing countries over the period 2000 to 2012.

The dynamic regression results show that capital guidelines, supervisory power and supervisory structure can have significantly positive effects on the capital adequacy state. Moreover, the multi-state Markov panel data model estimation results show that the significantly positive-effect practices can change the capital state transition intensity considerably; for example, they can transmit the critical-under-capitalized (the lowest) capital state of banks directly to a well or the adequate-capitalized (the highest) capital state without passing through middle states (under-capitalized and significantly-undercapitalized). Moreover, the results present some new evidence on transition probability and state sojourn time.

The main contribution of this paper, unlike the existing literature, is to consider the power of banking regulations and supervisory practices to improve the capital state using a multi-state Markov panel data model.

Since monetary policy has great economic impacts, before the policy implementation, careful simulation combined with real economy movement condition can predict the policy implementation effect and reduce the cost of monetary policy implementation effectively. The paper aims to discuss these issues.

This paper selects the large commercial banks in China as the research objects, takes commercial bank capital adequacy requirement as the threshold constraint on the traditional monetary policy transmission path, and simulates the implementation effects of policy combination by applying computer technology.

It shows that the threshold effect of capital restriction policy will affect the transmission path of monetary policy, suppress the collective irrational behavior caused by the profit maximization behavior of commercial banks, and control the excessive fluctuation of macro economy.

If using capital adequacy constraints threshold function scientifically and appropriately, the paper can effectively eliminate the negative effect of short-term traditional monetary policy transmission mechanism, control the macroeconomic overall risk within a predetermined range, and realize the goal of monetary policy with low cost.

Based on the theory of credit rationing from Stigliz and Weiss, combining threshold factors of capital restraint policy with the traditional monetary policy transmission path, this paper examines that the policy combination may lead to the implementation effect. The method of simulation used in this paper has not been found in other literatures, and the results have strong implications to set up a reasonable and scientific macro-prudential banking regulation framework.

This paper aims to provide a methodology for designing and conducting solvency stress tests, under the standardised approach as per IFSB-15, including the establishment of macro-financial links, running scenarios with variation of assumptions and stress scenario parameters; apply and illustrate this methodology by providing a stylised numerical example through a tractable Excel-based framework, through which Islamic Commercial Banks (ICBs) can introduce additional regulatory requirements and show that they would remain in compliance with all capital requirements after a moderate to severe shock; and identify the potential remedial actions that can be envisaged by an ICB.

The paper uses the data of the one of the groups to which certain amendments and related assumptions are applied to develop a stylised numerical example for solvency stress-testing purposes. The example uses a Stress Testing Matrix (STeM; a step-by-step approach) to illustrate the stress-testing process. The methodology of the paper uses a two-stage process. The first stage consists of calculating the capital adequacy ratio (CAR) of the ICB using the IFSB formulae, depending on how the profit sharing investment account (PSIA) are treated in the respective jurisdiction. The second stage is the application of the stress scenarios and shocks.

Taking into account the specificities of ICBs such as their use of PSIA, the results highlighted the sensitivity of the CAR of an ICB with respect to the changes in the values of alpha and the proportion of unrestricted PSIA on the funding side. The simulation also indicated that an ICB operating above the minimum CAR could be vulnerable to shocks of various degrees of gravity, thus bringing the CAR below the minimum regulatory requirement and necessitating appropriate remedial actions.

The paper highlights various implications and relationships arising out of stress testing for ICBs, including the vulnerability of an ICB under defined scenarios, demanding appropriate immediate remedial actions on future capital resources and capital needs. The findings of the paper provide a preliminary discussion on developing a comprehensive toolkit for the ICBs similar to what is developed by the International Monetary Fund Financial Sector Assessment Programme.

This paper focuses on the gap with respect to the stress testing of capital adequacy. The main contribution of the paper is twofold. The first is the development of an STeM – a step-by-step approach, which provides a method for simulating solvency (i.e. capital adequacy) stress tests for ICBs; the second is the demonstration of the potentially crucial impact of profit-sharing investment accounts and the way they are managed by ICBs (notably the smoothing of profit payouts) in assessing the capital adequacy of the ICBs.

This paper not only aims to trace developments from the inception of the 1988 Basel Accord to its present form (Basel II), but also to highlight flaws inherent in the 1988 Accord and Basel II, by way of reference to developments which occurred during the Northern Rock Crisis.

The paper highlights the importance of risks through a reference to the crucial role played by capital adequacy. In drawing attention to the importance of such a role and tracing developments which have taken place since the inception of the 1988 Basel Accord, it explores and analyses efforts of the Basel Committee to address capital measurement problems and assesses the success of such efforts through an illustration of capital measurement problems which still persist. An evaluation is made of the Basel Committee's efforts to address weaknesses of the 1988 Basel Accord through Basel II. Greater in‐depth evaluation of the effectiveness of the Basel Committee's efforts are undertaken through reference to developments which occurred during the Northern Rock Crisis, which is complemented by graphs and figures.

Whilst considerable progress has been achieved, the paper concludes on the basis of the principal aim of these Accords and failures of capital adequacy to address problems related to risk, that more work is still required particularly in relation to hedge funds, liquidity risks, and those risks attributed to non‐bank financial institutions.

The paper not only highlights existing problems with Basel II, as revealed in the aftermath of the Northern Rock Crisis, but also draws attention to other areas which the Basel Committee and regulators need to focus on.

The purpose of this study is to investigate the influence of capital adequacy ratio (CAR) prescribed in Basel III on the risk-taking behaviour of Islamic and conventional commercial banks in Malaysia. It also investigates the claim that the risk-taking behaviour of Islamic banks (IBs) and conventional banks (CBs) managers is identically influenced by CAR.

Secondary data for all CBs operating in the Malaysian banking sector are gathered from FitchConnect database for the 2011–2017 period. Both dynamic ordinary least squares and generalised method of moments techniques are used to estimate a panel data of 43 commercial banks, namely, 17 IBs and 26 CBs.

The findings of this study lend support to the favourable influence of CAR set in Basel III accord on risk-taking behaviour of both types of banks. CBs appeared to be remarkably better off in terms of capital buffers. Evidence is established on the identicality of the risk-taking behaviour of IBs and CBs managers under CAR influence.

Even though a high CAR is observed to hamper risk-taking of banks, the findings may serve as a signal to regulators to be mindful of the implications of holding a high CAR. Similarly, managers may capitalise on the findings in terms of strategising for efficient use of the considerable capital buffers. Shareholders are also concerned about managers’ use of the considerable capital buffers.

This study is among a few studies that endeavoured to provide empirical evidence on the claim that IBs mimic the conduct of CBs in light of the influence of CAR prescribed in Basel III on risk-taking behaviour, particularly banks operating within the same banking environment.

This paper aims to highlight the new regulatory framework established by Basel III.

This paper provides a critical review of the existing literature concerning bank supervision while providing an overview of the transition from Basel I to Basel III rules and critical appraisal of the current regulatory framework. Review of the existing literature.

Basel III introduces new measures in favor of bank stability and in order to mitigate the propagation of financial shocks. But on the other hand the new regulatory framework adds an extra burden to banks’ business plans affecting credit policies and thus the real economy. Another issue that is not properly addressed is the rising of financial innovations that are able to pass by the new regulations. Overall Basel III rules are moving to the right direction but need to stay always up-to-date in order to catch up with the modern ever-evolving financial system. Pros and cons. Need for improvement.

The paper presents an up-to-date review of Basel rules with future prospects.

The aims of this paper are: first, to draw attention to the issues of displaced commercial risk (DCR) which arise as a result of the risk characteristics of profit‐sharing investment accounts (PSIA), the main source of funding of Islamic banks in most jurisdictions; and, second, to present a value‐at‐risk approach to the estimation of DCR and the associated adjustments in capital requirements.

The paper is based on empirical research into the characteristics of PSIA in practice, which vary to a greater or lesser extent from what one would expect them to be in principle, on an analysis of the capital adequacy and risk management implications that flow from this, and on an econometric formulation whereby the extent of DCR in Islamic banks may be estimated.

The findings are, first, that the characteristics of PSIA can vary from being a deposit like product (fixed return, capital certain, all risks borne by shareholders) to an investment product (variable return, bearing the risk of losses in underlying investments), depending upon the extent to which the balance sheet risks get shifted (“displaced”) from investment account holders to shareholders through various techniques available to Islamic banks' management. Second, the paper finds that this DCR has a major impact on Islamic bank's economic and regulatory capital requirements, asset‐liability management, and product pricing. Finally, it proposes an econometric approach to estimating DCR but report that individual Islamic banks generally lack the data needed to apply this approach, in the absence of which panel data for a population of Islamic banks may be used to estimate DCR for that population.

Empirically, the paper is thus limited by the lack of data just mentioned. Furthermore, the application of the proposed panel data approach has been left for future research.

The analysis of the issues and the development of the econometric model represent in themselves an original research contribution of some significance.

This paper aims to investigate the impact of capital requirements and bank competition on banks' risk-taking behavior in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region.

The study combines both descriptive and analytical approaches. It considers panel data sets and adopts panel data econometric techniques like fixed effects/random effects and generalized method of moments estimator.

Regulatory capital and market competition have different effects according to the bank’s type (Islamic or conventional). The results show that the capital adequacy ratio has a significant impact on the credit risk of conventional banks (CBs) while this effect is irrelevant for Islamic banks (IBs). However, market competition plays a significant role in shaping risk-taking behavior of Islamic banking institutions. Our results indicate that banks with strong market power may pursue risky strategies in the face of increased regulatory pressure (e.g. increased minimum capital requirements). The results were robust to alternative profitability measures and endogeneity checks.

The most important limitation is the lack of data for some banks and years, and this paper had to exclude some variables because of missing observations. The second limitation concerns the number of IBs in the sample. However, this can be overcome by including more countries from MENA and other regions where Islamic banking is a growing phenomenon.

Our findings call for a change in Islamic banking’s traditional business model based on the prohibition of interest. The analysis indicates that market concentration moderates the association between capital requirements and the insolvency risk of IBs but not CBs. Therefore, regulatory authorities concerned with improving financial stability in the MENA region should set up their policies differently depending on the level of banking market concentration. Finally, bank managers are requested to apply a more disciplined approach to their lending decisions and build sufficient capital conservation buffers to limit the impact of downside risk from the depletion of capital buffers during the pandemic.

This study addresses banks’ risk-taking behavior and stability in the MENA region, which includes banks of different types (Islamic and conventional). This paper also contributes to the literature on bank stability by identifying the most critical factors that affect bank risk and stability in the MENA region, which can be relevant in the context of the new global (COVID-19) crisis.

Financial crises (FC) remain a global threat to the financial stability of financial institutions and international bank regulatory capital requirement (IBRCR) by the Committee on Banking Supervision provides mechanism for curbing the adverse effect of FC on financial stability. Hence, the purpose of this study is to provide, evidence on how IBRCR tones down the adverse FC effects on bank financial stability (BFS).

The study uses 102 economies between 2006 and 2016 in a two-step dynamic generalized method of moments model.

The results show that while FC and IBRCR negatively and positively impact BFS, respectively, it is observed that under the increasing presence of IBRCR, the negative effect of FC on BFS declines. Additionally, the results show that economies that maintain minimum IBRCR above 10.5% recommended by BASEL III are able to reinforce a significant reduction in the negative effect of FC on BFS.

These findings imply that in as much as financial crisis is injurious to BFS, regulators and policymakers can rely on IBRCR to avert the injurious effects of FC on BFS. Clearly, while IBRCR is necessary for reinforcing BFS through FC, bank managers who maintain IBRCR above the recommended 10.5% stands a better chance to taming the avert effect of FC on BFS. Additionally, economies that have not full adopted the BASEL minimum capital requirement may have to do so given its potential of dampening the adverse effect of FC on BFS.

The study presents an international perspective of how BASEL capital requirements can help tame global financial crisis using a global sample of 102 economies.