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An important aspect of UK competition policy is the attempt to maintain competitive markets by prohibiting restrictive agreements and cartels involving price fixing, market sharing, etc., the effect of which is to suppress, limit or distort active rivalry between suppliers. Examines UK policy towards restrictive agreements, alongside similar attempts to control cartels in the European Community. Outlines the regulatory frameworks operating in the UK and EC and emphasizes particular points of interest in the application of policy control by reference to selected restrictive agreement/cartel cases. While the attack on formal “open” collusion has been highly successful, it is clear from the work of the Office of Fair Trading and the European Commission that clandestine (”covert”) collusion between suppliers remains an on‐going problem.

Are directors remunerated as administrators or entrepreneurs? The theory of finance suggests that the objective of the firm is to maximise shareholder wealth or the current market value of the firm. Company law informs us that directors are appointed to manage the business on behalf of shareholders. However, a great deal of research suggests that the separation of ownership by shareholders and control by directors enables the managers of large companies to pursue objectives other than maximisation of shareholder wealth. This study attempts to relate selected financial variables to the amount of directors' remuneration as disclosed in published accounts. Our general conclusion is that managerial compensation is determined by the size of the firm rather than its accounting profits or market value.

Mounting public criticism of big business has forced the managers of large companies to reappraise their relationships with employees, consumers and the community as they have come to recognise that companies have to work within the limits imposed upon them by public opinion and political pressures as well as the restraints imposed by market forces. These non‐market forces such as the pressures of public opinion and the urgings and threats of legislators and bureaucrats have grown in importance over recent decades, paralleling the growth of large business units. Such constraints reflect society's changing view of the role of business, and they become effective through the political process insofar as they can lead to changes in Government regulation of the private sector. Evolving social values have led to demands that companies contribute more to the quality of life than merely perform their traditional economic roles of supplying goods, providing jobs and paying taxes, and since business can only function by public consent then these expectations must be met if businesses are to survive as independent institutions in society.

In recent years there has been a substantial increase in the number of mergers and takeovers in the UK referred by the Office of Fair Trading to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission for investigation and report. This reflects an ongoing concern of the UK competition authorities with the maintenance and promotion of competitive markets. Surveys UK merger policy alongside a concurrent development – the introduction in 1990 of a new supranational Merger Regulation by the European Community. Outlines the regulatory frameworks operating in the UK and EC and highlights particular points of interest in the application of policy control by reference to selected merger cases.

The past decade has witnessed a heated debate in the Western industrial nations about whether or not large companies should accept broader social obligations commensurate with their great power. This debate has been useful in highlighting the social pressures to which large companies are being subjected. It has also served to stimulate interest in the possibility of a wider, stakeholder ethos for guiding management decision‐making. The restricted profit‐making role historically assigned to business has been challenged in favour of a more radical alternative, which acknowledges that companies have responsibilities to all their stakeholders—employees, customers and the community—as well as shareholders. And as the debate has progressed, a whole new range of potential management functions have developed, concerned with monitoring social pressures, measuring company social performance by means of social audits and guiding management decision‐making through codes of conduct.

The continuing growth in the size and importance of very large joint‐stock companies in the modern economy has prompted a search for new theories of the firm which are more relevant in explaining the behaviour of giant enterprises. For whilst the traditional profit‐maximising theory of the firm derived from neo‐classical economics may be an appropriate generalised approximation of the behaviour of firms operating in competitive markets, the need for broader theories to explain the behaviour of large manager‐controlled, oligopolistic companies has been recognised.

The theory of financial management suggests that the objective of the firm is to maximise shareholder wealth. The valuation of the firm is its net operational cash flows discounted at the stock market's average required rate of return. A firm's risk class determines the rate of return required by investors. The operating objective for management is to maximise the difference between operational receipts and operational expenditures plus investment, whilst minimising risk. However, the separation of ownership by shareholders and control by professional managers enables directors to pursue objectives other than maximisation of shareholder wealth. Directors might attempt to maximise sales revenue, maximise growth in assets or employees, maximise value added or even their own well‐being. They may choose to pursue multiple objectives as described in corporate planning systems. Multiple objectives may include social goals as well as goals relating to marketing, production, personnel and finance. It has been suggested that levels of directors' remuneration might be associated with the extent to which directors achieve corporate objectives. Several research projects have tried to identify the major determinants of directors' remuneration. Some of these are summarised below.

Business objectives play a vital role in providing direction and purpose for a company. Just as an individual cannot plan a route for a journey until he determines his destination, so a company needs to establish some notion of its final destination for its journey into the future before managers can begin to deploy company resources. Even in companies which do not have formal planning systems, managers must still make strategic decisions regarding investment, product development and the like which will set their course into the future, and so they must have some goals in mind in making their decisions. But whilst such companies will have objectives, in the absence of any formal planning these objectives are likely to remain implicit, being carried in the heads of executives. Thus there is always the danger that managers will operate with different goals in mind, so that the company lurches into the future in an unco‐ordinated fashion.

Competition policy in the UK and European Community is concerned with the maintenance and promotion of competitive markets. However, many market sectors in the UK and EC exhibit high levels of supplier concentration and many are dominated by either a quasimonopoly supplier or a core of large oligopolistic firms. Examines UK and EC policy towards the control of dominant firms. The regulatory frameworks operating in the UK and EC are outlined and particular points of interest in the application of policy control are highlighted by reference to selected monopoly cases.

Evaluates current evidence on contemporary gift giving, drawing some tentative marketing conclusions. Draws evidence from surveys carried out in Bradford, UK and those carried out by Gallup and the National Opinion Polls on Christmas shopping. Looks at the role of gift giving in society while interpreting data and drawing marketing conclusions and contrasting with primitive societies.