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Boards of directors often attempt to foster corporate entrepreneurship by replacing a firmʼs chief executive officer (CEO). Compelling theoretical arguments and anecdotal evidence suggest that when firm performance has suffered, a new CEO is best suited to lead the firmʼs creative endeavors. On the other hand, among firms that retain their existing CEO after a decline in performance, manipulating the CEOʼs compensation package is a common governance practice used by boards to encourage innovation. In these cases, some have argued that increasing the CEOʼs pay will encourage corporate entrepreneurship, because the CEO has been compensated for assuming additional risk. Counter to these propositions, this study develops theoretical arguments that a firmʼs existing CEO is better equipped to foster corporate entrepreneurship and that this probability increases when the CEOʼs cash compensation is decreased. Results from a sample of 100 single-product manufacturing firms suggest firms that retain their current CEO and decrease the CEOʼs cash compensation are most likely to engage in corporate entrepreneurship. Implications that this research has for corporate entrepreneurship, corporate governance, and firm performance are discussed.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the effect of internal control on tax avoidance analyzing internal (family ownership) and external (environmental uncertainty) factors on the effectiveness of internal control in preventing tax avoidance.

First, the authors examine the direct effect of the effectiveness of internal control on tax avoidance. Second, the authors examine the effect of moderation of family ownership and environmental uncertainty on the relationship of the effectiveness of internal control on tax avoidance. Third, the authors divide the full sample into two groups, high and less effectiveness of internal control to examine the direct effect of internal control effectiveness on tax avoidance and when considering moderating variables. Fourth, the authors use two different measures of the effectiveness of internal control.

This research found that effective internal control can reduce tax avoidance. Family ownership affects the relationship between internal control and tax avoidance, but environmental uncertainty does not influence the relationship between internal control and tax avoidance.

Internal control increases compliance with rules and policies, so companies must design and implement effective internal control to prevent tax avoidance activities in violation of tax regulations.

In contrast to previous studies, this study measures the effectiveness of internal control using the index of internal control practice disclosure and considers internal and external factors that can affect the effectiveness of internal control to prevent tax avoidance.

This study aims to examine whether chief executive officer (CEO) pay-performance sensitivity to shareholder wealth is related to the use of non-financial performance measures in incentive contracts.

Using hand-collected performance measure data in a sample of S&P 500 firms across the period 1994–2010, this study investigates the sensitivity of CEO bonus and cash pay to shareholder wealth of firms that use non-financial performance (NFPM) measures of varying types and contractual weights in their bonus contracts along with financial measures (NFPM firms) in comparison to that of firms using financial measures only (FPM firms).

This study finds evidence that the pay-performance sensitivity is stronger in NFPM firms than in FPM firms. These results are driven by the use of CEO individual goals and operational efficiency. Furthermore, when using environmental, social and governance factors, the pay-performance sensitivity is stronger in terms of accounting performance only. This study also finds that using NFPM enhances pay-performance sensitivity more as their contractual weights increase and as financial risk increases.

These findings are important to stakeholders, and especially regulators in understanding incentive effects of alternative performance measures. This study also sheds light on what types of non-financial measures are better in helping firms align CEOs’ incentives to shareholders’ interests.

This study contributes to prior research on benefits of non-financial information within the context of executive compensation. This study presents original results about the effects of contractual weights of non-financial measures and financial risk on CEO pay-performance sensitivity. This study also presents new insights regarding how different types of non-financial measures affect CEO pay-performance sensitivity.

The purpose of this paper is to use tenets of the complexity theory in order to study the effect of various determinants of firm’s performance, such as CEO’s compensation and age, for the case of 72 insurance companies.

The authors identify the asymmetries in the data set by creating quantiles and using contrarian analysis. Instead of ignoring this information and use a main effects approach, all the available information in the data set is taken into account. For this purpose, the authors use qualitative comparative analysis to find alternative equifinal routes toward high firm performance.

Five configurations are found which lead to high performance. Every one of the five configurations is found to be sufficient but not necessary for high firm performance.

The research findings contribute to a better understanding of the determinants of firm’s performance taking into account the asymmetries in the data set. The authors identify alternative paths toward high firm performance, which could be vital information for the decision maker inside a firm.

Based on stakeholder, agency and institutional theory, this study aims to examine the role of institutional ownership in the relationship between environmental, social and governance practices and CEO compensation.

Utilizing a fixed-effect panel regression analysis, this research utilized a panel data approach, analyzing data spanning from 2014 to 2021, focusing on US companies listed on the S&P500 stock market index. The dataset encompassed 219 companies, leading to a total of 1,533 observations.

The analysis identified that environmental scores significantly impact CEO equity-linked compensation, unlike social and governance scores. Additionally, it was found that institutional ownership acts as a moderating factor in the relationship between the environmental score and CEO equity-linked compensation, as well as the association between the social score and CEO equity-linked compensation. Interestingly, the direction of these moderating effects varied between the two relationships, suggesting a nuanced role of institutional ownership.

This research makes a unique contribution to the field of corporate governance by exploring the relatively understudied area of institutional ownership's influence on the ESG practices–CEO compensation nexus.

We examined the relationship between employee equity compensation, incentive compensation, and firm growth using a sample of 480 privately held firms from the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation’s database of Ernst & Young Entrepreneur Of The Year (EOY) winners. Using frameworks from agency and motivation theories, we argued that larger percentages of both equity- and incentivebased compensation allocated to top managers and employees would be associated with firm growth. After controlling for firm and industry effects, the results of the study showed that while the firms in the sample preferred providing incentive compensation, providing equity compensation for employees was a positively significant predictor of firm growth over a three-year period. These findings suggest that prescriptions for growth in larger firms developed from agency theory also may be applicable to entrepreneurial firms, and founder/CEOs seeking to grow their firms should consider using equity compensation to motivate their current employees and to attract new ones.

Purpose – Previous studies distinguish revenue management based on discretionary accruals; the research of studies is to investigate the factors that affect the finance manager at the discretionary accrual in General financial information statement.

Design/Methodology/Approach – Literature review models used in research aimed at detecting any company that performs the company’s discretion to fulfill the accrual of interests internally. This research study also discusses the relationship between earnings and discretionary manager behavior.

Findings – The researcher wants to re-examine the hypothesis of market efficiency on Indonesia’s capital market. The current company information technology uses greatly influences worldwide investor interest to invest on Indonesian’s capital market. Emerging Indonesia Capital market status becomes very interesting to be studied.

Originality/Value – It also presented the shortcomings of current research and the trends for future study in capital market.