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The purpose of this paper is to study the impact of some corporate governance mechanisms on the market risk (stock price return and volatility, exchange rate) and on the exchange rate and Treasury Bill during the financial crisis. In order to better clarify the firms’ resistance to financial crises, the effect of exchange rate, Treasury Bill and the market risk are also considered.

The study uses a sample data of the SBF 120 on a panel of 99 French firms over the period between 2006 and 2015 divided into three sub-periods: the first sub-period, which covers the period between December 31, 2006 and December 31, 2009, was characterized by the outbreak of the subprime crisis. The second sub-period considers the sovereign debt crisis in Europe between December 31, 2010 and December 31, 2012. The last sub-period includes the post-crisis period (December 31, 2013 to December 31, 2015). The GARCH and BEKK models are used to capture the effect of volatility and conditional heteroskedasticity of both corporate governance and market risk.

The paper found that during the financial crisis (first sub-period, the sovereign crisis period), the high shareholders’ protection had a positive and significant impact on the stock market returns. Furthermore, the shareholders’ protection, the Treasury Bill, the institutional investors, the board’s size, had a negative and significant effect on the stock returns volatility. During the post-crisis period, the high protection and the board’s size had a negative and significant effect on the volatility of the stock returns.

This result implies that during the financial crisis, the high shareholders’ protection played a role in increases the stock market return and minimized the stock return volatility.

This study helps in improving the legal protection of investors and helps managers, shareholders and investors to evaluate their investments. This study also provides implications for policymakers and legal environment in order to evaluate the importance of the current corporate governance frameworks in place.

This result implies that the institutional investors, as the results suggest, should follow the shareholders’ protection in all the countries to make decisions about their investments since the high shareholders’ protection increases the firm’s stock returns and decreases the stock return volatility.

This paper deals with the relationship existing between the emotional aspect and decision‐making processes. More specifically, it examines the links between emotional intelligence, decision biases and effectiveness of the governance mechanisms. The primary purposes of this paper are to: consider emotional intelligence as new research ideas that make important contributions to society; offer suggestions for improving manuscripts submitted to Consortium for Research on Emotional Intelligence in Organizations; and discuss methods for enhancing the validity of inferences made from research.

The paper explains that the main cause of organization's problems is CEO emotional intelligence level. The authors use three models (linear regression and logistic binary regression) to examine this relation: every model treats the relationship between emotional intelligence and one of efficiency criteria of the board. Emotional intelligence has been measured according to Schutte et al.'s Shutte Self Report Emotional Intelligence Scale (SSREI), with a high internal validity level. The four cognitive biases have been measured by means of a questionnaire comprising several items and the selected sample was composed of some180 Tunisian executives (belonging to 60 firms).

The results revealed that the presence of a high emotional intelligence rate is not always positively correlated with the executives' suggestibility with respect to behavioural biases. They have also affirmed the existence of a complementarity relationship between emotional intelligence and the directors' board. Authors need to consider that emotion which minimizes CEO emotional biases and provides director's board effectiveness.

This article has implications for the development of CEO emotional intelligence capacity. Also, some psychological aspects of a theoretical nature could not be wholly approached in a complete empirical way.

The paper pushes organizations to select managers based on their levels of emotional intelligence (apply tests of emotional intelligence in place psychometric tests). Also, it increases the validity of inferences made from research in the field.

This paper incites governments to establish training programs aimed at the development of learning of emotional intelligence. Thus, it has important implications for enhancing the well‐being of individuals, organizations and society as a whole.

Actually, for the sake improving the explanatory power of a legal‐financial approach of governance, the behavioural dimension has been integrated for a more thorough analysis of the directors' board role. The authors' goal consists in highlighting the role played by emotional intelligence as a skill or tool available for the manager or controller to minimize the behavioural biases (bias of loss aversion, optimism, over‐confidence and lack of cognitive flexibility), and achieves an effective control.

The purpose of this study is to examine the impact of internal and external corporate governance mechanisms on the probability of engaging in tax aggressiveness.

This study uses a sample of 52 firms listed on the Tunis stock exchange observed over the 2003–2016 period (The authors had to stop sampling in 2016 because the measurement of tax aggressiveness requires 4 years after the year of study. Therefore, the data on the measurement of tax aggressiveness were collected until 2020). This paper uses the logistic regression technique.

The results of the first logistic regression show that ownership structure and the supervision role of the tax authorities are determining factors that explain tax aggressiveness; while, the attributes of the board of directors does not seem to explain the probability of engaging in aggressive tax strategies. To further probe this question, the authors carried out additional analyses that examine the moderating effect of controlling shareholders on the relationship between the attributes of the board and tax aggressiveness. The results of our additional regressions indicate that the effect of these attributes improves in cases of non-presence of a controlling shareholder. This implies that the role that the board of directors can play in controlling management is possibly conditioned by the presence or no of control block holders.

The major limitation of this study is that it concentrates only on Tunisian listed companies because they are the only companies the financial statements of which are publicly available in Tunisia. Although the sample is relatively small due to the problem of data availability, it appears to be satisfactory given the 15-year sampling period (i.e. from 2003 to 2016).

The results of the study may help Tunisian regulators create requirements for corporate governance (such as the size of the board of directors and audit committee or the concentration of ownership). Moreover, this study not only focuses on the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on tax aggressiveness but also provides shareholders with information on the governance mechanisms to which they should pay more attention in their desire to obtain more efficient tax results.

The findings are also useful for tax policymakers seeking to identify the circumstances that give rise to an increased risk of tax aggressiveness, as tax aggressive behavior and the resulting non-payment of taxes also have societal implications. In fact, taxes also play an important role in financing the provision of public goods, making corporation tax a matter of public concern.

The present study differs from others in the existing literature by designing a more precise measure of tax aggressiveness and examining the interaction between two internal governance mechanisms; the presence of a controlling shareholder and the attributes of the board of directors. This study also examines the impact of the control exercised by the tax authorities on the behavior of firms in terms of tax aggressiveness.

The purpose of this study is to investigate the influence of corporate governance and human governance on management commentary disclosure among Malaysian Public Listed in the Main Market, Bursa Malaysia.

The annual reports of 150 companies listed on the main market, Bursa Malaysia, for the year ended 2014, are examined to analyze the company’s management commentary disclosure using content analysis. A management commentary disclosure index was developed based on the five elements that had been established by the Malaysian Accounting Standards Board (MASB) in Practices of Management Commentary’s framework. The study considers four corporate governance mechanisms such as board composition, board size, board’s education and ownership structure. Structural equation modeling (SEM -PLS), partial least squares (PLS) and SmartPLS software were used to measure the impact of corporate governance and human capital on management commentary disclosure.

The results reveal that most of the information disclosure by Malaysian Listed companies was not presented in a complete and balanced manner and not providing an insight because they are more focused on describing the process. Besides, there was no clear link between companies’ strategies and performance measure. Consequently, the reporting is not balanced and cannot assist the shareholders in understanding the opportunities and risk associated with the business. The results, based on a structural model, indicated that only two variables, namely, board size and board independence, showed a positive and significant influence on the degree of disclosure information of management commentary. Board independence is the most significant variable that influences the degree of corporate governance and human capital on management commentary disclosure.

The study contributes to the information disclosure literature as it presents in empirical evidence proving that governance mechanism affects the management commentary disclosure of information by companies. This study also provides additional information which is expedient to other researchers since there is lack of studies in management commentary which relates the attributes of corporate and human governance mechanisms as key drivers in providing management commentary information. Importantly, this study will stimulate the interest of academics in research activities concerning the attributes of governance mechanisms and corporate and human governance on management commentary activities.

This paper aims to analyze the effects of internal and external governance mechanisms on the performance and risk taking of banks from the Euro zone before and after the 2008 financial crisis.

To avoid macroeconomic problems and shocks and because of data availability, the authors select some countries of the Euro zone, namely, France, Belgium, Germany and Finland, during the 2004-2009 period. These countries share similar macroeconomic environments (unemployment, inflation and economic growth rates). All the data relating to the banks are manually drawn from the supervising reports submitted to banks and are available on the banks’ websites and/or on that of the AMF website. The banks included in our sample are drawn from the list of European central banks on www.ecb.int

The empirical results show that banks undertake tradeoffs between different governance mechanisms to alleviate the intensity of the agency conflicts between the shareholders and managers. The findings also confirm that internal mechanisms and capital regulations are complementary and significantly impact bank performance.

This analysis can be extended through studying the interaction between bondholders’ governance and shareholders’ governance and their impact on the 2008 financial crisis.

The changes in banking governance help banks find a useful and necessary way to avoid ill-considered risks that can cause a systemic risk. Therefore, some conditions should be met so that banking governance can contribute to the economic development.

Culture and mentality of good banking governance must grow as much as possible through awareness-raising, training, promotion, recognition of performance, enhancing procedure transparency and stability of good banking governance and regulations, strengthening the national capacity to fight against corruption, and preventive mechanisms.

This paper complements previous studies, mainly those of Andres and Vallelado (2008) who examine the impact of the components of the board on banking performance and of Laeven and Levine (2009) who estimate the combined effect of regulatory and ownership structure on the risk-taking of each bank.

The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of board diversity on corporate social responsibility (CSR). The aim is twofold; does board diversity has any effect on CSR, do structural and demographic differences between one-tier and two-tier board models may impact this effect?

This paper applies a panel generalized method of moments estimator to a sample of 2,544 non-financial listed firms from 42 countries over the period of 2013–2017.

The findings reveal that board diversity leads to effective CSR. By distinguishing between diversity among boards from diversity within boards, the results display the effects of the specific variables that make up the manner and latter’s constructs within unitary and two-tier board structures. Specifically, this paper reveals that tenure, ideology and educational level (gender and nationality) predominantly appear to drive a firm’s CSR within one (two)-tier boards settings. These results remain consistent when robustness tests are ruled.

The study provides managers, investors and policymakers with knowledge about how among and within board diversity attributes favor the decision-making process around CSR. The evidence is useful for companies in setting the criteria to identify directors who can support their strategic decisions. It benefits, moreover, academics in better understanding firms’ CSR determinants and practices under different corporate board models.

Examining how different sets of board diversity affect firms’ CSR given divergences between one-tier and two-tier board structure is a useful and informative endeavor for all community actors.

Unlike prior studies that identify the limited scope of diversity, the study is the first to examine the effect of broader dimensions of board diversity on CSR under both one-tier and two-tier board settings. This paper provides a contribution to a greater understanding of the impacts underlying board models and different attributes of board diversity on CSR. This new understanding will help to improve predictions of different features of board diversity impacts on decision-making processes around organizational outcomes.

This paper aims to examine the effects of political connections (PCs) on corporate financial performance (CFP) in an emerging economy. It also investigates the moderating influence of the directors’ financial expertise (DFE) on the relationship between politically connected firms and their financial performance.

The study sample includes 304 firm-year observations from non-financial Tunisian listed firms covered over 2012–2019. Financial data are from various sources: financial statements, annual reports, official bulletins of the Tunisian Stock Exchange (TSE) and the Financial Market Council. PCs and DFE data are manually collected from the TSE and companies’ websites. Multivariate regression analyses are used to test the research hypotheses.

The results show that PCs negatively affect CFP and the DFE is a moderator variable that exacerbates this negative relationship. These results could be explained on the one hand by the fact that politicians often lack management, professionalism and know-how. On the other hand, political members on boards focus mainly on their political agendas and prioritize their interests rather than firm performance. Furthermore, board directors are more inclined towards the grabbing-hand approach to create personal linkages with these politicians and take personal benefits rather than protect the interests of minority shareholders and effectively use firm resources.

The most important limitation of the study is the small number of non-financial TSE-listed firms. Indeed, the small sample size prevents us from considering industry specificities and working in a homogeneous environment.

This study recommends that external investors pay particular attention to politically connected firms as PCs tend to weaken corporate governance. Also, it helps policymakers better assess the need to harmonize and develop corporate governance standards and practices that account for the specific conditions in Tunisia to mitigate the lobbying of political parties and supervise their abuse of power. Furthermore, the negative relationship between PCs and CFP in a poorly regulated and governed country could be used by financial institutions in their credit scoring.

The findings suggest that the nexus between politics and business draws attention to corruption post-revolution.

The originality and the relevance of this study consist in studying the moderating effect of the DFE on the association between PCs and CFP. To the best of the author’s knowledge, this study pioneers assessing the role of the DFE as a moderating variable. It also supplements prior literature by examining the combined factors, such as PCs and DFE, on CFP in an emerging market.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the link between earnings quality, Audit Committees and the Board of companies located in Jordan through the lens of enhancing corporate governance.

The real earnings management (REM) and accruals earnings management models were notably used within the panel data robust regression analysis approach; these were used against certain Audit Committee characteristics (i.e. meeting frequency, amount of Board and Committee participants [both internal and external], size) and Board of Directors.

The former characteristics were found to have a positive relationship with REM, while the latter yielded mixed results: while there was no significant identifiable relationship between Board outsiders and REM, there was a positive relationship identified between Board meetings, Board insiders and Board size and REM. In regard to this study’s limitations, the qualitative data gathered for the Board of Directors through the lens of corporate governance enhancement should have been documented with more detail; furthermore, the study was limited to the study of just one nation.

The data is limited to only a single country. More explanation for Board of Directors need qualitative understandings into corporate governance improvement. The control variables are essentially partial in a developing market context.

The different corporate governance code and guidelines improvements have varied influence on earnings quality. As predictable, boards of directors most effect on earnings quality. Improvements have included most modification to audit committees but through them slight measured effect on earnings quality.

Jordan’s corporate governance improvements expected organised corporate governance practices generally in place amongst its boards, and though invoking considerable modification to audit committees, eventually included slight modification to earnings quality. However, both improved earnings quality.

This particular research appears to be the first to consider both Audit Committee and Board of Directors characteristics in one model; indeed, in this vein, this research is also the first to explore the corporate governance enhancements that initially stemmed from there being zero code or guideline regarding its use, despite it becoming required recently. Hence, the authors can say this study has high originality.

The structure of corporate governance, as one of the important elements to be considered based on the different characteristics than other companies, such as women, expertise, tenure and management is different. But two measures for the presence of women in the board of directors and the size of director’s board are considered as corporate content characteristics that can affect corporate tax strategies in avoiding tax or taxes timely pay off. The purpose of this paper is to understand the demographic characteristics of the board of directors structure on the board and tax avoidance in Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE).

Sample includes the 505 firm-year observations from companies listed on the TSE during the years 2012–2016 and research hypothesis was tested using multivariate regression model based on panel data.

The results indicate that female presence on the board of directors reduces the corporate tax avoidance. Additionally, firms with a larger size of board of directors are associated with more tax avoidance.

The current study is almost the first study which has been conducted in Iran, so the findings of the study not only extend the extant theoretical literature concerning the tax avoidance in developing countries including emerging capital market of Iran, but also help investors, capital market regulators and accounting standard setters to make informed decisions.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the link between board of directors’ roles namely strategy, service and control roles and ambidextrous innovation. This study also aims to determine whether the independence and gender diversity of boards have mediating effects in this relationship.

On the basis of a quantitative approach, the authors conducted a survey on all Tunisian-listed firms. A partial least square method was used to analyze the quantitative data. The authors also conducted semi-structured interviews with a sample of boards’ members of the surveyed firms followed by a thematic analysis of the discourses to discuss the results.

Results revealed that ambidextrous innovation is negatively linked to board’s control role. The outcomes of this research show also that ambidextrous innovation is positively associated with board’s service role and that the gender diversity moderates positively this link. Findings do not indicate a significant relationship between board’s strategy role and ambidextrous innovation but show evidence that the relationship is negatively moderated by independent directors, while positively moderated by gender diversity.

This research sheds light on the effects of Boards’ roles on ambidextrous innovation and the moderating effect of board’s gender diversity and independence as well. This paper addresses the gap in the literature as this thematic has not been studied, offering key insights with regard to corporate governance of companies looking to achieve ambidextrous innovation.