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COVID-19 has forced Big 4 firms to challenge existing management control arrangements and adapt their ways of working. Yet, we know little about how management control might be enacted in the future of the sustainable workplace. The objective of the study is to examine the patterns of management control change in the Big 4 accounting firms during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Adopting an exploratory qualitative research design, the authors draw on 42 interviews with directors and associates in the Big 4 professional services firms.

The findings reveal two pathways of management control change including alignment and displacement. The authors found that relatively minor adaptions to action and result controls were relied upon to respond to substantial cultural and personnel control changes.

The contributions are threefold: the authors take a temporal perspective to (1) unpack the changes to management control arrangements; (2) theorise the findings by developing a three-dimensional taxonomy of change pathways encompassing pace, scope and longevity of management control change and (3) contextualise management control arrangements in a hybrid work setting.

1. COVID-19 has forced Big 4 firms to challenge existing management control arrangements.

2. Literature has focused on traditional, onsite work settings and largely ignored change pathways.

3. The authors take a temporal perspective to unpack changes to management control arrangements.

4. Big 4 firms adapted to hybrid work with substantial changes to personnel and cultural controls.

5. The authors theorise the findings by developing a three-dimensional taxonomy of change pathways.

COVID-19 has forced Big 4 firms to challenge existing management control arrangements.

Literature has focused on traditional, onsite work settings and largely ignored change pathways.

The authors take a temporal perspective to unpack changes to management control arrangements.

Big 4 firms adapted to hybrid work with substantial changes to personnel and cultural controls.

The authors theorise the findings by developing a three-dimensional taxonomy of change pathways.

This rich descriptive study examines auditors' client risk assessment (i.e. “key audit matters”/critical audit matters) disclosures in expanded audit reports of 328 Financial Times Stock Exchange (FTSE) 350 companies. The study compares auditor-identified client risks with corporate risk disclosures identified in audit committee reports, in terms of number and type of risks. The research also compares variation in auditor-identified client risks between individual Big 4 audit firms. In addition, the study examines auditor ranking of their client risks disclosed.

The study manually content analyses disclosures in audit reports and audit committee reports of a sample of 328 FTSE-350 companies with 2015 year-ends.

Audit committees identify more risks than auditors (23% more risks). However, auditor-identified client risks and audit-committee-identified risks are similar (80% similar), as are auditor-identified client risks between the individual Big 4 audit firms. Only ten (3%) audit reports rank the importance of auditor-identified client risks.

Sample is restricted to one year, one jurisdiction, large-listed companies and companies audited by Big 4 auditors.

The study provides important insights for regulators, auditors and users of financial statements by identifying influences on disclosure of auditor-identified client risks.

The paper mobilises institutional theory to interpret the findings. The findings suggest that auditor-identified client risks in expanded audit reports may demonstrate mimetic behaviour in terms of similarity with audit-committee-identified risks and similarity between individual Big 4 audit firms. The study provides important insights for regulators, auditors and users of financial statements by identifying influences on disclosure of auditor-identified client risks.

The purpose of this paper is to accentuate whether audit quality or other variables matter for the performance of companies in Greece.

This study examines the effect of audit quality on firm performance using data of 75 companies listed in the Athens Exchange in Greece and covering the period 2018–2021. Panel data analysis is applied. The independent variables are audit quality, the size of firms, their age, leverage, liquidity and efficiency ratios. Seven alternative measures of performance are used, including, among others, return on assets and return on equity. Stock returns and risks are used too.

The results provide evidence of a positive relationship between financial performance and audit quality. The opposite is the case for stock returns and risk. On the other explanatory variables, age has a clearly negative relationship with financial performance. The opposite is the case for liquidity and efficiency. The size factor also has some sort of a positive correlation with financial performance, whereas the opposite correlation concerns the leverage ratio.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study to examine the relationship between audit quality and firm performance with data from Greece.

This study aims to explore the use, effectiveness, motives and obstacles of analytical procedures (APs) used by auditors in Palestine, a context characterised by a pool of small and medium enterprises (SMEs), a limited skill set, poor quality of data, political uncertainty and a community-based business culture.

The study considers the audit market in Palestine using a sequential mixed-methods approach combining a questionnaire survey and a series of in-depth interviews. A total of 129 Big-4 and non-Big-4 auditors were surveyed.

The use of APs is driven by the auditor size (Big-4 vs non-Big-4) and the client size (large vs SMEs). Even though the use of APs has increased over the past decade, audit objectives, know-how, and personal, family and social connections among auditors and clients influence the quality of the audit process.

Small firms take advantage of the lack of audit governance in Palestine. Our findings suggest that the regulators should help bridge the knowledge-sharing programmes between the small and large audit firms to help improve audit quality.

Studies on audit quality, particularly using APs, in the context of politically unstable cases such as Palestine are limited. The study has implications for the use of APs in the case of SMEs to prepare for the technological revolution that will modernise audit procedures and quality soon.

This article investigated whether the executives' compensation and corporate governance attributes are aligned with stakeholders' demands for higher corporate voluntary disclosures. Moreover, the study also examined the moderating role of the auditor's reputation in the direction of association among executive compensation, corporate governance attributes, and voluntary disclosures.

The study used a sample of S&P BSE index constituents' 90 Indian firms for 2017–2019. The voluntary disclosure scores were fetched from the India Disclosure Index Report published by FTI Consulting. This analysis was carried out in two parts by applying four panel-data regression models in the agency and signalling theories framework. First, the study examined the association between executive compensation, board strength, composition, gender diversity, and voluntary disclosures. Second, the article investigated the moderating role of the “Big 4” in the direction of association among executive compensation, corporate governance attributes, and voluntary disclosures.

The willingness of executives to share private information with stakeholders depends on the compensation they receive from their employer. The higher compensation paid to executives leads to a higher “tone from the top,” which is better aligned with stakeholder interests. Further, the research also found that bigger board sizes, a higher proportion of independent and woman directors (indicators of good governance), and an auditor's reputation are associated with increased voluntary disclosure.

The findings showed that the executives' compensation and corporate governance attributes are aligned with stakeholders' demand for higher voluntary information from firms. Moreover, the study also found that the “Big 4” play a moderating role in this direction. The choice of a reputed auditor indicates the firms' long-term positive future perspectives, which strengthens investor confidence in the financial market.

The study suggests that fair executive compensation can address the agency problem.

This research furnishes managers and different stakeholders with significant implications of executives' compensation, corporate governance, and auditor's reputation in the best interests of a firm through reducing potential risks of information asymmetry.

From an agency perspective, the authors investigate whether family ownership and control configurations are systematically associated with a firm's choice of auditor and audit fees. Agency theory is an economic theory that purposes the existence of a contract between two parties, principals and agents. Auditor choice and audit fees by family firms provide interesting insights given the unique nature of the agency problems faced by such firms.

The authors employ Big-4 auditors (PWC, KPMG, E&Y and Deloitte) as a proxy for high quality auditor (Big N) for the auditor choice model. For the audit fee model, the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of audit fees (LnAF). The authors use two measures for family firm as explanatory variables: (1) a dummy variable (FAM_Control), which equals one if the firm is classified as a family firm and (2) FAM_Ownership, which is an indicator variable with a value of one if a firm has family members who hold CEO position, occupy board seats, or hold at least 10% of the firm's equity. Data of Chinese listed firms from 2011 to 2021 are used. The authors adopt the Heckman (1979) two-stage model to mitigate the potential endogeneity issue involved in the selection of Big-N auditors.

The findings suggest that compared with non-family firms, Chinese family firms have a less tendency to employ Big-4 auditors due to less severe agency problems between owners and managers. Additionally, Chinese family firms sustain higher audit fees than non-family firms. Similar to the prior literature, however, Chinese family firms audited by Big-4 auditors incur lower audit fees than family firms audited by non-Big-4 auditors in this study. In contrast to young-family firms, old-family firms are less likely to pick top-tier auditors and sustain lower audit fees. Consistent and robust results are found from endogeneity tests and sensitivity analyses.

The empirical evidence provides a unique insight, for accounting practitioners, policymakers, family owners and other capital market participants concerning the diverse effects of various family ownership and control features on selecting high-quality auditors and audit fees. This study advances the understanding, showing that a lower demand for audit quality occurs in Chinese family firms as they encounter less severe Type I agency problems. However, the more severe Type II agency problems in Chinese family firms sustain higher audit fees due to higher audit risk and greater audit effort.

This study aims to investigate whether auditors compromise their independence for economically important clients in family business settings.

The authors empirically examine the research question based on China for the years 2011 to 2020. The dependent variable is the auditors’ propensity to issue modified audit opinions, which is a proxy for auditor independence. The authors use relative client audit fees as a proxy for client importance. To address endogeneity issues in the selection of family firms, the authors use the two-stage least squares regression model and, subsequently, the propensity score matching and Hausman firm fixed effect modeling.

This study reveals that the propensity to issue modified audit opinions is positively correlated with client importance. Big-N auditors are more likely to issue modified audit opinions for their economically important family firm clients, whereas such evidence is not found for non-Big-N auditors. Results are consistent and robust to endogeneity test and sensitivity analysis.

This study enriches the literature on auditor independence and the effect of family firms’ ownership structure factors on audit reporting behavior for their economically important clients. Findings may prove useful for managers and practitioners interested in family business.

This study aims to investigate why and how shared service centres (SSCs) are implemented as well as how they affect audit firm practice and audit quality.

In this qualitative study guided by the theoretical framework of institutional theory, the authors conducted 25 semi-structured interviews in seven European countries, including 16 interviews with audit partners from Big 4 firms, 6 with audit team members, 2 with interviewees from second-tier audit firms and 1 with a member of an oversight body.

The authors show that the central rationale for audit firms to implement SSCs is economic rather than external legitimacy. The authors find that SSC implementation has substantial effects on audit practices, particularly those related to standardisation, coordination and monitoring activities. The authors also highlight the potential impacts on audit quality.

By exploring the motivation for and effects of SSC implementation amongst audit firms, the authors offer insights into the best practices related to subsequent change processes and audit quality.

Exploiting a unique measure of hostile takeover exposure principally based on the staggered adoption of state legislations, the authors investigate how external audit quality is influenced by the discipline of the takeover market. External auditors and the takeover market both function as important instruments of external corporate governance.

The authors execute a standard regression analysis and run a variety of robustness checks to minimize endogeneity, namely, propensity score matching (PSM), entropy balancing, an instrumental-variable analysis, Generalized method of moment (GMM) dynamic panel data analysis and Lewbel's (2012) heteroscedastic identification.

The authors’ immense sample spans half a century, encompassing nearly 180,000 observations and 17 takeover-related state legislations, one of the largest samples in the literature in this area. The authors’ results suggest that firms with more takeover exposure are significantly less likely to use Big N auditors. Therefore, a more active takeover market results in poorer external audit quality, corroborating the substitution hypothesis. The discipline of the takeover market substitutes for the necessity for a high-quality external auditor. Specifically, a rise in takeover susceptibility by one standard deviation lowers the probability of using a Big N auditor by 4.29%.

The authors’ study is the first to examine the effect of the takeover over market on audit quality using a novel measure of hostile takeover susceptibility mainly based on the staggered implementation of state legislation. Because the enactment of state legislation is beyond the control of any firm individually, it is plausibly exogenous. The authors’ results therefore probably reflect a causal influence rather than merely a correlation.

This study seeks to understand how accountant stereotypes have been constructed and reconstructed at the macro-national and the structural level in Chinese society.

This qualitative investigation into China's social construction of accountant stereotypes employs Becker's (1963) labelling theory. Viewing stereotyping as a socially constructed practice, this study draws on a post-positivistic, reflexive epistemology in conducting 28 semi-structured interviews with accountants and related actors.

Chinese accountant stereotypes are constructed and reconstructed according to the rules created and enforced in different cultural-political periods. The accountant stereotypes constructed during the ancient Confucian period (500 BC – 1948) were replaced during 1949 and 2012 when the political focus shifted towards propagating socialism and later promoting economic growth. They also show how Confucian stereotypes of accountants resurfaced in 2013 but were reconstructed by the central government's cultural confidence policy of propagating Confucianism.

Empirically, prior literature has focused on what the accountant stereotype is and how accountants respond to such stereotypes, but it has neglected the ways in which these accountant stereotypes are politically and culturally constructed, diffused and legitimated. This paper fills in the gap by understanding the social practice of accountant stereotyping in a previously unexplored political-cultural context, namely Chinese society. In theoretical terms, by offering the first use of Becker's (1963) labelling theory in the accounting literature, it furthermore enhances our understanding of how accountants' identities and social standing are shaped by social rules.