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The recent 2008–2009 financial crisis has led international financial authorities to review the existing regulation; the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has been thus induced to review the pillars of the Basel Accord (Basel II) in order to strengthen the risk coverage of capital framework (Basel 2.5 and III). These reforms will help to raise capital requirements for the trading book, which represents a major source of losses for internationally financial institutions, especially during crisis periods. In particular, the Committee has introduced a Stressed Value-at-Risk (SVaR) capital requirement, as a new methodology to evaluate market risk.

This chapter aims to shed some lights on the issues major banks have to face when calculating SVaR in the context of emerging markets, pointing out the differences in adopting an estimation model with respect to another one. Our results show a considerable increase in capital requirements especially when new rules are applied to financial markets with high-risk parameters, such as emerging markets are. The increased cost due to higher capital requirements could be a disincentive to investment in markets with higher risk profiles than the developed markets, taking also into account that diversification benefits deriving from investing in emerging economies have shown a decrease over time. The reduction of institutional investors can thus represent a brake on the process of innovation and evolution of emerging markets.

To raise the quality of regulatory capital, Basel III capital rules recognize unrealized gains and losses on all available-for-sale (AFS) securities in Common Equity Tier 1 Capital (CET1). However, by examining the correlations between U.S. GDP growth rate, interest rates and regulatory capital ratios computed using Basel III regulatory capital definition for six U.S. global systemically important banks (G-SIBs) since 2007, this chapter finds that Basel III regulatory capital will enhance the pro-cyclicality of Basel III leverage ratio and Tier 1 capital ratio and their sensitivity to long-term interest rates. Therefore, Basel III capital standards may have significant implications for bank supervision and bank capital risk management in the near future. As banks will hold more high-quality liquid assets (HQLAs) as required by Basel III Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR), the weight of unrealized gains and losses arising from fair value accounting will increase in Basel III Tier 1 capital base, the consequent increase of pro-cyclicality in a bank’s regulatory capital ratios may distort the true picture of bank capital adequacy. If an expected loss approach (EL) is used as the provisioning model, such capital risk may be increased further. Moreover, as U.S. monetary policy has started tapering quantitative easing, long-term interest rates will increase inevitably. This may increase the negative impact of unrealized gains and losses on AFS securities on bank capital. As a result, it may be difficult for banks to maintain appropriate capital ratios to meet regulatory requirements and support business activities.

The 1988 Basel Accord and the proposed revisions to the Accord represent some of the most significant international regulations impacting the financial decisions of firms, in this case, financial services firms, in recent years. The revisions to the Accord incorporate operational risk into the capital, supervisory and market requirements. In our review of the issues in this area, we provide insight into the workings of an important international regulation. We also present suggestions for further research in this area that will become feasible when data on the impact of the new regulations become available after the proposed implementation in 2006.

Integrating interdisciplinary studies with Human Capital Management Accounting (HCMA) refers to the dynamics of organized interdisciplinary action that are transversal or cross-cutting. This approach requires the mastery of a certain number of technical skills and disciplines, as well as the capacity to use them in a process to solve problems of financial performance. This is accomplished through the specific interaction tasks that are performed by each management function and operational unit, which act in real time with others, in the same direction as an organizational team, using a selected risk appetite threshold base.

Putting business fields side by side, (i.e., business disciplines silos, as is normally the case in MBA programs), is not enough to create the transversal interaction dynamic needed for firms to achieve expected financial performance goals. As a result, few graduates today have the cross-cutting or vertical skills required to act, in real time, from their workstation in accordance with the pyramid shape of the organization chart in order to create value.

This chapter presents the results of the interface established by a faculty member in the Accounting Department of the University of San Francisco with a “seasoned leader in the FinTech industry.” It proposes a single portal for employers and HRMs to which the continuing education services of professional training associations, executive education departments of colleges, and MBA schools and universities, can connect to issue the HCMA certificate supplementing their training offerings focused on “Leadership Development”.

The new Basel Accord (known as Basel II) attempts to introduce more risk-sensitive capital requirements. We propose a multiperiod deposit insurance pricing model that incorporates specific regulatory capital requirements and the possibility of capital forbearance and moral hazard. We estimate the cost of deposit insurance under alternative regulation regimes based on the building block approach of the 1988 Basel Accord (known as Basel I) and internal model-based (IMB) capital regulation. In contrast to the building block of Basel I, Basel II's IMB capital regulation links more closely the capital requirement to a bank's actual risk. We develop a multiperiod pricing model while incorporating the effects of capital forbearance and moral hazard. The fairly-priced premium rates are computed by assuming that a bank's asset value follows a GARCH process. In contrast to previous studies based on the building block capital standard, we find that forbearance and the potential moral hazard behavior will not increase the cost of deposit insurance in the scheme of Basel II's IMB capital regulation.