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A persistent and increasing pattern in cash holdings was notable in the aggregate behaviour of Indian corporations around the period from 2007–2008 to 2012–2013. Extant literature suggests that agency conflicts and financing frictions are important determinants of cash holdings. In this chapter the author aims to shed light on the role of corporate governance (CG) in the determination of cash holdings and examined how ownership structure, board and audit-related attributes (used as proxies for the nature of CG) impact cash holdings in the context of an emerging economy, like India. The author employed four different measures of cash and liquidity and 24 structural indicators of CG. Using principal component analysis, the author offers an exploratory inquiry into the dimensions of CG. Thereafter, multiple regression was used to delve into the association between cash holdings (the dependent variable) and CG. Using a sample of 58 top-listed companies the results revealed that the quality of firm-level CG is important in deciding corporate cash holdings. The author reported that firms with stronger CG tend to reduce cash balances and have higher capital expenditures, while in firms with entrenched managers having high cash reserves invest more in current assets. Firms also hold cash for financial flexibility and to take advantage of strategic opportunities as they present themselves. Parallel to this point is the fact that larger balances help firms to avoid uncertainty and hedge themselves against the difficulty of accessing external funds.

The results of recent research suggest that certain provisions of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) may have been less successful than intended (e.g., Abbott, Parker, & Peters, 2009). Based on two different descriptions of economic bonding between auditors and their clients, we propose an explanation of why this might be so by showing that the effect of SOX mandates, and regulation in general, aimed at enhancing auditor independence is dependent on whether shareholders or managers monitor the auditor. The results of prior empirical studies are examined in context of the framework we describe, and suggestions for future research on this important topic are outlined.

Independence is the cornerstone of the auditing profession. Even so, it is often assumed that acquiescing to the audit client when a disagreement occurs is more beneficial to the auditor-client relationship than asserting one’s independence (e.g., see Wang & Tuttle, 2009). We look more closely at the issue in the context of auditor-client management disagreements as recalled by experienced auditors.

We find that for most disagreements in which the auditor did not make any concession at all, the auditor-client relationship was either unaffected or strengthened. We find that a client’s use of pressure tactics did not appear to influence whether or not the auditor made a concession, but that a client’s use of pressure tactics, was associated with damage to the auditor-client relationship. The importance of the issue causing a disagreement was positively associated with the likelihood of the auditor staying with his/her initial position.

This case examines critical ethical accounting practice issues surrounding a request for proposal for audit services at Aviary Corporation based on a real Securities and Exchange Commission enforcement action. Audit and tax partners at Western Accounting Firm, a large international public accounting firm, used confidential information obtained from the company’s Chief Audit Officer to modify their proposal for audit services. In response to their actions, the Securities and Exchange Commission fined the auditing firm, the partners, and the Chief Audit Executive. The authors used publicly available information and adopted fictitious names to develop a teaching case that instructors can implement in a variety of accounting and ethics classes to increase students’ understanding of professional codes of conduct and independence guidance.

Mandatory auditor firm rotation (mandatory rotation) has been a controversial issue in the United States for many decades. Mandatory rotation has been considered at various times as a means of improving auditor independence. For example, in the United States, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) has considered mandatory rotation as a solution to the independence problem (PCAOB, 2011) and the European Parliament approved legislation that will require mandatory rotation in the near future (Council of European Union, 2014). The concept of implementing a mandatory rotation policy has been encouraged by some constituents of audited financial statements and rejected by other constituents of audited financial statements. Although there are apparent pros and cons of such a policy, the developmental process of such a policy in this country has not necessarily been an open-democratic, objective process. Universal mandatory rotation may or may not be the ideal solution; however, an open-democratic, objective process is needed to facilitate the development of a solution that considers the needs of all major stakeholders of audited financial statements – not simply accounting firms and public companies, but also investors. The purpose of this paper is to critically examine key issues relating to mandatory rotation and to encourage and stimulate future research and ongoing dialogue regarding this issue, in spite of efforts by certain constituents to silence the issue. This paper provides an overview of the various reasons, including practical, theoretical, political, and self-motivated reasons, why a mandatory rotation policy has not been implemented in the United States in order to address the potential conflict of interest between the auditor and client. This paper will also discuss how some deliberations of mandatory rotation have been flawed. The paper concludes with a summary of key issues along with two approaches for regulators, policy makers, and academics to consider as ways to improve the process and address auditor independence. The authors are not advocating for any specific solution; however, we are advocating for a more objective, unified approach and for the dialogue regarding auditor rotation to continue.

This research examines the effect of auditors’ personal debt on their audit decision making. We developed two different background scenarios that vary the level of the auditor’s personal debt. While one scenario indicated that the partner lived a modest lifestyle and was relatively free of debt, the other indicated that the partner lived an expensive lifestyle and had considerable personal debt. Our data indicate that auditors receiving the higher personal indebtedness scenario were more likely to believe that the auditor in the case study would sign-off on the audit without doing any additional work. We also found that the propensity to believe that the auditor in the case study would sign-off on the audit without doing any additional work decreased as the participants’ rank within the firm increased. Our research documents that a partner’s level of indebtedness could influence the participant’s audit decisions.

The typical unqualified audit report of publicly traded firms in the United States indicates the nature of the audit and an opinion that the firm’s financial statements fairly present the financial position and the results of operations of the audited company. Accordingly, some users of the financial statements, including investors, do not consider the unqualified opinion to be very useful in providing other informational value about the particular audit. In this paper, the authors examined the views of two stakeholders in the US financial reporting system, auditors in large public accounting firms and Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) in the Fortune 1000. The authors elicited their perceptions involving a Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) proposed auditing standard commonly referred to as “the other information standard.” This standard, if adopted, would require the auditor to evaluate information other than the audited financial statements and the related audit report for (1) a material inconsistency, (2) a material misstatement of fact, or (3) both, and if they exist, communicate them in the auditor’s report. The authors developed their research instrument based upon its perceived potential effects on the audit if adopted, some of which were referenced in the exposure draft of the proposed standard (PCAOB, 2013). They found that a majority of each groups believed, among other effects, that the proposed standard would increase audit costs, subject both the auditor and the reporting firm to increased litigation risk, and that its implementation costs by affected firms would exceed any benefits to financial statement users created by the standard.