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This chapter explores how next-generation women owners participate and contribute to their families’ single-family offices (SFOs). To examine this issue, we analyze 12 SFOs from Europe, North America, Latin America and Asia Pacific.

Our results show that daughters actively participate in philanthropic efforts, community-based entrepreneurship projects and family council meetings. Yet, they are rarely involved in the SFO investment committees or board of directors. Moreover, female next gens are less likely to propose new business ventures to the family council or SFO board of directors. Apparently, daughters are not as encouraged as sons to create their own for-profit start-up. Family inclusive values and culture, parental influence and/or sibling’s encouragement, the presence of female role models, and the existence of a gender-diverse SFO top management team positively influence the way women owners relate to and connect into the SFO.

We realize, too, that when women owners are not involved in the family council, less family-related activities are promoted. Occasional family-related activities are associated with the family council limited operation and null vision of intergenerational wealth transfer. Further findings are grouped in five major themes: (1) Motivation to set up the SFO, (2) SFO activities, (3) New business ventures, (4) SFO governance structures and (5) SFO strategy and vision. Based on the SFO strategy, vision and activities, we identified four types of SFOs: The SFO as a Legacy School, as an Entrepreneurship School, as a Community School, and as a Decorative-Investment Arm.

The following is an introductory profile of the fastest growing firms over the three-year period of the study listed by corporate reputation ranking order. The business activities in which the firms are engaged are outlined to provide background information for the reader.

Perhaps the most significant development in the global business arena in the post-war period has been the emergence of the Asia-Pacific rim countries as a significant economic force.

As components of society, social classes contain individuals who are carriers of productive relationships. In the era of global capitalism, chains of accumulation are functionally integrating across borders and regions – uniquely altering the formation of productive relationships. How can we understand class relations in the global era, and in the context of regions and countries in Oceania and Asia? How do transnational capitalist-class fractions, new middle strata, and labor undergird globalization? How have state apparatuses and other institutions in this part of the world become entwined with new transnational processes? To begin to consider these questions, this paper provides an overview and summary of studies on transnational class relations and the associated political economic changes occurring across areas of Asia and Oceania.

In large parts of the world, income inequality has been rising in recent decades. Other regions have experienced declining trends in income inequality. This raises the question of which mechanisms underlie contrasting observed trends in income inequality around the globe. To address this research question in an empirical analysis at the aggregate level, we examine a global sample of 73 countries between 1981 and 2010, studying a broad set of drivers to investigate their interaction and influence on income inequality. Within this broad approach, we are interested in the heterogeneity of income inequality determinants across world regions and along the income distribution. Our findings indicate the existence of a small set of systematic drivers across the global sample of countries. Declining labour income shares and increasing imports from high-income countries significantly contribute to increasing income inequality, while taxation and imports from low-income countries exert countervailing effects. Our study reveals the region-specific impacts of technological change, financial globalisation, domestic financial deepening and public social spending. Most importantly, we do not find systematic evidence of education’s equalising effect across high- and low-income countries. Our results are largely robust to changing the underlying sources of income Ginis, but looking at different segments of income distribution reveals heterogeneous effects.