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Although manufacturer-initiated rewards are widely used to secure distributors’ compliance, the spillover effect on unrewarded distributors (i.e. observers) in the same distribution channel is under-researched. Using insights from social learning theory, this paper aims to investigate how manufacturer-initiated rewards affect observers’ expectation of reward and shape observers’ compliance toward the manufacturer. Furthermore, this paper explores how such effects are contingent upon distributor relationship features.

To test the hypotheses, hierarchical multiple regression and bootstrapping analyses were performed using survey data from 280 Chinese distributors.

The magnitude of a manufacturer-initiated reward to a distributor stimulates expectation of reward among observers, which enhances compliance; observers’ expectation of reward mediates the impact of reward magnitude on compliance. Moreover, network centrality (of the rewarded peer) negatively moderates the positive impact of reward magnitude on observers’ expectation of reward, whereas observers’ dependence (on the manufacturer) positively moderates this dynamic.

Manufacturers should pay attention to the spillover effects of rewards. Overall, they should use rewards of appropriate magnitude to show willingness to recognize outstanding distributors. This will inspire unrewarded distributors, which will then be more compliant. Furthermore, manufacturers should know that specific types of distributor relationship features may significantly vary the spillover effects.

This study illuminates the spillover effects of manufacturer-initiated reward by opening the “black box” of the link between reward magnitude and observers’ compliance and by specifying the effects’ boundary conditions.