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On April 4, 2007, Don Imus, one of the company&s most popular talk show personalities made comments on the air regarding the Rutgers women&s basketball team. According to the transcription from Media Matters for America, Imus said, “ That&s some nappy-headed hos there. I&m gonna tell you that now, man, that&s some … woo. And the girls from Tennessee, they all look cute, you know, so, like … kinda like … I don&t know.” At first, the comments did not seem out of the ordinary for one of radio&s “shock jocks.” However, as the public reaction grew, the situation changed considerably. Under pressure from the public, Moonves reluctantly suspended Imus. But it was too little too late. By the end of the day on April 11, analysts estimated that $2.5 million in advertising revenue was lost. On April 12, Moonves terminated Don Imus& contract.

After Moonves fired Imus, there was still a lot to consider. He really wanted a way for the company to meet the demands of the company&s stakeholders. In addition, he wanted to avoid any more distractions from the firm&s normal day-to-day operations.

Gary Parr, deputy chairman of Lazard Freres & Co. and Kellogg class of 1980, could not believe his ears. “You can't mean that,” he said, reacting to the lowered bid given by Doug Braunstein, JP Morgan head of investment banking, for Parr's client, legendary investment bank Bear Stearns. Less than eighteen months after trading at an all-time high of $172.61 a share, Bear now had little choice but to accept Morgan's humiliating $2-per-share, Federal Reserve-sanctioned bailout offer. “I'll have to get back to you.” Hanging up the phone, Parr leaned back and gave an exhausted sigh. Rumors had swirled around Bear ever since two of its hedge funds imploded as a result of the subprime housing crisis, but time and again, the scrappy Bear appeared to have weathered the storm. Parr's efforts to find a capital infusion for the bank had resulted in lengthy discussions and marathon due diligence sessions, but one after another, potential investors had backed away, scared off in part by Bear's sizable mortgage holdings at a time when every bank on Wall Street was reducing its positions and taking massive write-downs in the asset class. In the past week, those rumors had reached a fever pitch, with financial analysts openly questioning Bear's ability to continue operations and its clients running for the exits. Now Sunday afternoon, it had already been a long weekend, and it would almost certainly be a long night, as the Fed-backed bailout of Bear would require onerous negotiations before Monday's market open. By morning, the eighty-five-year-old investment bank, which had survived the Great Depression, the savings and loan crisis, and the dot-com implosion, would cease to exist as an independent firm. Pausing briefly before calling CEO Alan Schwartz and the rest of Bear's board, Parr allowed himself a moment of reflection. How had it all happened?

An analysis of the fall of Bear Stearns facilitates an understanding of the difficulties affecting the entire investment banking industry: high leverage, overreliance on short-term financing, excessive risk taking on proprietary trading and asset management desks, and myopic senior management all contributed to the massive losses and loss of confidence. The impact on the global economy was of epic proportions.