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The purpose of this chapter is to explore whether and how angel investors’ emotions unfold in the investment opportunity evaluation process as they interact with the social environment. Complementing recent research that has emphasized the financial calculations, we add angel investors’ own emotional arousal to the list of tools that may help them to rate investment opportunities.

Drawing on semi-structured qualitative interviews, we develop a phenomenological analysis of the investment opportunity evaluation process at the level of angel investors’ lived experience.

Our findings indicate that when angel investors use their emotional arousal in evaluating investment criteria, they engage in a developmental process characterized by three elements: subjective validation, social validation, and investment decision.

We illuminate how discrete emotions can complement rational considerations in the opportunity evaluation journey. Capturing the nature of emotion as action oriented, embodied, socially situated, and distributed, we embrace its adaptive socially situated dynamics.

Taking a step toward better understanding of the soft aspects in the relationship development that leads to investments, we hope this study will help not only those entrepreneurs who need funding but also those policymakers who design new incentives that improve the flow of investment into promising new ventures.

We demonstrate how angel investors’ emotions can complement their rational considerations in the investment opportunity evaluation process as they interact with the social environment. Identifying boundary values for the conditions that are necessary and sufficient to advance in the process, we have demonstrated how emotion can serve as a driving or restraining force not only during subjective validation but also during social validation.

Private company investors operate in unique environments. Seed equity investors, which generally include venture capitalists and angel investors, often have the particularly unusual role of becoming involved in the oversight of the investee company. This continuing involvement with the investee firm introduces conflicting interests: the desire to maximize the profit from the investment, but also the desire to maintain a positive relationship with the entrepreneur(s) (consistent with the theory of upper echelons/strategic management). We discuss in detail this unusual investment context and the role that accounting disclosures can have in this environment. We predict that accounting disclosures can influence the tradeoff between the profit motive and the relationship motive. Using 64 experienced angel investors as participants in a realistic experimental setting, we find that disclosures indicating conservatively biased accounting choice and lower account risk (variance) lead to angels increasing the valuation of the target firm and forgoing higher profits. Increasing the valuation serves to foster the relationship with the entrepreneur(s). Our findings have implications for entrepreneurs making choices about discretionary disclosures and for standard setters; we also inform theory related to overcoming anchoring.